NA528/36693 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1834  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure - Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 210 & 213 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sections 31, 33 & 42A - Cognizance - Power of Special Court - Whether Special Judge under POCSO Act can summon an accused not charge- sheeted on the basis of victim's statement under Section 183 BNSS - Held, Special Court derives cognizance power exclusively from Section 33 POCSO Act; it may take cognizance only upon complaint or police report, not upon its own "knowledge" - Section 210 BNSS inapplicable in view of Section 42A POCSO Act - Summoning order based on victim's statement under Section 183 BNSS unsustainable - Matter remanded for fresh order. (Paras 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9) HELD: After hearing the rival submissions extended by learned counsel for the parties, one thing is crystal clear that there is slight difference between the normal procedure available under BNSS, 2023 as well as in comparison to the procedure available under POCSO Act, 2012. However, it is mentioned under Section 31 of Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 that application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceeding before a Special Court shall be applicable, is related to the procedure for commencement of trial so far as regarding the procedure for taking cognizance of offence, it is specifically mentioned under Section 33 of POCSO Act, 2012 and so far as regarding power vest with Section 33 of POCSO Act, 2012 is concerned, it deals with Section 42(A) of POCSO Act, 2012 wherein, it is specifically mentioned that the provision of this Act shall be in addition and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force and in case of any inconsistency the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provision of any such law to the extent of inconsistency. In the strict consonance of Section 42(A), it is Section 33 of POCSO Act, 2012 which will be applicable before the learned Session Court for taking cognizance of offence, if the same has been taken in pursuance to the certain offences made out in pursuance to Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012. (Para 7) In view of aforementioned facts and circumstances, impugned cognizance/ summoning order dated 07.10.2024 is not sustainable in the eye of law since the same has been passed not in pursuance to the police report or the complaint which attracted the offence carried out by the applicant whereas the same has been passed in pursuance to the statement record by the victim under Section 183 BNSS, 2023. (Para 8) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Sitam @ Prince Minor Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Srivastava

English hearing

CRLA/2275/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 19-06-2025 (2025) 6 ILRA 64  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 180 & 183 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Sections â?? 3(2)(V) & 14-A(2) - Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 69, 89, 115(2), 333, 352, 351(2) & 351(3) - Criminal Appeal - filed u/s 14-A(2) of SC/ST Act, - for quashing the impugned order - whereby court below rejected Bail Application - FIR - offence of rape and prepared obscene video - alleged that accused appellant under the pretext of false promise of marriage sexually exploited the victim - arrest - Statement recorded under section 180 and 183 of BNSS - Bail Application - Rejected - pleas taken in defence that, victim is major lady, and she was consenting party ?? court finds that, there is no video on record, - admittedly, victim lady is major lady and she was in a consensual relationship, - no previous criminal history - held, impugned order by which bail application of the applicant has been dismissed by the court concerned is illegal and is liable to be set aside and appellant is entitled to be released on bail - accordingly, instant appeal stands allowed - Appellant be released on bail with strict conditions to prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, allowing the prosecution to seek cancellation if any condition is breached. (Para - 10, 11, 12, 13) Application Allowed. (E-11)

Title: Anshu Kushwaha Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Sameer Jain

English hearing

CRLA/2045 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 20-06-2025 (2025) 6 ILRA 62  

HEADNOTE hearing

Bail -Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-Criminal appeal u/s 14-A(2)-initially FIR lodged u/s 103 BNS and other sections against the appellant and another -with regard to murder of the wife of the o.p. no.2- but subsequently the case was converted u/s 108 BNS-abatement to suicide-if appellant was having illicit relationship with the deceased -then it cannot be said that due to his abetment she committed suicide-Bail granted. Appeal allowed. (E-9)

Title: Kamal Bharbhuja Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Sameer Jain

English hearing

NA528/526/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 03-06-2025 (2025) 6 ILRA 58  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 115(2), 352, 351(2), 118(1) & 109(1) - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 174 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - NCR was lodged on 28.11.2024 under various Sections of BNS for incident that occurred on same day - Subsequently, medical report revealed head injury caused by sharp-edged weapon - Based on this, another Section 118(1), BNS, being cognizable and non-bailable was added and NCR was converted into FIR - Thereafter chargesheet submitted - After filing of charge sheet, Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons, which is under challenge - Petitioners had earlier filed writ petitions but withdrew them on 02.05.2025 without liberty to raise same grounds again - Those grounds are no longer available - Since NCR was converted into FIR due to addition of cognizable offence based on medical report, police was legally empowered to investigate - Considering overall facts, no illegality is found in proceedings - Application lacks merit, dismissed. (Para 6, 12, 15) Application dismissed. (E-13)

Title: Vinay & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar

English hearing

A482/491/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 13-06-2025 (2025) 6 ILRA 2  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 323, 504, 506, 325 & 308 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319 - Impugned summoning order is based on St.ments of injured witnesses (PW-1), (PW-2)/complainant and witness of fact (PW-3), who levelled specific allegations against applicant, also found in NCR - Challenge to order is based on ground that earlier application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was dismissed as withdrawn without Court's permission to file a fresh one - It is contended that subsequent application under same Section was not maintainable - Testimony of injured witnesses holds high evidentiary value and should not be lightly discarded - At this stage, trial court need not assess evidence on merits, that is to be done during trial - First application was withdrawn for bona fide reasons, as it was informed that named person, had already passed away - Subsequently, second application was filed - Judgment in Baccha Lal @ Vijay Singh (infra) is per incuriam and not binding, liable to be disregarded - No illegality in impugned order. (Para 4, 6, 24 to 26) Application dismissed. (E-13)

Title: Deepak Singh @ Subham Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Lavania

English hearing

CRLR/4171 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 12-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1947  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 125 - Maintenance to wife - Compliance of Supreme Court directions - Filing of affidavit of assets and liabilities - Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 - Aditi @ Mithi v. Jitesh Sharma, Criminal Appeal No. 3446 of 2023 - Smt. Parul Tyagi v. Gaurav Tyagi, 2023 SCC OnLine All 2684 - Persistent non-compliance by Family Courts - Repeated circulars and judicial training ignored - Chronic delay in deciding interim maintenance - Systemic judicial inertia - Directions issued for statewide compliance and accountability - Registrar General to place order before Hon'ble Chief Justice. (Paras 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 22-24, 27-34) HELD: Parting with the facts of the instance case, this is not the first case in which this Court has noticed non-compliance with the above referred judgments. This Court has observed that circulations of judgments on the direction of Hon'ble Supreme Court by this Court have a little effect on the working of the trial Courts, despite regular training and sensitization programmes by the Judicial Training and Research Institute, Lucknow, it is out of the understanding of this Court why the Judicial Officers are failed to understand the consequences of non-compliance of the orders, passed by the Constitutional Courts even though, it is premature to come to any conclusion as of now. Therefore, this Court directed all the learned Principal Judges, Family Courts established under the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, to file a compliance report in view of the Rajnesh v. Neha case (supra) and Smt. Parul Tyagi v. Gaurav Tyagi case (supra) in a sealed cover of their own Court, along with all the Family Courts working under their supervision and control. (Para 10) This Court feels compelled to express its concern about summoning such a report on the judicial side. This Court is aware that this action may negatively impact the morale of Judicial Officers. However, for the effective and consistent implementation of the Supreme Court's directives, this Court has no option but to monitor the Family Courts so far as the implementation of the judgments is concerned. Despite issuing numerous orders to the learned Principal Judge of Family Courts individually, widely circulating the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and conducting training programs by JTRI in Lucknow, as well as seminars on Family Court Sensitisation by the Sensitisation of Family Courts Committee, this Court have observed minimal impact in practice (Para 11) Despite the law's clear mandate for speedy relief, interim maintenance is subjected to endless delays- often involving 70 to 90 adjournments over nearly a decade. Such routine adjournments exemplify the plight of thousands of women who are re-victimized by a sluggish and indifferent judicial system. Maintenance laws are intended as social welfare legislation, designed to prevent destitution. The Supreme Court, in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), has prescribed clear timelines for the disposal of maintenance applications, underscoring the necessity of affidavits of assets and liabilities and time- bound decisions. Yet, a woman's plea for basic subsistence is frequently buried beneath the weight of adjournments, judicial absenteeism, and procedural delays. (Para 27) The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted to establish specialized courts for the expeditious resolution of matrimonial and family disputes-particularly matters of maintenance, custody, and domestic violence, which require urgent adjudication. However, the very purpose of creating separate Family Courts appears to be defeated due to poor infrastructure, an overwhelming backlog of cases, frequent adjournments, non-functional courtrooms, and undue delays-such as waiting over a decade and enduring 70 to 90 adjournments even for interim maintenance. (Para 29) Despite the clear and specific directions laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra) and subsequent authoritative pronouncements, a disturbing trend has emerged wherein the learned Family Court Judges routinely fail to implement these mandates. Judges often neglect to require the mandatory filing of "Assets and Liabilities Affidavits" from both parties-affidavits intended to prevent concealment, promote transparency, and facilitate fair maintenance orders. No fixed timelines are enforced by the Courts, and routine adjournments are granted without sufficient justification. Noncooperative parties are are not penalized by the imposition of reasonable costs for evading proceedings. Consequently, interim maintenance applications remain undecided for years, despite being summary proceeding in nature, and there are no effective or practical consequences for non-compliance with the High Court's orders. (Para 31) Reverting to the facts of this case, neither party has chosen to file the affidavit of assets and liabilities as mandated in Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr. (supra), disclosing all sources of income, in compliance with the order dated 23.5.2024. The office report dated 11.12.2024 reflects that notice was duly received by the respondent- wife, and a Vakalatnama has been filed on her behalf. Upon perusal, the impugned order does not warrant interference by this Court, as the record indicates that the revisionist-husband holds a senior position in Gail India Limited. It is made clear that, in the event the revisionist husband fails to pay the maintenance, recovery shall be affected in accordance with the directions laid down in Rajesh Babu Saxena v. State of U.P. and Others [Criminal Revision Defective No. 1789 of 2023]. (Para 35) Petition dismissed. (E-14)

Title: Nirmal Kumar Fukan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vinod Diwakar

English hearing

BAIL/13376/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 28-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1907  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Corresponding to Section 306 IPC), Section 108 - Abetment of suicide - Ingredients - Maid found dead in employer's house - Allegation of suicide due to harassment at workplace - No suicide note - No evidence of instigation, conspiracy, or aiding the act - Statements of co-worker and parents of deceased silent on abetment - Delay of five days in lodging FIR - Deceased's last calls with third person (boyfriend) indicate private cause - Mens rea absent - Prima facie case not made out - Bail granted. (Paras 7.1-7.4, 9.1, 9.3, 11.9-11.15) HELD: In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 108 BNS, 2023 (corresponding Section 306 IPC), there must be case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. (Para 7.1) To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. (Para 7.2) -In the light of above mentioned settled law, in case of suicide, a person is liable for abetment if the person has inter alia instigated the deceased for committing suicide or has engaged in any conspiracy for committing suicide or intentionally aided the commission of suicide. (Para 7.4) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Jahid Baig @ Jahid Jamal Beg Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Sanjay Kumar Singh

English hearing

CRLA/74 /2020 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1899  

HEADNOTE hearing

A. Criminal matter-Indian Penal Code,1860- Section 302-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 374 (2)- Challenge to-Conviction-deceased died by burning in her matrimonial home-The deceased had a love marriage with the accused-The prosecution failed to establish any motive or prior incident of quarrel-No eye witness or documentary evidence was produced by the prosecution to establish that the deceased was murdered-PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 did not support the prosecution as all witnesses were relatives of the deceased who did not witness the incident themselves-The main witness, Rita (Jethani) was not examined-Medical report did not support the prosecution version as the cause of death attributed to shock and extensive burning-The Court relied on the precedent Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. St. of Mah. which emphasized that in case of circumstantial evidence, all circumstances must be conclusively proven to establish guilt- Thus, the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 1 to 38) B. It is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused. (Para 27) The appeal is allowed. (E-6)

Title: Vinod Patel Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Madan Pal Singh

English hearing

A482/12482 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 12-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1879  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Police investigation - Quality of investigation - Closure report filed without forensic examination - Protest petition allowed - Quashing of summoning order - Systemic reform - Directions for mandatory review of charge-sheets by prosecution - Implementation of scientific investigation and modern police training - Circular No. DG/Circular-06/2018 reaffirmed - Held, investigation must be fair, scientific, and based on evidence; mechanical, perfunctory or biased investigations violate Articles 20 and 21 - Summoning order based on non-existent forged document unsustainable - Proceedings quashed - Comprehensive directions issued for modernizing police investigation and training. (Paras 8, 9, 12, 13, 25, 33, 38 and 39) HELD: Recently, in Sanuj Bansal v. State of U.P. & Anr 4 , the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, gave an undertaking that chargesheets in the state are not filed solely on the basis of confessional statements. However, this Court has observed that, in practice, chargesheets are routinely filed on a daily basis relying primarily on the confessional statements of co-accused, without any discovery of corroborative evidence- an approach that is in clear derogation of the law. (Para 12) It is also interesting to discuss that the reports filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. are routinely filed in template formats without having sufficient material enabling the Courts to come to a reasonable conclusion that the offences mentioned in the charge-sheet are made out prima-facie. The C.D. may suggest sequence of events but the C.D. cannot replace the requirement of detailed descriptions of steps taken by the Investigating Officer along with the relevant facts and evidence collected during investigation, in column-16 of the police report filed under section 173 Cr.P.C. (Para 13) Keeping in mind the aforesaid deliberations, vide order dated 18.9.2024 a copy of the charge sheet was forwarded to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Uttar Pradesh; the Director General of Police; and the Director General (Training), Headquarters, with the direction to review the same and assess whether charge- sheets filed by the police are in consonance with the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Dablu Kujur (supra) and Sharif Ahmad (supra). Following such assessment, they were directed to propose measures, including a comprehensive training programme for police personnel from constables to Superintendents of Police (S.S.P.) -aimed at enhancing their professional competencies. The D.G. (Training) was further expected to hold broad consultations with A.D.Gs, I.Gs, D.I.Gs, S.Ps., Additional S.Ps., and D.S.Ps. posted at various Police Training Centres across Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, the Secretary (Law), A.D.G. (Prosecution), and Director (Prosecution), Uttar Pradesh, were also expected to be consulted in this process. (Para 25) Upon consideration of the facts and legal submissions, this Court is of the view that the criminal proceedings has been manifestly attended with mala-fide and is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the petitioners and with the view to spite them due to private and personal grudge. The Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue. (Para 38) Accordingly, I find merit in the submissions advanced by Shri N.I. Jafri, learned Senior Counsel for the applicants. The impugned summoning order is hereby set aside. Consequently, the proceedings arising out of FIR Case Crime No. 8 of 2024, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 341, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Civil Lines, District Aligarh, are quashed. However, liberty is granted to the complainant/respondent no. 2 to approach the police in accordance with law, in the event that any incriminating material surfaces establishing the essential ingredients of cheating or forgery against the applicants. (Para 39) Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

Title: Subhash Chandra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vinod Diwakar

English hearing

CRLR/3355/2018 Judgment/Order Date: 17-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1865  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 345, 346, 352 & 195 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 188 & 228 - Contempt in the face of Court - Scope of power of subordinate criminal courts - Procedure under Section 345 Cr.P.C. - Conviction of Investigating Officer by Special Judge (POCSO) for disobedience of judicial direction - Held, conviction under Section 188 IPC without following procedure under Sections 345 & 195 Cr.P.C. illegal - Offence not committed in view or presence of Court - Trial Court acted de hors its jurisdiction - Conviction and sentence set aside. (Paras 18, 20, 24, 25, 27 and 28) HELD: The plain reading of Section 345 Cr.P.C. transpires that the concerned provision is attracted when the offence of Indian Penal Code described under Section 175 (omission to produce document or electronic record to public servant by person legally bound to produce it), Section 178 (refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to make it), Section 179 (refusing to answer public servant authorised to question), Section 180 (refusing to sign statement); or Section 228 (intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding) is committed, but the condition prerequisite in exercise of Section 345 Cr.P.C. is that the offence(s) is committed 'in the view or presence of any civil, criminal or revenue court'. In the present case the alleged offence has not been considered to have been committed in view of or in presence of the learned trial court because the substance of show cause notice only shows that the Court has initiated to proceed in disobedience of its order passed during the investigation of the case. (para 18) This Court has found that the proceeding by the learned trial court has not been carried out under Section 345 Cr.P.C., but it is the one that has been conducted purely and explicitly under Section 188 IPC. It is required to be considered, whether the learned trial court has rightly convicted the revisionist under Section 188 IPC, though, Section 346 Cr.P.C. provides that if the Court is of the opinion that the case should not be disposed of under Section 345 Cr.P.C. then the case shall be forwarded to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same; and Section 352 Cr.P.C. has taken away the power of contempt from the criminal court other than the Judge of a High Court. (Para 20) Even if, it is considered that the learned trial court has registered a case against the revisionist for offence under Section 188 IPC on the basis of application of Special Court Ahalmad, Narendra Kumar and Court Moharrir, Bharat Singh, as a complaint, then the learned trial court has got no jurisdiction to try the case in view of Sections 345 and 346 Cr.P.C.. It is further required to point out here that the said alleged cognizance has been taken by the learned trial court on 19th September, 2018 and on 20th September, 2018 the impugned judgement of conviction has been recorded and sentence has been awarded against the revisionist. It is also a matter of grave concern that no material and evidences were adduced before the trial court in a day, which led to the basis of conviction of revisionist. It is further, a matter of grave concern that the revisionist/accused has not been given a fair chance to give his explanation or to defend his case and the trial court has reached to the conclusion, that the alleged disobedience on the part of the revisionist/accused has cause danger to human life, health or safety or causes a riot or affray and therefore punish with a graver punishment of six months and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, which has got no rational basis. (Para 24) The matter in hand has it's genesis on the report of Ahalmad and Court Moharrir of the Court. The record is silent about the authority of the two officials of the court to submit report against the Investigating Officer of a case and how such a report qualified the term 'Complaint', provided under Section 195 Cr.P.C., but this Court is of the view that the suo-moto report of the court Ahalmad and court Moharrir cannot be considered as a 'complaint'. Moreover, the record is also silent that the orders and directions issued by the Special POCSO Judge to the Investigating Officer of case crime no. 508 of 2018 is a time bound order. The judgement is also silent on the point whether any date has been fixed for compliance of the said order. Further, the proceeding reflects that no charge under Section 188 IPC has been framed against the revisionist, in absence whereof the proceedings, conviction and sentence became improper and legally not tenable and liable to be set aside. (Para 27) Revision allowed. (E-14)

Title: Chandradhar Gaur Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Avnish Saxena

English hearing

A482/12048 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 27-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1849  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 19 - Sanction for prosecution - Validity - Bank officials accused of conspiracy and defalcation - Sanction granted under Section 19 PC Act also purporting to cover offences under Indian Penal Code - Competence and application of mind - Held, sanction under Section 19 PC Act cannot extend to IPC offences - Authority not competent to sanction prosecution for offences beyond PC Act - Sanction "for the said offences and for any other offences under any other law" shows total non-application of mind - Vitiates sanction and cognizance order - Discharge granted. (Paras 41, 43, 44 and 45) HELD: The applicants were working in Axis Bank, which is not even a nationalized Bank, and it is not disputed that the applicants were not holding a post where they could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the government. In this view of the matter the provisions of Section 197 are not attracted to the case of the applicants. The prosecution sanction order dated 02.02.2022 issued by the President and Head Corporate Affairs of Axis Bank, Mumbai, states that the allegations levelled against 20 persons, including the applicants, have been corroborated by the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the documents collected during investigation of the case. After careful examination and perusal of the documents and statements of the witnesses it has been found that offences u/s 120-B read with 409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 (A) IPC and Section 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of PC Act and substantive offence thereof are made out against 20 persons, including the applicants. The sanctioning authority proceeded to state that after fully and carefully examining the documents, copies of the statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and other materials placed before him and having applied his mind properly in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, considered that offences u/s 120-B read with 409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 (A) I.P.C. and Section 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 and substantive offence thereof are made out against the applicants and other persons and therefore the authority has accorded sanction under Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for prosecution of the applicants and other persons 'for the said offences and for any other offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law in respect of the said acts and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction'. (Para 41) While recording the aforesaid reason, the learned trial court failed to appreciate that neither any sanction had been sought for prosecution of the applicants for the offences under Penal Code nor was the authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the offences under the Penal Code. The sanction of prosecution "for the said offences and for any other offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law in respect of the said acts" for which no sanction was obtained, indicates a total non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable. It indicates that the sanctioning authority has acted as a mere rubber stamp. Non- application of mind by the sanctioning authority vitiates the sanction order dated 02.02.2023 as also the order dated 28.07.2023 passed by the trial Court rejecting the discharge application. (Para 43) The order of sanction after a proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the material on record is a prerequisite for prosecution of a public servant, as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants. This safeguard cannot be dealt with in a casual and mechanical manner. (Para 45) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Sri Sushant Gupta & Ors. Vs. Central Bureau Of Investigation S.C.B. Lko

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Subhash Vidyarthi

English hearing

A482/41453 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1837  

HEADNOTE hearing

Family Law - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Sections 12, 21 & 23 - Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, Section 6 - Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - Custody of minor female child - Welfare of child - Paramount consideration - Female child entering puberty - Custody to mother preferred - Father deceitfully taking custody through manipulation - Digital evidence (SMS, WhatsApp chats, Google Maps timeline) corroborating mother's case - Custody directed to be handed to mother within three days - Child's welfare not subservient to patriarchal presumption under Section 6 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act - Visitation rights to father reserved. (Paras 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 28) HELD: The principle that the father is the natural guardian of the minor child-boy or unmarried girl, and after him, the mother is primarily derived from section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, though seminal at its time. Now it smacks patriarchal bias, therefore, become obsolete in the progressive realities of 21st- century in India. The judicial interpretation has commendably filled the legislative void, especially in recognizing the preferential custodial rights of mothers of girl children. However, true progress demands that the legislature codify these evolving norms to ensure a consistent and gender-neutral approach across the country. (Para 15) In child custody proceedings, especially involving a minor girl entering puberty, the role of the family court judge is not merely adjudicative but deeply protective and facilitative. The transition into adolescence is a sensitive period marked by profound emotional and physical changes, and the law recognises the need for careful, child centric engagement by the judiciary. The judge is tasked with upholding not just statutory rights but also the child's dignity, safety, emotional well-being, and evolving autonomy. (Para 19) When deciding custody of a girl who has just entered puberty, courts shall consider: (i) who the primary caregiver has been, (ii) the girl's schooling, community ties, and stability, (iii) allegations of abuse, neglect, or inappropriate behaviour, and (iv) demeanour and conduct of the parities to the litigation. The judicial role in custody matters involving minor girls entering puberty is far more than a procedural function- it is a constitutional, moral, and empathetic responsibility. A judge must rise above adversarial structures and act as a trustee of the child's welfare. This calls for a gender-sensitive, emotionally intelligent, and child-centred judicial approach, ensuring that the dignity, safety, and well-being of the child remain the unwavering focus of custody decisions. (Para 20) The mother has a unique position in the case of the custody of the female child. In most cases, the mother is naturally better positioned to understand and support a daughter going through puberty because of shared biological experience. The mother has personally experienced menstruation, other female-specific changes, and comfort in discussing such issues. The girls often feel more comfortable talking to their mothers about body changes, menstrual hygiene, etc. The mother often plays the more effective role in emotional attunement, being a natural caregiver, and is more likely to notice subtle psychological shifts. The society and family dynamics often encourage closer emotional bonding between mother and daughter, especially during adolescence. (Para 21) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Saumya Sajiv Kumar Sharma & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vinod Diwakar

English hearing

CRLP/8881/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 06-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1828  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law-The Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986-Sections 2 & 3(1) -The Uttar Pradesh Gangster and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021- Rule 5 (3) (A)---It is not disputed that the earlier writ petition was allowed on procedural grounds and that liberty was granted to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law. From the record, it appears that the authorities have now complied with the requisite procedural mandates including completion of base case investigations, preparation of gang-chart, convening of a joint meeting, approval by the District Magistrate after application of mind. The petitioner has a long-standing criminal history and the allegations pertain to organized crime across multiple districts---No procedural illegality or arbitrariness has been demonstrated in the initiation of the present proceedings under the Act, 198. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Jitendra Paswan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,Anil Kumar-X

English hearing

BAIL/17325/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 26-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1818  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 376, 354 & 506 - Bail - Allegation of rape and molestation by father and guardian on daughter and niece - Delay of one year in lodging FIR - Victims' inconsistent St.ments - Absence of medical or forensic corroboration - Prior disputes between families and cross- litigations - Alleged misuse of guardianship - Criminal history explained - Held, where prosecution evidence suffers from contradictions, unexplained delay, and absence of corroboration, bail cannot be denied merely on moral considerations - Bail granted. (Paras 14, 52, 54, 57 and 58) HELD: The allegations if found true are of extreme mental depravity and must be dealt with an iron hand. However, branding the applicant as a 'paedophile' in the present matter is premature and legally untenable, particularly in the absence of any prior conduct or antecedent allegations supporting such a characterization in the FIR. (Para 54) In the present case, the two victims have repeatedly altered their St.ments, exhibiting inconsistency akin to a pendulum. It is also pertinent to note that the First Information Reports (FIRs) were lodged by the applicant concerning the two victims only at a time when they were minors. The said FIRs were filed against the victims' alleged lovers and their family members. Additionally, the present FIR has been lodged after a considerable delay of approximately one year. Furthermore, there is an absence of forensic evidence to substantiate the allegations. There is no recovery of any video either. (Para 57) Considering these facts, the wavering testimonies of the witnesses, the delayed lodging of the FIR, the lack of forensic corroboration, and the nature of the earlier FIRs, coupled by the fact that the criminal antecedents have been explained, taking into consideration the settled dictum that 'bail is rule and jail an exception' this Court finds it appropriate to grant bail to the applicant. (Para 58) Bail Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Pradeep Soni Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Krishan Pahal

English hearing

COPP/6/2012 Judgment/Order Date: 22-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1805  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Companies Act,1956- Sections 439(1)(b), 433(e) (f) & 434(1)(a) - The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985-Section 20(1)--- Petition seeking winding up of the respondent/Co. mainly on the ground that it has failed to pay the admitted amounts of Rs.21,55,52,263/--- The petition lacking a prayer for winding up of a Co. under Section 433(c) of the Act cannot be considered in view of the lack of prayer--- The claim of the petitioner/Co. based upon the 'assignment deed' cannot be a foundation for seeking winding up-- - To appreciate a case for winding up of a Co. on the ground that it is just and equitable, it is essential for the Court to form a view that in view of the status of the Co., if the Co. is not wound up, the same would amount to a threat to the commercial world and the existence of the Co. is not desirable for the commercial world. No such material exists to form a view that the Co. if not wound up would be a threat to the commercial world and/or can lead to further defrauding of creditors, more so, when the respondent/Co. has categorically undertaken to settle the dues of the Provident Fund within a period of three weeks of the decision of the present case along with any other due payable to any other creditor. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Zaitek Polyblends Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sri Durga Bansal Fertilizer Ltd.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia

English hearing

A482/39316/2023 Judgment/Order Date: 12-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1783  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 304 & 304A - Medical negligence - Prosecution of doctor - Scope of criminal liability - Confessional St.ment to police - Inadmissibility - Medical Board exonerating the applicant - Magistrate's failure to consider expert opinion before summoning - Held, confession recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. inadmissible - Medical practitioner cannot be prosecuted under Section 304, 304AIPC unless gross or reckless negligence of a very high degree is proved- Proceedings quashed. (Paras 29, 48, 55, 59, 66 and 69) HELD: Coming to the merits of the case, two issues have been touched upon by learned counsel for the applicant. The primary issue for consideration is whether a St.ment recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can form the basis for initiating criminal proceedings against the applicant, and whether such a St.ment is admissible as evidence for that purpose. (Para 29) In light of the legal principles established in Jacob Mathew (supra) case, the liability of a doctor for medical negligence must be assessed carefully. A doctor who diligently treats and cures a patient should not be held criminally liable for mere errors in judgment or minor lapses. However, those doctors who act with gross negligence, demonstrating a blatant disregard for standard medical practices, can be held accountable under criminal law. (Para 48) In Jacob Mathew Vs St. of Punj. & anr.11 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraph 12 of the judgment, held that mere lack of care or an act of negligence, which may give rise to civil liability, is not sufficient to attract criminal liability. The Court emphasized that negligence, for the purpose of establishing a criminal offence, must be of a gross or very high degree. Only such aggravated negligence can amount to a criminal act warranting penal consequences. (Para 55) It is an admitted position that the applicant was a qualified doctor. There are no specific allegations of any act of omission or commission against the accused persons in the entire plethora of documents relied upon by learned counsel for the parties. The act of giving injections as attributed to the doctor, even if accepted to be true, could be described as an act of negligence as there may have been a lack of due care and precaution prior to giving the injections. But, the Court cannot categorically hold the applicant criminally liable for this act of negligence as he may be his carelessness or want of due attention. As has already been discussed and observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.VS Narayan Rao (supra) that an error of judgment in giving five injections consequently, as in the present case, does not amount to criminal negligence. (Para 59) In the case of Dr. Mohan vs. St. of T.N. & anr.14 , the Apex Court has held that after reading over accusation of instructing a staff nurse to administer an injection over telephone which injection when administered to the patient, apparently reacted, resulting into his death would not constitute an offence under Section 304 Part-I IPC and could be covered by Section 304A IPC. (Para 66) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Dr. Neeraj Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manju Rani Chauhan

English hearing

CLRE/80/2011 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1767  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law -The Provincial Small Cause Court Act 1887-Section 23 & 25---The Court of Small Causes is not denuded from considering the issue of title which incidentally arises in a suit before it. While considering an application under section 23 PSCC, the SCC court is not obligated to mechanically refer the suit to be decided by a regular court. In all cases where the issue of title is raised, the Court is required to consider the case and only if it finds that intricate questions of title are involved can it refer and return the plaint to be presented before the regular court. The power conferred under section 23 is discretionary in nature but even discretion which is to be exercised, should be within the four corners of law--- A suit for arrears of rent and ejectment is seen on the parameters of subsistence of relationship between the parties as that of landlord and tenant. The question of title is never to be decided by the SCC Court and in case if it is incidentally raised by a party then the Court is competent to decide the same, prima facie, for the purposes of adjudicating a SCC Suit and in any case any such incidental finding is always subject to the decision of a suit filed and decided by regular courts. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Jugeshwar Prasad Vs. Hanuman Prasad

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Jaspreet Singh

English hearing

FAFO/37 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 08-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1756  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law- The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Section 147--- The accident is said to have occurred on 08.01.2016 and the policy which had been issued on 28.11.2014 was cancelled on 09.01.2015 and the intimation to the insured was sent on 11.02.2015 i.e. the policy having been cancelled and the holder having been informed are all events which took place prior to the accident consequently there cannot be any occasion for an insurance policy to have subsisted on the date of accident i.e. 08.01.2016 and as such, the insurance Co. cannot be held liable to pay the amount at the first instance and to recover from the owne. Matter remitted. (E-15)

Title: The National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Reetu Devi & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin

English hearing

CRLR/478 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1745  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120-B & 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) - Discharge - Scope - Subletting of Government contract by public sector company through pre-tender tie-up - Allegation of conspiracy causing loss to public exchequer - Plea that no person cheated and offence compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. - Held, cheating of Government constitutes offence under Section 420 IPC as 'St.' falls within definition of 'person' under Section 11 IPC - Charge not speculative merely because exact loss not quantified - Offences under Sections 120-B IPC and 13(1)(d), 13(2) PC Act non-compoundable - No ground for discharge - Revisions dismissed. (Paras 27, 28, 32, 37, 39 and 41) HELD: The second submission of the learned counsel for the revisionists is the amount of losses has not been quantified and the charge is merely speculative. When it is apparent from the material available on record that the Government had awarded the contract to NPCC for Rs.14,60,62,604/-, NPCC sublet the contract to UCC for Rs.13.82 crores and UCC further sublet the contract to Sat Sai Earth Works Rs.7.16 crores i.e. almost half the amount of contract value of NPCC and the contract has been awarded without following the usual process of inviting tenders so as to ensure availability of best rates, prima facie a case of causing wrongful loss to the Public Exchequer is made out which needs to be tried by the trial Court. (Para 28) Definition of the word 'person' given in Section 11 of the Penal Code is wide enough to include any association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. It would certainly include within its ambit the St. Government, which is a body of persons. If the accused persons have deceived the Government by fraudulently or dishonestly inducing it to enter into a contract with NPCC, which contract was first sub-let to UCC and thereafter it was further sub-let to M/s Sat Sai Earth Works at almost half of the contract value and thereby an excessive amount was paid to NPCC, which act has caused financial loss to the Government, the accused persons have committed the offence of cheating. If any person was involved in the criminal conspiracy to commit the offence of cheating, he is liable to be prosecuted. Therefore, I find no force in the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the revisionist. (Para 32) The revisionist has been charged for commission of the offence of criminal conspiracy for committing the offence punishable under Section 420 I.P.C. The revisionist has also been charged for commission of offences under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which offences are also non-compoundable offences. Therefore, the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the revisionist is misconceived. (Para 37) When the offences under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are not compoundable offences, the alleged lack of opportunity of compounding for want of any natural person having been cheated, with whose consent the offence could have been compounded, does not make out a ground for quashing of the criminal proceedings. (Para 39) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Praveen Pratap Singh & Anr. Vs. C.B.I.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Subhash Vidyarthi

English hearing

CRLA/11357/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1733  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law-The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973-Section 374-Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence--- Prosecution story relies on the narration that the deceased was done to death on 10.01.2023--- Theory is unbelievable in face of clear medical opinion that the death was caused on 21.01.2023--- The evidence of last seen and the occurrence caused on 21.01.2023, is so far distant in time that it renders it wholly uncredible and unreliable to the point of being extraneous to the essential facts that the prosecution set out to prove--- Occurrence/manner of death was never proven on the strength of any circumstantial evidence. In fact, the homicidal nature of that occurrence itself was not established--- Prosecution story based solely on such circumstantial evidence is wholly disjointed, there is a complete break of the chain of evidence which remained unexplained by the prosecution --- merely because the occurrence may have been caused and merely because one accused may have been named for reason of motive disclosed, it may not be enough for the prosecution to claim that it had proof of the occurrence caused by such accused. The test of proof beyond reasonable doubt would remain to be satisfied by the prosecution by proving each circumstance in the chain of circumstances relied by it, motive being one but not the only material circumstance. Judgment of conviction set aside. Appeal allowed. (E-15)

Title: Sukh Lal Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain

English hearing

CRLA/10492 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 01-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1729  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 386 - Cross-cases - Common Judgment - Illegality - Separate evidence in cross-cases to be considered independently - Passing of common judgment on appreciation of joint evidence in distinct case crimes held impermissible - Principle of Nathi Lal Vs St. of U.P., (1990 Supp SCC 145) reaffirmed - Order of conviction set aside and matter remitted for fresh decision - Appellants, who were on bail during trial, directed to be released on bail pending retrial. (Paras 6, 9, 11 and 12) HELD: The procedure adopted by the learned court below is described, manifestly erroneous and wholly impermissible in law. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nathi Lal & ors. Vs St. of U.P., 1990 Supp SCC 145, as consistently followed in Sudhir & ors. Vs St. of M.P, (2001) 2 SCC 688, St. of M.P. Vs Mishrilal (dead) & ors., (2003) 9 SCC 426, as considered and applied by a three-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in A.T. Mydeen & anr. Vs Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department, (2022) 14 SCC 392. The principle of law invoked by in these sets of appeal is beyond shadow of doubt. It is described as an absolute proposition in criminal jurisprudence. (para 6) Appeal allowed. (E-14)

Title: Rajendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain

English hearing

CRLA/7898 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1715  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 363, 366 & 376-D - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 4 - Evidence - Sole testimony of prosecutrix - Contradictory St.ments under Section 164 Cr.P.C. - Absence of corroboration - Victim's first St.ment exonerating the accused and second St.ment implicating them after 40 days - Unexplained delay, material improvements and improbabilities in prosecution case - Denial by informant of having lodged FIR - Held, conviction cannot rest on inconsistent, uncorroborated, and unreliable testimony of prosecutrix - Benefit of doubt - Accused acquitted. (Paras 28, 33, 34, 37, 39, and 41) HELD: Yet the informant 'M' P.W.-2 has simultaneously accepted that the Tehrir paper No. 5Ka, does not bear her signature and she had also not submitted it to the police. It is pertinent to mention here that on the basis of informant's application (paper No. 5Ka) F.I.R regarding the incident has been registered on 08.04.2014 at 11:30 a.m. Since the informant has denied that the basis of F.I.R i.e. her purported application (paper No. 5Ka) was not given by her, as such the whole prosecution story becomes doubtful. It is true that F.I.R is not a substantive piece of evidence, but it's contents are required to be proved in accordance with law, which the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt in this case. This will become apparent from our subsequent analysis. (Para 28) From the perusal of the first St.ment of the victim 'X' recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, proved by the accused as Ex. Kha-1, it is evident that she had gone with accused Malik Chandra of her own sweet will. She had thus eloped with him and gone to Gujarat, where she resided with him and no physical relations established between them. The victim has mentioned in her St.ment that the accused Malik Chandra had not raped her and she wanted to stay with him. The victim 'X' had also told the Doctor P.W.-3 at the time of her medical examination, (P.W.-3 has also proved in her examination-in-chief) that on 31.03.2014 at 05:00 a.m. she had left her house with a boy and gone by a truck to Auraiya, who had left her in the way, and then the son-in-law of her aunt had taken her to Gujarat, where she had solemnized marriage in a temple with him. Both the above St.ments have been proved in accordance with law, according to which, the accused Shailendra Kushwaha, Manvendra Singh @ Jhamman Pal and Malik Chandra, neither were involved in the enticement nor they had committed rape upon the victim. In fact the victim has mentioned that she was not raped by anybody. (Para 33) From the testimony of the victim 'X' P.W.-1 in Court, it is evident that all the three accused had forcibly kidnapped her from her house and taken her to Gujarat, Hyderabad, Delhi, but she could not tell the name of mohalla, city, name of landlord, who resided in that house, date and month of first rape, how many times she was raped. She has deposed that she had raised alarm but no person residing nearby ever came to help her. That is not reliable. She has also St.d that she, remained unconscious during her various journeys, which too is totally unreliable. The victim has also mentioned in her cross- examination that she had telephoned the police on No.100 from Gujarat, Har. and Delhi, but none came to her rescue, which is also improbable. The victim has been unable to tell whether she was taken by car, or bus, or train. It is highly improbable that from 31.3.2014 to 19.5.2014, a duration of 49 days , the victim remained unconscious, and was not in a physical and mental condition to resist the accused, moreso, when she was living in public place and travelling in public transport. (Para 37) It is also evident that after recording the first St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C, the victim's custody was handed over to her mother P.W.-2 and thereafter about 40 days later, her second St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C (Ex.Ka-1)was recorded on 03.7.2014. S.I. Mohd. Sattar Beg, P.W.-5, has accepted in his crossexamination that he had not given any application for recording the second St.ment of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C and the Court has suo- motu ordered it. It is very surprising that in the absence of any application on behalf of the investigating officer, why second St.ment of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C has been recorded by the Court. All the improvements made by the victim in her subsequent St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C and in the testimony given in the Court, during trial, have been proved, in accordance with law by the accused, which makes the testimony of victim highly unreliable and in the absence of corroboration, it cannot be relied upon. (Para 39) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Shailendra Kushwaha Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain

English hearing

A227/11867/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 02-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1709  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Registration Act,1908- Sections 17(1), 23 & 32 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XII, Rule 6--- "Whether the judgment and decree of the year 1988 needs registration under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1908 being the compromise decree or otherwise?"--- Compromise decree dated 30.05.1988 and decree on the basis of admission under Order XII, Rule 6 dated 12.08.1988 does not require registration in view of exclusionary clause of Section 17(2) (vi) --- Section 23 of clearly provides for time limit for registration of an order or decree, which is four months when it becomes final. In the instant case, application has been moved after thirty- five years, which is barred by provisions of Section 23--- Section 32 clearly provides for the person who shall present the document for registration. The Act does not envisage any provision requiring the Court to get the order or decree registered--- The application moved by the plaintiff was defective and not maintainable due to non-joinder of necessary parties. Petition allowed. (E-15)

Title: Sukhdev Singh Majithiya & Ors. Vs. Bhavnesh Kumar Jindal & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

A227/4101 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 02-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1705  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XLI Rule 27 - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-Section 34--- The court below had wrongly interpreted the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 as it is applicable in the case of an appeal where the party to an appeal makes an application for production of additional evidence at appellate stage. Section 34 is summary proceeding and is not an appeal as court below has held. The invocation of provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 by court below in rejecting the application of petitioner is wholly misconceived. It seems that court concerned does not know the scope of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC as well as Section 34 of the Act of 1996--- The court below on the wrong assumption has proceeded to reject the application on the basis of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC--- matter is remitted back to court below to consider the application of petitioner afresh. (E-15)

Title: Kamta Prasad Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

CLRE/4/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 19-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1673  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law- The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Sections-115 & 80(2) - Order XXVI Rule 9--- Revision filed under Section 115 against orders for grant of leave to institute the suit before expiry of period of notice under Section 80 (2) CPC, and the order for appointment of Commission for local investigation under Order XXVI Rule 9 and 10 CPC--- Revisionist being a private individual cannot object for want of notice under Section 80 which is for the benefit of Government and its officers--- The order was strictly passed in consonance with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order XXVI CPC read with Rule 68 and 69 of the General Rules Civil, as the court while appointing an Advocate Commissioner had directed for the survey to be made with the help of police force and necessary photography and videography was to be carried out of the site to be inspected and surveyed--- Present suit is not prima facie barred by provisions of The Place of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, in fact, it has been filed seeking right to access to property in dispute under Section 18 of The Ancient Monument and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 being a protected monument. Revision dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Committee Of Management, Jami Masjid Sambhal Ahmed Marg Kot Sambhal Vs. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

BAIL/40954/2023 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1667  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B - Bail - Delay in lodging FIR - Counter-blast to earlier complaint - Applicant accused of cheating and forgery in alleged sale of teaching post - Six-year delay unexplained - Criminal history not resulting in conviction - Pre-trial incarceration and Article 21 - Imposition of monetary condition on bail deprecated - Held, prolonged custody without trial violates Article 21 - Delay in FIR and absence of conviction entitle applicant to bail - Courts not to act as recovery agents or impose deposit conditions for bail. (Paras 5, 12, 15, 16, 17 and 19) HELD: It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that accused of an offence is presumed to be innocent till he is convicted. Thus though the applicant herein has been involved in various cases he has not been convicted in any of the cases till date. Therefore a presumption of innocence is in his favour. Pre trial incarceration is a serious matter, which is violative of the fundamental right of an accused. (Para 15) The Apex Court has deprecated the practice of imposing the amount as a condition for payment as a condition for release on bail at pre trial stage. It cannot be said that the amount alleged to be paid by the complainant was actually paid to the accused at this stage. In such circumstances direction for payment cannot be imposed while granting bail to the applicant. (Para 16) In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the case in its entirety specifically the delay in lodging the FIR that too as a counter blast to the FIR lodged by the applicant against the relatives of the informant and further that though there is criminal history but in none of the those cases the applicant has been convicted so far and out of 34 cases 11 cases are under section 138 of the N.I. Act, which arise out of civil transaction between the parties and cannot be said to be a criminal case in strict sense. (Para 18) Bail Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Rajnikant Shukla Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Anish Kumar Gupta

English hearing

A483/49 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1636  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law-The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,2023-Section 529 - The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973-Section 483--- Whether the remedy under Section 483 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now repealed) or Section 529 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, as the case may be, would be available to the concerned for seeking prayer of expeditious disposal of the case under Section 16 of Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986--- The 'Court' while exercising the power under Section 16 of the Act of 1986, related to the matters connected with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act of 1986, being an authority under the Act of 1986, would be inferior Criminal Court in relation to High Court. Therefore, the application for expeditious disposal of the proceedings under Section 16 of the Act of 1986 would be maintainable under Section 483 Cr.P.C. or Section 529 BNSS---Petition disposed of with a direction to the concerned Court to conclude the proceedings of the case(s) most expeditiously. Petition disposed of. (E-15)

Title: Abdul Raqib @ Pehtul Vs. State Of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Lavania

English hearing

A227/9547 /2019 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1625  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987-Section 22C--- Petition filed challenging the award whereby the Permanent Lok Adalat has awarded a sum of Rs.13,15,000/-.to the claimants--- The deceased was a contractual worker, he would be deemed to be on a fixed salary, thus, an addition of 40% of the established income is to be added as the deceased was less than 40 years of age which makes the income of the deceased as Rs.9,800/- (income Rs.7,000/- plus 40%)--- Respondents would be further entitled to loss of eSt. at Rs.16,500/- and funeral expenses at Rs.16,500/--- Respondents would also be entitled to spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each in respect of all the six claimants in Claim Petition--- Petition is dismissed with direction to the petitioners/ corporation to pay the total amount of compensation of Rs.23,78,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of claim up to the actual payment/realization---A further cost of Rs.50,000/- is imposed upon the petitioners/ corporation for denying the poor person of the legitimate compensation. (E-15)

Title: UPPCL Vs. Sunita Verma & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia

English hearing

A227/4107 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1621  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227-The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 151 ---Application for amending decree was allowed against which Petitioner filed Civil Revision which got dismissed---Once there was no denial to the fact that endowment deed of 1969 stands and was not in possession of plaintiff, the amendment of preliminary decree cannot be opposed. Had it been a case where the plaintiff was in possession of the endowment deed and had deliberately withheld the same, then the defendant could have opposed the amendment to the preliminary decree and judgment relied upon by him would have come to his rescue. It is also not denied that a suit for eviction against the occupier of endowed property has been instituted on behalf of Deity in the year 2022. Once such is a position, the defendant cannot oppose the amendment of a preliminary decree. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Shiv Narayan Gupta Vs. Garib Chandra

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

A227/2495/2016 Judgment/Order Date: 12-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1614  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order VI Rule 17 - The Waqf Act,1995-Sections 3(a), 3(r) & 3(s))--- Petition challenging the order allowing amendment application of defendants for amending their written St.ment---Entire constructions, which has been raised by the plaintiff, stands upon the land of National Highway No.73 and in the garb of waqf property, the petitioner is claiming right. The defendants had rightly moved amendment application for amending the written St.ment on the ground that it is the National Highway Authority, who is the owner of land in question as the constructions are standing over the National Highway No.73 which does not belong to the plaintiffs---The plaintiff has made construction over the land of National Highways and had let out the structure to different persons and is realizing the rent treating it to be property of waqf Madarsa. It cannot be said to be a case of 'waqf by user' as the owner of the property in dispute is the National Highway Authority of India, which is under the control of Central Government, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Waqf Madarsa Qasimul Uloom Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

FAFO/895 /2016 Judgment/Order Date: 01-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1610  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law- The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XLI Rule 27--- Nowhere does the affidavit indicate that the learned trial court has refused to admit the annexure as an evidence or notwithstanding exercise of due diligence by the appellant, he could not get hold of annexure 1 and neither is the said annexure accompanied by the application under the said provision for treating annexure 1 to be an additional evidence---Appellant has also failed to indicate as to how the aforesaid verification can be related with the driving license which had been filed before the learned Tribunal and thus, in absence of any evidence being led before the learned Tribunal of the driving license filed before it of Shri Hori Lal being fake or forged and the said driving license not having been controverted in any manner, consequently, it cannot be said that the learned Tribunal has committed any error in holding that the driver namely Shri Hori lal was having a valid and effective driving license on the date of the incident. Appeal dismissed. (E-15)

Title: National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shiva Vishwakarma Minor

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin

English hearing

FAFO/664 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 26-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1602  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law-The Motor Vehicles Act,1988- Sections 169(2) & 173 - The Evidence Act,1872-Section 114(g)--- The eye witness has been produced and nothing could be extracted from him, which may create any doubt about veracity of his evidence and indicate that he had not seen the accident--- Once an eye witness has been produced, who proved the accident, merely because a person who was in the car has not been produced cannot be a ground for not believing the testimony of the eye witness---The tribunal determined the income of the deceased on the basis of evidence produced before it. Since no contrary evidence could be produced or shown, no illegality or error in the income of the deceased determined by the tribunal--- The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed - -- Merely because the application moved by the appellant for summoning and providing copies of the income tax return on the date of judgment was dismissed by the tribunal, it cannot be said that the power has not been exercised by the tribunal because the Court has also to see that process of law may not be misused to delay or stall the proceedings---Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Dayawati Gupta & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar

English hearing

FAFO/217 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1598  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law- The Employee's Compensation Act, 1923-Sections 3 & 4A - The Central Motor Vehicle Rule, 1989 - Rule 18--- Mere renewal of the license would not be and cannot be indicative of the fact that the claimant does not suffer from the 40 % permanent physical disability as duly certified by the concerned Chief Medical Officer--- Insurance Co. will be liable to meet the claim for compensation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under the Act, 1923 on the conjoint operation of Sections 3 & 4 (A) and sub Section 3 (A) of the Act, 1923--- Owner & the insurance Co. jointly and severally liable to pay the awarded amount. Appeal dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Future Generali India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar Singh & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin

English hearing

ELEP/11/2022 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1584  

HEADNOTE hearing

Election Petition - The Representation of People Act, 1951-Sections 80 & 81 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order VI Rule 17 - Order VII Rule 11---Election petition filed questioning the election of respondent on the ground that he does not belong to Scheduled Castes community and is from Other Backward Caste---In an election petition, material facts have to be set out in the petition under Section 83(1)(a) and no amendment can be carried out. The same applies with the pleading of a suit where the material fact has to be disclosed in view of Rule 2 of Order VI in the pleading by a party relying for his claim or defence---The amendment application moved by petitioner cannot be allowed as it introduces totally a new case---Non disclosure of material fact is an incurable defect which leads to an inevitable conclusion that an election petition is not maintainable---The present case is not for bringing on record material particulars which have been left while filing the election petition, but through proposed amendment, material facts are being brought on record which goes to the root of the case and cannot be allowed at this stage---As the petitioner has not disclosed the material facts in his election petition and had tried to subsequently get the election petition amended, the application moved by respondent no. 1 under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC for dismissing the election petition for non disclosure of cause of action stands allowed. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Title: Prem Pal Singh Vs. Prem Pal Singh Dhangar & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

English hearing

CRLP/2588 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1578  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 256 & 302 - Death of complainant during pendency of complaint case - Whether complaint abates - Legal representative on basis of Will - Permissibility to continue prosecution - Held, death of complainant does not ipso facto terminate prosecution - Magistrate may, under Section 302 Cr.P.C., permit any person including legal heir or legatee to continue proceedings - No abatement of inquiry or trial on complainant's death - Heir by Will entitled to pursue complaint - Petition dismissed. (Paras 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 18) HELD: Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. provides that if the summons have been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused, unless for some reason, he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day; Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader, or by the Officer conducting the prosecution, or where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. It has been provided in subsection (2) of Section 256 that the provisions of sub Section (1) of Section 256 shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non- appearance of the complainant is due to his death. (Para 9) In view of above, on the death of the complainant, the criminal prosecution does not put to end and the prosecution can be permitted to be continued by the Magistrate, before whom the proceedings are pending and it may be permitted to be continued through Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor as there is no provision of abatement of inquiry and trial in absence of the complainant, whereas the provision has been made for abatement of appeal or trial on the death of the accused. It is for this reason, it does not provide abatement of the proceedings on death of the complainant, rather if the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date; Provided that the Magistrate is of the opinion that personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary and may proceed with the case dispensing his attendance. It is also in the cases where the nonappearance of the complainant is due to his death. The prosecution may be permitted to be conducted by any person personally or by a pleader. Thus, on the death of complainant, his legal representative may move application for prosecuting the case, therefore, a legal representative cannot be debarred only because he is on the basis of a will in his favour. (Para 11) Adverting to the facts of the present case, the complaint has been filed on the ground that the petitioner, showing himself to be the son after death of the husband of the complainant, got his name recorded in the revenue records as heir, whereas they had no issue and the accused/petitioner along with his two brothers is son of Bechai. It is not in dispute that the Will was executed by the complainant Atwari in favour of the respondent no.2 in regard to the property, on which the name had been got recorded by the petitioner fraudulently as alleged during pendency of the application of the complainant for mutation before the Consolidation Officer and after filing of the application by the complainant, the proceedings in consolidation are going on and the respondent no.2 is in possession of the property in dispute of the complainant on the basis of Will. Thus, he is her legal representative and entitled for the property-in-dispute on the basis of Will and entitled to continue with the proceedings on behalf of the complainant. (Para 18) Application allowed. (E-14)

Title: Kodai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar

English hearing

CRLA/6099 /2019 Judgment/Order Date: 29-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1569  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302/34, 304 Part II/34, 323/34 - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Sudden Fight - Exception 4 to Section 300 - Absence of premeditation - Altercation over removal of barrier on pathway leading to scuffle - Blows with lathi and danda resulting in death - No prior enmity or motive - Held, occurrence was sudden, without premeditation, in heat of passion - Accused did not act cruelly or take undue advantage - Case falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 - Conviction altered from Section 302/34 IPC to Section 304 Part II/34 IPC. (Paras 25, 26, 30, 31 and 34) HELD: In the present case, the question whether the appellants could be said to have caused the injuries with intention of causing death of the deceased is concerned, admittedly, from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it came into light that the incident had taken place on the spur of moment and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, therefore, it can not be said that the appellants have pre-motivated or premeditation of mind to cause injuries to the deceased. (Para 25) In the postmortem report no fracture has been found on the body and head of the deceased, which indicates that the appellants had no intention to cause grievous injuries or to kill the deceased. Knowledge and intention of a person is a mental St. and the direct evidence for the same is not possible, it can only be gathered by the attending circumstances like weapon used, commission of crime, manner of assault, nature and number of injuries. These are the factors, which will have to be considered to justify the intention and knowledge. (Para 26) On going through the entire evidence on record, we find that the necessary ingredients to attract 4th Exception to section 300 IPC are clearly present in the facts of the present case inasmuch as death is caused; there existed no pre-meditation; it was a sudden fight; the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, therefore, the case in hand clearly falls under fourth exception to section 300 IPC. (Para 30) In the case of Jugut Ram Vs. St. of Chhattisgarh (2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 520, the Hon'ble Apex Court modified/altered the charges from Section 302 IPC to 304-II IPC. In that case also the weapon lathi was used and the case was of sudden provocation. In the said case two injuries were found on the head of the deceased caused by lalthi blow and in the instant case also two injuries were found on the head of the deceased caused by lathi, therefore, we are of the definite opinion that in the instant case the conviction of the appellants could be altered from Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC to 304-II IPC. (Para 31) n the present case, the act of appellants are not pre-meditated or pre-motivated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC deserves to be converted into Section 304-II IPC, therefore, it can be said that though the appellants had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. (Para 34) Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

Title: Jumma Shah & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Madan Pal Singh

English hearing

BAIL/24930 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 13-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1561  

HEADNOTE hearing

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B - Bail - Principles governing grant or refusal of bail - Applicant a habitual offender with 52 criminal cases of cheating and forgery - No explanation for delay of four years in lodging FIR - Role as property mediator alleged in fraudulent sale transaction - Gravity of offence and antecedents disentitle applicant to bail - Co-accused's bail not a ground for parity - Held, discretion to grant bail must be exercised judiciously considering antecedents, gravity, likelihood of tampering with evidence and repetition of offence - Bail refused. (Paras 14, 20, 22, 23, and 25) HELD: This Court has taken into consideration of the fact that the applicant has almost 52 criminal cases pending against him under section 420 IPC. Under Schedule 1 of the Code or Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), an offence under Section 420 IPC is cognizable and non-bailable and is triable by a Magistrate of the First Class, therefore, the instant offence is serious in nature. It is also noted that he is habitual offender of commission of the same nature of the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. In view of the aforesaid facts, there is great apprehension in the mind of the Court that applicant upon release on bail may tamper with evidence and may influence the witnesses. There are also great apprehension that he may breach the conditions imposed by this Court and can repeat the same nature of offence in future. Taking into the consideration of aforesaid reasons, this Court cannot take lenient view while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction. (Para 22) It is pertinent to note that co-accused in the matter who has been released on bail, however, bearing no resemblance to the present applicant as he is habitual offender and has criminal history of 52 cases. (Para 23) Bail Application rejected. (E-14)

Title: Kamlesh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Chandra Dhari Singh

English hearing

WRIA/5494 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 07-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1555  

HEADNOTE hearing

Service Law - Assistant Teacher Appointment - Equivalence of D.Ed. and D.El.Ed. - Petitioner completed two-year Diploma in Education (D.Ed.) from M.P. Board (2014) and qualified TET (2015) - Appointment order issued in 2024 but school not allotted; later appointment cancelled on ground that D.Ed. not equivalent to Diploma in Elementary Education (D.El.Ed.) as required under NCTE Regulations - Challenge thereto. Held: NCTE notification (23.08.2010) prescribes "Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)" as minimum qualification. However, syllabus comparison reveals substantial differences: D.El.Ed. focuses on child psychology, elementary education pedagogy, and inclusive education, while D.Ed. is more general, oriented towards upper primary. Therefore, D.Ed. cannot be treated as equivalent to D.El.Ed. Appointment rightly cancelled. No interference warranted. Writ Petition dismissed.

Title: Sanghpriya Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery

English hearing

WRIA/10380/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 13-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1550  

HEADNOTE hearing

Intermediate Education Act, 1921 - Back Wages - Principle of "No Work No Pay" - Not applicable where employee is prevented from working due to employer's illegal order - Petitioner's appointment was duly approved on 20.5.1994. Director of Education cancelled the approval on 27.2.1998, which was quashed by the High Court on 5.10.2023 with a direction that "necessary consequences will follow". In contempt proceedings, the authorities stated in compliance affidavit that the petitioner has been treated in service w.e.f. 13.5.1998. However, DIOS denied salary on the plea that petitioner had not actually worked after cancellation of approval. Held: Principle of "no work no pay" does not apply where the employer itself restrains the employee from working. Once the cancellation order dated 27.2.1998 was set aside, the original approval revived, and petitioner stood reinstated w.e.f. 13.5.1998. Since the fault lay with the employer in not permitting him to work, the petitioner is entitled to back wages from 13.5.1998 till retirement along with consequential benefits. (Paras 10, 11, 12). (E-5)

Title: Abdul Wahab Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vikram D Chauhan

English hearing

WTAX/71 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1530  

HEADNOTE hearing

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950- Article 226-Customs Act,1962-Sections 28H, 28I & 28J-Customs Tariff Act,1975: Chapter 8 Vs Chapter 20-M/s Rawder Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. imported "roasted areca nuts" after obtaining an advance ruling from the Customs Authority for Advance Ruling (CAAR), which classified the product under Tariff Item 2008 19 20 (Chapter 20 of Customs Tariff Act)-The Customs Department disputed this classification and claimed the product was instead "dried areca nuts" falling under Chapter 8, specifically Tariff Item 0802 80-The department challenged the CAAR ruling via Custom Appeals and also refused to release the imported goods, citing adverse test reports from CRCL, New Delhi-The importer, in turn, filed a writ petition for release of the goods and to enforce the advance ruling-The Court upheld the CAAR's ruling, it held that roasting is a process distinct from drying involving high heat that alters the physical and chemical properties of the nut-Since Chapter 8 deals with moderate heat/drying and Chapter 20 includes roasted nuts, the classification under 2008 19 20 was correct-Conflicting lab reports were presented, private lab reported moisture content below 4%, declaring the nuts as roasted while CRCL, New Delhi(govt. lab) found moisture content above 7%, declaring them dried and unfit for human consumption- However, The court found merit in the importer's claim and circumstances-Hence, the importer's goods cannot be treated as mis declared solely based on disputed lab reports-the Impugned letter dated 27.12.2024 and seizure memo dated 10.03.2025 quashed- Customs directed to release the goods immediately. (Para 1 to 46) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

Title: M/S Rawder Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajan Roy,Om Prakash Shukla

English hearing

WRIC/1002411/1999 Judgment/Order Date: 16-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1523  

HEADNOTE hearing

(A) Administrative Law - Firearms - Deposit of licensed firearms during Parliamentary elections - Arms Act, 1959 - Section 24-A & 24-B - Validity of police direction requiring deposit - No suspension/cancellation of licence - Lack of statutory backing - Election Commission - licence-holders cannot be compelled to deposit firearms unless licence is suspended or cancelled in accordance with law - no nexus between objective sought to be achieved and impugned action - Deposit of licensed firearm cannot be enforced in absence of statutory order suspending/cancelling licence - Police cannot compel deposit solely on commencement of election process - Authorities shall not compel firearm license holders to deposit firearms without a prior written notice, especially if they have valid licenses, no criminal antecedents, and were granted the license for security purposes. (Para - 8, 20 to 23) Petitioners, including advocates and law-abiding citizens, holding valid and renewed firearm licenses for their security - having no criminal antecedents, were directed by police officials to deposit their firearms at the police station due to upcoming parliamentary elections - by means of a general order without any written notice - Petitioners filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the authorities not to compel them to deposit their firearms. (Para - 2,3) HELD: - In order to ensure peace and peaceful conduct of elections, firearms may be deposited to the police station concerned by issuing a written notice, but the authorities in no case shall compel the firearm licence holders to deposit their firearms in case they have a valid license, no criminal antecedents, and the license was issued for security. Respondents were directed not to compel the petitioners to deposit their firearms without a prior written notice. For causing harassment to the petitioners by means of a general order, a cost of Rs. 25,000/- was awarded to be paid to the petitioners within six months. (Para - 21 to 24) Petition disposed of. (E-7)

Title: Mohd. Arif Khan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali

English hearing

WRIC/1000570/2001 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1521  

HEADNOTE hearing

(A) Administrative Law - Judicial review of an administrative order - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 132 - Whether a subsequent officer has the jurisdiction to cancel a predecessor's order without providing an opportunity of hearing - An administrative order passed by a subsequent officer, which cancels a predecessor's order, is invalid and liable to be quashed if it is done without notice, without an opportunity of hearing, and without a vested power of review.(Para - 7 to 10) Petitioner, a Scheduled Caste landless agricultural labourer in possession of land for over 40 years - challenged the Sub-Divisional Officer's order cancelling earlier grant without notice - passed allegedly on social forestry claim - without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. (Para - 3 to 6) HELD: - Impugned order was quashed on the grounds that it was passed without notice or opportunity of hearing, and the officer had no jurisdiction to review the earlier order passed by his predecessor. (Para - 10,11,12) Petition Allowed. (E-7)

Title: Laxmi Objection Filed Appropriate Bench & Ors. Vs. U.P. Zila Adhikari/ Sub-Divisional Officer Misrikh Sitapur & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali

English hearing

WRIC/31912 /2018 Judgment/Order Date: 15-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1510  

HEADNOTE hearing

Civil Law - U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 - Inclusion in Grant-in-Aid List - Government Order dated 07.09.2006 - Government Order dated 14.07.2020 - Petitioner's institution granted permanent recognition in 1986 - Claim for grant-in- aid wrongly rejected firstly on non- existent ground of suspicious signature and thereafter on unsustainable grounds including appointment of two Class-IV employees - Petitioner's earlier writ ppetition No.66902 of 2009 allowed with categorical positive direction that if there is some optimum limit the petitioner shall be adjusted against such institution or alternative arrangement shall be made - Despite that, respondents again rejected claim which was quashed in Writ Petition No.48835 of 2011 and special appeal dismissed. Held : Claim was rejected on grounds not sustainable in law, right of petitioner crystallised under Government Order dated 07.09.2006 and subsequent Government Order dated 14.07.2020, which provided that it was not feasible to open a new institution or to establish a new institution on grant-in-aid, could not defeat such crystallised right, rejection on pretext of new policy misconceived - Once State Government had extended benefit of grant-in-aid to similarly placed institution denial to petitioner was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Impugned order set aside, Special Secretary, Basic Education, U.P. directed to take petitioner's institution on grant-in-aid and provide full financial aid forthwith - Writ petition allowed. Allowed. (E-5)

Title: C/M Janhit Madhyamik Vidyalaya & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saral Srivastava

English hearing

WRIC/14892/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1505  

HEADNOTE hearing

(A) Writ Jurisdiction - Registration of Documents - Challenging Official Act of Sub-Registrar - Registration Act, 1908 - Section 34 - Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 22 - Partition Act, 1893 - Section 4 - Rules/Regulations - Rule 285 in UP Registration Manual - Duty of Registering Officer - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 - Writ jurisdiction not to be exercised to usurp that of the civil Court - Petitioner must find his remedy in the civil court - For a party to challenge the official act of the registering authority, there must be reliance on the documents presented for registration. (Para - 10,11) Petitioner, co-sharer in inherited property - challenged the Sub-Registrar's act of registering a sale deed executed by his cousins through a power of attorney - arguing the Sub-Registrar failed to perform his statutory duty under Section 34 of the Registration Act - breach of preferential right under Section 22 Hindu Succession Act. (Para - 1, 2, 7) HELD: - Writ petition was not maintainable as the underlying controversy between the parties was civil in nature. Petitioner must seek his remedy in a civil court and refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction to interfere with the official act of the Sub-Registrar. (Para - 10 to 12) Petition disposed of. (E-7)

Title: Kamlesh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Arindam Sinha,Avnish Saxena

English hearing

WRIC/13012/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 06-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1502  

HEADNOTE hearing

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-SARFAESI ACT-Rule 9(5)- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002-The petitioner filed a writ seeking a refund of Rs 17.49 lakhs, which was 25% of the bid amount deposited by him an e- auction conducted by the respondent Bank on 29.12.2023-This amount was forfeited by the Bank when he failed to pay the remaining 75% within the stipulated time, as per Rules 9(5) of the Rule 9(5) of the Rules,2002-the petitioner argued that the forfeiture was unjust since the Bank later withdrew the SARFAESI proceedings and re-initiated them, which he claimed invalidated the original forfeiture and demanded refund on equitable grounds-The court held that forfeiture under Rule 9(5) is a statutory consequence not subject to equitable considerations-The petitioner failed to demonstrate any exceptional or extraneous circumstances that justified his failure to deposit the remaining amount-The withdrawal and re-initiation of SARFAESI proceedings by the Bank did not invalidate the prior forfeiture.(Para 1 to 11) The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

Title: Anil Kumar Jaiswal Vs. U.O.I. & Anr.

Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava

English hearing