
WRIA/11524 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 03-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 191
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings challenged and imposition of major penalty - Invalid Inquiry - Uttar Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7,13 - Failure to hold oral inquiry and prove charges by evidence -U.P. Civil Services Regulations - Article 351-A - post-retirement disciplinary action - against a government servant - U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 - Section 4 - remedy before Tribunal - In all major penalty matters, charges have to be proved by production of evidence in the first instance by the employer - Inquiry Officer cannot return findings by merely reading the charge- sheet and the reply of the charge-sheeted employee; evidence, both oral and documentary, must be produced by the establishment and witnesses cross- examined - Departmental inquiry must strictly follow the procedure laid down in Rule 7; failure to do so vitiates the entire proceedings - Non-consideration of Article 351-A renders denial of emoluments legally vulnerable. (Para -2,10,13,35) Petitioner challenged disciplinary proceedings initiated against him - earlier remanded for de novo inquiry by Tribunal - Inquiry Officer failed to fix date, time, and place for inquiry - No oral evidence was led by establishment - No opportunity given to petitioner to cross-examine witnesses - Inquiry Officer erroneously assumed that charges stood proved based on documents and petitioner's reply alone - Inquiry Officer was bound to require establishment to prove charges by leading oral and documentary evidence - Breach of Rule 7 of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Violated salutary principles of natural justice - Disciplinary authority passed order of reduction to basic pay - later amended to denial of salary for dismissal period as petitioner retired during pendency of proceedings.(Paras 24 to 32) HELD: - After retirement, only the Governor had the authority to impose punishment under Article 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations. Punishment imposed was not permissible either under Rule 3 of Rules of 1999 or under Article 351-A. Respondents were held incompetent to pass any punitive order based on a flawed inquiry report. Fresh inquiry could be held only in accordance with Rule 7 and salutary principles. Any punishment, if warranted, could only be imposed by the Governor under Article 351-A. impugned orders were quashed. (Para -33 to 37) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Jagmohan Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing

WRIA/7683 /2021 Judgment/Order Date: 05-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 187
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Regularisation - U.P. Regularisation of Persons Working on Daily Wages or on Work-charge or on Contract in Government on Group 'C' and Group 'D' Posts (Outside Purview of the U.P. Public Service Commission) Rules, 2016 - Group 'D' employee engaged on contractual basis - Denial of regularisation on technical grounds - Held, impermissible - Employer is a model employer - Has to act fairly - Nomenclature not determinative - Nature of work, continuity of service, and perennial need to be considered - Writ petition allowed. B. Service Law - Regularisation - Petitioner, a Group-D multipurpose employee engaged on contractual basis, had discharged various duties assigned to him without interruption. His claim for regularisation was declined on the ground that he did not possess the technical qualification for appointment as Pump Operator and was a contractual employee. Held : Denial of regularisation on such technical grounds amounted to unfair labour practice. Court emphasized that the real nature of employment must be determined by lifting the veil and examining the duties performed, duration of service, and the ongoing need for such services. Court further observed that multipurpose employees, who perform diverse tasks under the direction of the employer, cannot be denied regularisation solely due to the absence of qualification for one specific role, particularly when they are willing to be appointed to other Group-D posts for which they are otherwise eligible. Respondents were directed to consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation in Group-D category . (Para 8, 11, 15) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Ras Bihari Srivastava Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ajay Bhanot
English hearing

WRIA/368/2021 Judgment/Order Date: 12-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 167
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Service Law - Appointment - Ambiguity in Advertisement - ambiguous expressions like "concerned/relevant/allied subject" - Aligarh Muslim University's recruitment to post of Assistant Professor (Chemistry) - AMU used ambiguous expressions like "concerned/relevant/allied subject" in the advertisment - Supreme Court in Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University, (2009) 4 SCC 555 has very specifically directed that the University shall lay down the qualification necessary for filling up the post laying down exact essential qualification indicating allied subject and subject stream which is required to be mentioned for making application for filling up said post - Writ petition disposed of with direction to AMU to ensure future advertisements carry specific, unambiguous qualifications to avoid prejudice and exclusion of otherwise eligible candidates (Para 15, 18) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Amna Khatoon C/o Rajeeb Ahmad & Ors. Vs. A.M.U. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
English hearing

A482/28882/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 28-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 154
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law-The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 482- Law protects those who respect it and abide by it. A person flagrantly violating law cannot be equated with a person following the process of law. A person avoiding the process of law cannot be let to ventilate his grievance as per his choice for selective stages as per his sweet will--- The accused-applicants never joined the investigation which concluded in filing of a charge sheet against them as an absconder and again they are absconding from the trial court despite knowledge of the proceedings and thus are not entitled to invoke the inherent powers of this Court for seeking quashing of proceedings-- - total non cooperation of the applicants in the investigation, vagueness of the pleadings, the conduct of the applicants in not joining the investigation and not co-operating therein due to which charge sheet was submitted against them as absconders, intentional efforts to avoid the courts orders as would appear from the order of the revisional court and the fact that charge sheet is not being challenged on its merits coupled with the fact that the order of taking cognizance dated 01.3.2024 being challenged in a revision which stood dismissed on its merits, no ground for interference is called for. (Para 20 & 21) Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Mukul Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. C.B.I.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Samit Gopal
English hearing

A482/25836/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 06-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 148
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Criminal Law - Cognizance on police report - Informant's right to notice - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 173(2)(ii) , 190(1)(b) &319 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence - Principles of natural justice - Magistrate not bound to issue notice to informant before taking cognizance against charge-sheeted accused - No prejudice is caused to the informant when Magistrate has taken cognizance only against charge-sheeted persons without issuing notice to the informant with respect to the persons named in FIR but not charge-sheeted - there remains scope to summon others under Section 319 Cr.P.C. during trial.(Para - 25 to 31) FIR lodged by the applicant - charge sheet submitted only against one accused - final report against five others - applicant challenged the order of cognizance taken by Magistrate without notice to her. (Para - 2,3) HELD: - The right of the informant is not in any way affected in case if the Magistrate has taken cognizance only against charge-sheeted persons without issuing notice to the informant with respect to the persons who are named in the FIR but have not been charge-sheeted. No interference is called for in the present matter. (Para -31,33) Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. dismissed. (E-7)
Title: Smt. Suman Prajapati Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manju Rani Chauhan
English hearing

A482/18295/2021 Judgment/Order Date: 27-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 132
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law-The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973-Section 482 - The Indian Penal Coe, 1860-Sections 420, 323, 376, 344 - The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Prevention Act, 2020-Sections 3/4- Any compromise or settlement with respect to the offence of rape, against the honour of a woman, which shakes the very core of her life and tantamounts to a serious blow to her supreme honour, offending both, her esteem and dignity, is not acceptable to this Court--- The object of Act, 2020 is to provide for prohibition of unlawful conversion from one religion to another by misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means--- It is clear that unlawful religious conversion, particularly when achieved through coercion, fraud, or undue influence, is considered a serious offence, in which the Court cannot quash the proceedings on the basis of settlement between the parties--- The alleged offences under section 376 IPC and Section (1) U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, 2020, are serious in nature and non-compoundable, therefore, the instant proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties in exercise of powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Para 48, 54 & 56) Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Taufik Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manju Rani Chauhan
English hearing

A482/13742/2021 Judgment/Order Date: 12-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 126
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 - Sections 138 & 142- Application U/s 482 - Larger Bench - constituted to address whether filing of a Impleadment application in a complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is valid, if filed solely against the proprietor without naming the company as an accused - Different High Court benches had given conflicting decisions - The reference arose due to conflicting High Court rulings interpreting Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels. - Later, the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Goel v. St. of U.P. clarified that if a company is involved, it must be named as an accused in the complaint. Also, once the legal time limit (limitation period) for taking action under Section 142 is over, no new accused can be added - held - no additional accused can be impleaded subsequent to filing of a complaint once the limitation prescribed for taking of cognizance of the offence under section 142 of the NI Act, has expired - hence, the reference was thus answered - and the matter will resume before the concerned Single Judge - Application is pending. (Para - 9, 10, 11) Application Pending. (E-11)
Title: Mohd. Khalid Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajiv Gupta,Samit Gopal
English hearing

A227/11807/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 11-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 116
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India,1950- Artcle 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 115, Order 21 Rule 97,102 - The Transfer of Property Act-1882-Section 52- Revisional court had exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 by the petitioner before the executing court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC--- The executing court has also failed in its endeavour to decide the execution case pending before it since the year 2014, and after framing the issue of res judicata had postponed the matter to be decided at the final stage--- Where it is an admitted fact that the property was transferred during pendency of the suit and petitioner is a transferee pendente lite and hit by provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the executing court should have, at the very outset, proceeded to pass the order in pursuance of Rule 102--- Matter is remanded to the executing court to pass necessary orders on the application moved under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC in accordance with law within a period of one month. (Para 34, 35 & 37) Petition disposed of. (E-15)
Title: Smt. Santosh Awasthi Vs. Smt. Urmila Jain
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing

A227/10194 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 21-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 98
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Artcle 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 94 - Order 40 Rule 1- Appointment of Receivers and controlling day to day functioning of Sri Thakur Baldeo Ji Maharaj Temple aka Dauji Mandir--- No person shall act as Receiver of the Temple in question and a Seven Member Management Committee be constituted in terms of Agreement dated 02.09.1904---Matter remitted with following directions to learned District Judge (1) Convene a meeting of 734 Pandas/Sevayats of Dauji Temple, who are divided in six Thoks, to be conducted by the senior most Additional District Judge within a month (2) A supplementary agreement would be executed by all 734 members only to the extent that their names are brought on record, without touching upon the terms and conditions laid out in the Agreement dated 02.09.1904 (3) members shall select a person from their respective Thoks to be sent to Committee of Management for managing the affairs of the Temple (4) Management Committee would be constituted in terms of Agreement dated 02.09.1904 and only the new members of 734 families would become part of the supplementary agreement (5) newly constituted Management Committee would look after day to day affairs of the Temple---The District Judge, Mathura, is hereby requested to get the complete inventory prepared of all movable and immovable properties of Dauji Temple, including cash, bank accounts, ornaments etc. immediately, within a period of two days from today. When the management is handed over to newly constituted Committee of Management, the inventory so prepared shall also be passed on. (Para 61 to 65) (E-15)
Title: Govind Ram Pandey & Anr. Vs. Nutan Prakash & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing

A227/8387 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 28-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 89
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Artcle 227 - The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996-Sections 34 & 37- Payment of mense profit for not complying the award in its letter and spirit- Petitioner has not vacated the premises in question within 30 days from the date of passing the award and further the petitioner has not brought any material on record to show that the award was stayed by any of the competent Court--- The arbitral award was not stayed or any material was brought on record otherwise and ultimately the award has been affirmed by the Apex Court and no proceedings are pending thereafter---the contesting respondent no. 1 is entitled for mesne profits as the award was not complied with in its letter and spiri. (Para 22 & 25) Petition lacks merit, dismissed. (E-15)
Title: M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Piyush Agrawal
English hearing

A227/8117/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 05-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 84
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Artcle 227 -The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 107, Order 6 Rule 17--- Once the amendment application has been rejected and the same had not been challenged, petitioner cannot be given liberty to bring very same facts again after some time by filing new application. In fact such act of petitioner is barred by the Principle of res judicata---Court has rightly rejected the amendment application by the impugned order---The appellate Court has ample power to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction---no illegality in the impugned order. (Para 11, 15 & 16) Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Raj Kumar Chauturvedi Vs. U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Neeraj Tiwari
English hearing

A227/4173/2018 Judgment/Order Date: 06-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 73
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 20 & 227 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406, 420, 465, 471 & 506 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 468 & 482 - The dispute over the management of a society and an educational institution led to multiple legal proceedings - a complaint case - an FIR was field in 2005 - but after investigation, the police submitted a final report in 2006 due to insufficient evidence - final report was accepted by the trial court in 2012 - In 2017, the opposite party filed another complaint against petitioner based on the same facts - leading to summoning orders - criminal revision - dismissed - instant writ u/Article 227 - additionally, after a six-year delay, opposite party no. 2 contested the acceptance of the final report through an Application U/s 482, with no justification for the delay - both cases arise from the same cause of action and are decided through a common judgment - court finds that, - (i) the dispute primarily pertains to the management of a society and educational institution, which is of a civil nature but, attempts to give it a criminal colour were deemed inappropriate, - (ii) to prove an offense under Section 406 IPC, entrustment is necessary, which wasn't shown in this case, - (iii) The summoning order was vague and lacked proper reasoning, - (iv) Filing a second complaint on the same set of facts after a significant delay was deemed unwarranted and hit by Section 468 CrPC - (v) before summoning someone, the court must carefully check if there are valid grounds to proceed, which wasn't done here - held, - trial court has erred in entertaining the second complaint and further the order impugned is very cryptic order, whereby the applicant have been summoned, therefore, the same is not sustainable - accordingly, the writ petition under Article 227 is allowed - and - the application under Section 482 CrPC is dismissed due to delay and lack of merit. (Para - 27, 28, 30, 36, 37, 38) Writ petition Allowed & Application Dismissed. (E-11)
Title: Yogeshwar Raj Nagar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Anish Kumar Gupta
English hearing

A227/1667 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 27-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 66
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Artcle 227 - The Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 2006-Sections 80 & 82-The impugned order in utter mechanic manner as also without application of mind and without taking note of the specific provisions related to the issue involved before it--- The application preferred under Section 80 of the Code can be allowed or rejected after taking note of the conditions indicated in the statutory provisions including the conditions indicated under Sub- Section (4), (7) and (8) of Section 80 of Code and the permission so granted can be cancelled only in terms of Section 82 of the Code and all these aspects ought to have been taken note of by the opposite party no.2 who failed to take note of the same-Impugned order set aside/quashed. (Para 6-8) Petition allowed. (E-15)
Title: Kanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Lavania
English hearing

A227/1133 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 12-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 58
HEADNOTE hearing
Manner in which the possession has been taken violates the rights of the petitioners vested by virtue of Article 300A of the Constitution of India- was contrary to the mandate of Section 14 of the Act-Writ petition maintainable- directions issued. W.P. allowed. (E-9)
Title: M/S Durga Travels & Ors. Vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia
English hearing

CMRA/33 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 07-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 54
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law-Civil Procedure Code,1908- Order XLVII Rule 1(a)-The review application filed by the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of maintainability-The court held that since the petitioner had already availed the appellate remedy by filing a Special Appeal and got it dismissed as withdrawn without seeking liberty to file a review, the review application was not maintainable in law under Order XLVII Rule 1(a) CPC-The court relied on the Supreme court's rulings in Thungabhadra Industries, Kunhayammed, and Khoday Distilleries, and held that invoking appellate jurisdiction bars a subsequent review.(Para 1 to 13) The review application is dismissed. (E-6)
Title: Adeel Ahmad Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing

HABC/384/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 04-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 43
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - National Security Act, 1980 - Section 3 (2) - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 & 404 - Against detention order - Due to animosity of Gram Pradhan election, petitioner along with other associates committed murder of brother of informant, by firing upon him at public place carrying arms - Taking cognizance, proceedings under NSA started against all accused persons including petitioner - Held, in some cases, detenue has been acquitted whereas in some cases police found no evidence, resulted into submission of closure reports - After getting acquittal in four cases in 2010, no crime committed by detenue up to 2019, hence for period of 9 years detenue never indulged in anti-social activities - Investigating Officer mentioned about disturbance of law and order but such St.ments not given by informant and eye witnesses - Authority failed to find nexus between alleged offences and order of detention. (Para 14, 23, 26, 27) Apprehension of D.M. that detenue who was detained in jail, likely to get bail soon and further satisfaction that he may be involved in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order has no rational basis - Impugned order quashed. (Para 33) Writ petition allowed. (E-13)
Title: Kapil Kasana Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vivek Kumar Birla,Nalin Kumar Srivastava
English hearing

FAPL/27/2018 Judgment/Order Date: 11-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 38
HEADNOTE hearing
Family Law - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 13 & 13B - Divorce - Appeal against dismissal of divorce petition by Family Court - Long separation and absence of cohabitation - Settlement arrived at before Mediation and Conciliation Centre - Payment of permanent alimony completed - All pending litigations agreed to be withdrawn - No further claims to be raised - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 89(2)(d), Order XXIII Rule 3 - Mediation - Court empowered to pass decree based on voluntary and lawful mediated settlement - Satisfaction of statutory requirements under CPC and Mediation Rules - Decree of divorce rightly passed on basis of compromise- U.P. Civil Procedure Mediation Rules, 2009 - Rule 26 - Settlement recorded by Mediation Centre found to be voluntary and non-collusive - Court satisfied before passing decree-Held, decree of divorce by mutual consent granted in terms of Settlement Agreement - Appeal allowed. (Paras 10 to 14) HELD: In this regard, this Court is guided by Section 89(2)(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which St.s that where a dispute has been referred for mediation, the mediator will assist the parties in reaching a settlement, and if a settlement is arrived at, the Court may pass a decree in accordance with its terms. This ensures that mediated settlements have legal enforceability and enables courts to grant decrees based on mutually agreed terms, thereby promoting amicable dispute resolution..... (para 10) Additionally, Rule 26 of the U.P. Civil Procedure Mediation Rules, 2009, mandates that the Court ensure the settlement is not collusive and has been arrived at voluntarily.... (Para 11) In the present case, both parties have amicably resolved and settled all pending cases and consideration has also been exchanged between them as per the Settlement Agreement dated 07.04.2022, executed before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court. Upon perusal of the said agreement and after considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is satisfied that the settlement is bonafide and voluntary. The only thing now remaining is the passing of a decree of divorce between the parties. (Para 12) In this regard, this Court is also guided by Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which allows compromise of suits, provided that such compromise is in writing and signed by the parties. It is evident from the records of the case before this Court that the Settlement Agreement dated 07.04.2022 fulfills these requirements and has been entered into voluntarily by the parties. As per this provision, the Court is bound to record the agreement and pass a decree in accordance with it.... (Para 13) Since the settlement is bona fide and has been acted upon by both parties, this Court, in the exercise of its powers under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is competent to pass a decree in terms of the settlement, even beyond the scope of the original suit. Furthermore, as the proceedings arise from the Family Court, this Court is also empowered to grant a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in light of the settlement, as recognized under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code, 1908. (Para 14) Appeal allowed. (E-14)
Title: Khajanchi Vs. Preete
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vivek Chaudhary,Om Prakash Shukla
English hearing

FAFO/182 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 05-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 30
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 168, 169 & 173 - Motor Accident Claim - Duty of Tribunal - Mandatory inquiry - Tribunal failed to conduct proper inquiry under Section 168 - Contradictory vehicle registration numbers in FIR and claim petition - Tribunal proceeded without deciding application to summon key eyewitness for cross-examination -Plea of accident involving insured vehicle not proved - Award passed without adequate scrutiny - Judgment and award set aside - Matter remitted for fresh adjudication-Appeal partly allowed. (Paras 10 to 13, 14,16, and 23) HELD: The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mohamed Haji Latif & ors.; 1968 AIR SC 1413/1968 SCC OnLine SC 63, has held that if a party, even if the burden of proof does not lie on him/her, withholds important evidence in his possession which can throw light on the facts in issue, the adverse inference may be drawn by the court. (Para 14) The aforesaid facts were required to be examined by the Tribunal under the facts and circumstances of the case because the accident was denied by the owner and driver. They adduced evidence to the effect that the vehicle was being driven in their village on the date of accident, though they have specifically not St.d that at the time of the accident the vehicle was not at the place of accident, but there are several discrepancies in the pleadings and evidence adduced by the claimant-respondent, which were required to be inquired by the Tribunal in inquiry under Section 168 of the M.V.Act. Section 168 of the M.V.Act provides that on receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice to the insurer and parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or as the case may be, subject to the provisions of Section 163, and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. (Para 16) In view of aforesaid Section 169 of the M.V.Act the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-Section (2) of Section 169 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed and it shall be deemed to be a Civil Court. Thus the Claims Tribunal has to hold the inquiry following the summary procedure to ascertain the truth to be just. It is true that the claim petition under the M.V.Act has to be decided on the preponderance of probabilities and the strict proof beyond doubt as required under the Criminal Cases is not required but when discrepancies as above were pointed out before the Tribunal and an application was also moved by the appellant for summoning the eye witness for cross-examination, whose evidence could have been material to clarify the discrepancies, the same was required to be inquired by the Tribunal or adverse inference could have been drawn. (Para 18) In view of above and considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the view that the learned Tribunal has not only failed to make inquiry as required under Section 168 of the M.V.Act, but also failed to given sufficient opportunity to the appellant by not considering and disposing of its applications before passing the impugned judgment and award, therefore the same is liable to be set aside with the direction to the Tribunal to consider and decide the case afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made here-in-above in this order. (Para 23) Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)
Title: TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Aman Kumar & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing

FAFOD/178/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 17-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 23
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Delay Condonation - Departmental appeal filed with delay of 700 days - St. failed to furnish sufficient cause - Casual and negligent conduct - Delay attributed to administrative lethargy and bureaucratic red tape - Court held that such conduct cannot justify condonation - Exercise of discretion in condoning delay must be judicious - Delay not explained satisfactorily Government not entitled to special treatment under limitation law - Appeal dismissed. (Paras 7, 8, 14, and 15) HELD: From a perusal of the averments made in the application for condonation of delay duly supported by an affidavit and the supplementary affidavit, it emerges that it took the government almost ten months to take a decision for filing of the appeal and despite the appeal having been allegedly drafted in December 2023, it took the pairokar almost 11 months in order to find out as to whether the appeal has in fact been filed or not. This itself indicates the cavalier and casual attitude on the part of the officials in filing the appeal before this Court which has resulted in a delay of 700 days. (Para 7) In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been of the view that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the person has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. Though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all rigour when prescribed by statute. (Para 14) In the instant case, as already indicated above, there has been a casual, cavalier and lackadaisical approach on the part of the appellants all along inasmuch as, it has taken the St. almost ten months to take a decision for filing of the appeal and despite the appeal having been allegedly prepared, it took the pairokar eleven months to realize that the appeal has not been filed. This is sheer negligence on the part of the appellants and thus, the grounds, as taken in the applications for condonation of delay, do not inspire confidence and consequently, the applications for condonation of delay merit to be rejected and are accordingly, rejected. (Para 15) Application dismissed. (E-14)
Title: Dig UP Police Headquarters Allahabad & Anr. Vs. Smt. Mithlesh & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing

FAFO/137/2017 Judgment/Order Date: 10-03-2025 (2025) 3 ILRA 5
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act, 1908 - Sections 166 & 173 - Enhancement of Compensation - Claim petition filed by claimant alleging that claimant met with accident due to negligent driving of driver of offending Truck, his left leg amputated in hospital - Allowed and awarded compensation - Impugned order - Held, disability certificate issued by Chief Medical Officer with signatures of orthopaedic surgeon as one of signatory - Certificate shows permanent disability of 70% - Rightly determined. (Para 10, 13, 41) Tribunal awarded Rs.50,000/- for pain and sufferings, Rs.1,00,000/- for loss of amenities and degradation in married life - Claimant who was student of intermediate and 18 years of age, good player, on account of loss of one leg he became incapable of playing it, therefore, it cannot be equated in terms of money as he could made his career in any field in future but he cannot do the same, therefore, compensation to be enhanced to Rs.1,50,000/-. (Para 42) Regarding claim of future treatment, Rs.2,00,000/- will be sufficient as by interest of same, claimant will meet out said expenses in future - Thus, claimant entitled to compensation alongwith interest. (Para 43) Writ petition partly allowed. (E-13)
Title: National Insurance Co. Ltd. Lucknow Vs. Gaurav Sharma & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing

WRIC/9298 /2021 Judgment/Order Date: 20-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 704
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Section 47-A - Deficiency of Stamp Duty - A big chunk of land was sub-divided into 37 small plots, having a common passage of 9 meters, which was duly approved by the Development Authority. The exit of the colony joined the main road. Petitioner purchased a residential plot situated on the 9-meter-wide internal road, but deficiency of stamp duty was imposed, treating the plot as if situated on the main road, merely because the larger chunk of land abutted the main road, and that too without any spot inspection. Held: Once a colony is approved by the Development Authority, the internal roads therein are also deemed approved and are to be maintained by the Authority thereafter. Once the sub- division and the common road have been approved by the Development Authority, the inference drawn that the petitioner's plot is situated on the main road has no legs to stand on. Merely because the road of the colony joins the main road, as stated above, will not entitle the authorities to charge the deficiency of stamp duty on the petitioner as compared to the first plot, which is adjacent to the main road. (Paras 8, 9) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Birjesh Aggarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Piyush Agrawal
English hearing

WRIA/56331/2012 Judgment/Order Date: 05-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 687
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Punishment - Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 - Fundamental Rule 54-B - The most important feature about the decision of the Government to pay allowances for the period of suspension is that a decision in this regard has to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority, after giving a notice to the government servant and calling for his explanation within the period specified under Fundamental Rule 54 of the Financial Hand Book. Here, admittedly, no notice was served upon the petitioner, calling for his explanation by the Disciplinary Authority as to why for the period of his suspension from service, nothing towards his emoluments be paid, except the subsistence allowance that he had received. (Para 26) B. Rule 5 of the Rules of 1999 - It says that for the period of suspension after notice to the employee, a decision shall be taken by the Disciplinary Authority, whether the period of suspension shall be treated as one spent on duty or not. But, that power may not entirely apply in this case. In any case, even if there were such a power in the Disciplinary Authority, it has to be exercised reasonably; not capriciously. (Para 31) C. The decision to discount the entire period of time that the petitioner remained out of service on account of the order of dismissal passed by the respondents and since quashed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, is not one of the penalties envisaged under the Service Rules; to be specific the eight penalties enumerated in Rule 3 of the Rules of 1999. Therefore, this deprivation, inflicted upon the petitioner, not being one of the enumerated penalties, going by the salutary principle that no order, visiting a person with adverse civil consequence, ought be made without a reasonable opportunity of hearing to him, the order would be bad for want of notice and opportunity. D. If Rule 5 of the Rules of 1999 has any bearing on the issue proprio vigor or by analogy, before a deprivation of this kind for the period of dismissal was brought upon the petitioner, it was incumbent to issue notice to him in this regard and hear him on the point. This has admittedly not been done. This devastating prejudicial measure, a part of the impugned order, has come together with the order of punishment of reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale awarded to the petitioner with this Court granting liberty to the respondents to award a lesser penalty, instead of dismissal earlier ordered. If at all any kind of a measure prejudicial to the petitioner's interest, apart form the penalty imposed under the Rules, were to be taken by the respondents, it had to be with due notice and opportunity to the petitioner, afforded separately. (Para 32) E. Violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution - Apart from this part of the order being bad on account of want of notice and opportunity to the petitioner, the order is utterly arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. It is found that the penalty of dismissal from service earlier awarded to be shockingly disproportionate. The penalty of dismissal was regarded too severe by this Court and that judgment of the Court was accepted by the respondents without invoking any appellate procedures. If the respondents had not erred in passing an order of dismissal from service for a relatively trivial misconduct, the petitioner would have continued in service, suffering some minor penalty. There would be continuity in service for him, which would at least preserve his seniority and contribute to his post retiral benefits. In one stroke of pen, the petitioner has been deprived of all these benefits by this part of the order impugned. It is beyond any standard of reasonableness or fairness why an employee, who is held by this Court to have been awarded a shockingly disproportionate terminal punishment for a relatively trivial misconduct with a direction to award a lesser punishment, upon reinSt.ment would loose the benefit of continuity in service, including seniority and reckoning of the period of service for the purpose of post retiral benefits. This part of the order, to the clear understanding of the Court, given the circumstances that the petitioner's dismissal from service was regarded as shockingly disproportionate, is both arbitrary and unfair. (Para 33) The impugned order dated 19.07.2012, to the extent it punishes the petitioner, is hereby quashed. (Para 35) Writ petition allowed. (E-4) This writ petition assails an order passed by the Joint Commissioner (Commercial Tax), holding charge of the Deputy Commissioner (Administration), Commercial Tax, Noida dated 19.07.2012 to the extent it punishes the petitioner after disciplinary proceedings.
Title: Sripal Giri Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing

WRIA/16401 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 11-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 675
HEADNOTE hearing
A. The petitioner challenged the order dated 16.08.2024 which assigned him Booth Level Officer (BLO) election duties- Held, Authorities must review and revise the deployment of teachers for election duties-Teachers should only be appointed if all other categories (Patwaris, Panchayat Secretaries etc.) are exhausted-until review, the petitioner must perform duties only on holidays or after school hours. (Para 1 to 42) The writ petition is disposed of. (E-6)
Title: Surya Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ajay Bhanot
English hearing

WRIA/12905 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 11-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 668
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Pension - Bank of Baroda (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 - Regulation 41 - Commutation - The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 - Rule 10 A - Restoration of commuted pension - Doctrine of Estoppel - Wednesbury Unreasonableness - Matters related to commutation of pension are complex affairs involving vexed issues traversing diverse fields, requiring specialized expertise - In such matters, the Court would venture only in cases of manifest and apparent arbitrariness. (Para -13) Petitioner (retired employee of Bank of Baroda) challenged - validity of a note appended to Regulation 41 of the Bank of Baroda (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 - which mandates a 15-year period for the restoration of commuted pension - petitioner argued - commuted amount had already been set off in 9.81 years, making the remaining deductions unjust enrichment. (Para - 2,3,4) HELD: - Petitioner voluntarily accepted the commutation scheme in 2013 and is now estopped from challenging it. 15-year restoration rule is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause case. Provision does not amount to unjust enrichment, and no interference is warranted. (Para -13,19) Petition dismissed. (E-7)
Title: Dan Bahadur Yadav Vs. Managing Director And Ceo Bank of Baroda Corporate Center Mumbai & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing

WRIA/11079 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 10-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 662
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Retirement - Determination of date of birth - Uttar Pradesh Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 - Rules 2 & 3 - For a government servant, who is not a matriculate or the holder of an equivalent certificate for the determination of his DOB, the DOB recorded in the service book at the time of entry into service by mandate of Rule 2 has to be deemed as his correct DOB for all purposes, which include superannuation. Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 is unequivocal, in that, that certificates of education below that of the high-school or an equivalent certificate are irrelevant for the purpose of a determination of a person's age. (Para 17) B. Words and Phrases - 'deemed' - The employment of the expression "deemed" in the context of Rule 2 is of profound relevance. (Para 17) It is for the purpose of curtailing controversy related to age of non-matriculate employees in the lower grades of government servants, assuming that there would be no dependable testimonial about it, the statute raises a fiction that the DOB or age recorded in the service book at the time of entry into service shall be deemed to be correct for all purposes u/Rule 2, which includes superannuation. No other evidence about such a non-matriculate employee's DOB is, therefore, to be let in or examined at all. (Para 17) Since there is no cavil about the issue that the petitioner's DOB, that was originally recorded, was 20.02.1967, and later on changed on the basis of the notarial affidavit dated 09.01.2012 furnished by the petitioner, the change is clearly in the teeth of Rule 2 of the Rules 1974. Moreover, by virtue of Rule 3, the Rules of 1974 have overriding effect over all other rules. The petitioner's DOB originally recorded in his service book, to wit, 20.02.1967, has to be regarded as his correct and immutable DOB. (Para 17, 18) Writ petition allowed. (E-4) Present petition assails office memo dated 13.05.2024 and the order dated 03.07.2024, directing the petitioner's retirement on 31.08.2024, upon attaining the age of superannuation. Both these orders have been made by the Works Manager, Irrigation Workshop Division, Meerut.
Title: Jagbeer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing

WRIA/3770 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 04-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 648
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Government Employment - Merger - Seniority and Promotion - Challenge to the validity of the Employees of Entertainment Tax Department (Service Cadres of Officers, Inspectors, and Other Employees) in the related Cadres of Commercial Tax Department - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7 - The U.P. Government Servant Seniority Rules, 1991 - Clause 4(h) - 'substantive appointment' - Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - Section 174 , Uttar Pradesh Merger Rules, 2022 - Rule 2, Rule 3(3), Rule 3(4), Rule 4(4), Rule 4(5), Rule 4(7), The Constitution of India - Article 311 - Change in chances of promotion does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution - Judicial review of government policy decisions is limited and should not interfere unless the policy is arbitrary, irrational, or unconstitutional - Merger of employees into a new department is a policy decision of the government and cannot be challenged unless it violates statutory or constitutional provisions - Seniority and promotion are subject to the new rules of the merged department. (Para - 47 to 56) Petitioners were originally appointed as Entertainment Tax Inspectors - later promoted to higher positions - U.P. Goods and Services Tax Act repealed the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act - Entertainment Tax Department was abolished - State Government merged employees into Commercial Tax Department through a policy decision - petitioners were placed at the bottom of seniority list in their respective cadres of Commercial Tax Department under Merger Rules - challenged placement - ground - arbitrary, violated Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution - affected their promotional prospects - State Government contended - only employees of Entertainment Tax Department merged into Commercial Tax Dept. and not posts of Entertainment Tax Dept. - seniority had to be determined under new cadre rules of Commercial Tax Department.(Para - 33 to 48) HELD: - Merger Rules, 2022, are upheld as valid and do not violate Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Placement of the petitioners in the Merger Rules, 2022 is a part of policy decision and the petitioners have no locus to question the policy decision taken by the State Government. Substantive appointment and promotions of petitioners shall be considered from 21.07.2022 instead of 24.04.2018. (Para - 45,48,49,56) Petition dismissed. (E-7)
Title: Jai Prakash Chand & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing

SPLA/459 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 13-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 635
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 14, 19, 19(1)(a), 21 & 226 - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952- Chapter VIII - Rule 5, - U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 - Chapter - III, XII, Regulation - 7, 40, 40(b) & 40(c)- Intra Court Appeal - assailing the validity of judgment and order passed by Single Judge - Writ Petition - writ petitioner Md. Sameer Rao was earlier known as Shahnawaz - who has cleared High School & Intermediate Board in year 2013 and 2015 respectively - by means of an application in year 2020 based upon some newly issued Adhar Card & PAN card in the name of Md. Sameer Rao and also a gazette notification approached to Board to incorporate his new name in High School & Intermediate Certificates and issue a new certificates - Board rejected his request being time barred - writ petition - single judge set aside the impugned order - instant appeal - court finds that, the learned Single Judge has held Regulation 40(c) as arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India - further, various other directions have also been issued like surrender of public documents of identity like Adhar card, Ration card, Driving Licence, Passport, Voter I.D. card etc. to the competent authorities with a direction to them to register the change of name, dispose off or destroy the earlier identity documents as per law and issue fresh documents consistent with his changed name - and - Learned Single Judge has also issued a direction to the Secretary, Ministry of Home, Government of India and the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P., Lucknow to create appropriate legal and administrative framework to ensure that both Governments work in concert to achieve the end of making identity related identity documents removing anomalies therein -- held, (i) in fact, these are policy matters exclusively in legislative/ executive domain and on factual matrix of the matter, the writ petitioner had no case on merits, - (ii) in view of specific administrative order, the jurisdiction to read down or hold any regulation as arbitrary, unconstitutional and/or violative of fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution only vests with the division bench in appropriate cases - hence, judgment of the learned single judge cannot be sustained - Special Appeal stands allowed - writ petition dismissed, accordingly. (Para - 31, 32, 35) Special Appeal Allowed. (E-11)
Title: State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Arun Bhansali,Kshitij Shailendra
English hearing

WRIC/1000097 /1995 Judgment/Order Date: 19-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 631
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Revenue Law -U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 331 & 333 - Maintainability of second appeal -appeal cannot be converted into revision - conversion of second appeal into revision held to be without jurisdiction - Appeal cannot be converted into revision under Section 333 of the Act - such conversion is illegal and unsustainable. (Para - 24 to 26) Petitioners, in continuous possession since the zamindari period - declared Seerdars under Section 12 - order attained finality as no appeal was filed - later declared Bhumidars with transferable rights under Section 229-B - affirmed in appeal - belated review was dismissed - second appeal was illegally converted into revision by the Board of Revenue - leading to the present writ petition challenging the impugned order. (Para - 4 to 18 ) HELD: - Appeal could not be converted into revision. Board of Revenue's order suffered from apparent illegality and was unsustainable in law. Second appeal was filed but was wrongly converted into revision, which was impermissible. Hence, the impugned order suffered from illegality and was liable to be set aside. (Para - 25,26) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Shiv Balak Singh & Anr. Vs. Board of Revenue & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali
English hearing

WRIC/33222/2023 Judgment/Order Date: 07-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 628
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law -Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act,1976 & 1999(Repeal)- Section 3-The petitioner challenged the interference by the state of up and bareilly development authority with its possession over a piece of land declared surplus under the Act,1976-The petitioner contended that actual physical possession had never been taken by the State and hence, it was entitled to the protection u/s 3 of the Repeal Act,1999-mere symbolic possession does not amount to actual possession and that de jure vesting u/s 10(3) of the Act is not sufficient to extinguish the rights of the holder without actual physical dispossession u/s 10(5) or 10(6)-Finding no evidence of peaceful or forceful dispossession by the state, the court held that the petitioner retained possession of the land and was entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act-Hence the impugned order was quashed and writ of mandamus was issued to restrain the respondents from interfering with the petitioner possession.(Para 1 to 9) The writ petition is disposed of. (E-6)
Title: Span Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Vipin Chandra Dixit
English hearing

WRIC/28993 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 10-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 627
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226- Clause 8.5.6 of Marketing Discipline Guidelines,2012-delay in issuance of show cause notice-mandatory nature of time limit-the petitioner challenged a show cause notice issued beyond permissible period of 30 days from the date of sample test results, as prescribed in Guidelines 2012-The court observed that the said clause mandates issuance of notice within 30 days-in the present case, no valid explanation was provided for the delay of over two months- the impugned show cause notice was quashed and liberty was granted to the respondents to conduct a fresh inspection in accordance with law.(Para 1 to 7) The writ petition is disposed of. (E-6)
Title: Gyanendra Kumar Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Vipin Chandra Dixit
English hearing

WRIC/26640 /2021 Judgment/Order Date: 24-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 612
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Urban Development and Administrative Law - Challenge to the inaction of NOIDA Authority and claim for multiple reliefs relating to Sports City-II Scheme - Constitution of India - Article 243Q - Lead Member -Consortium - Zero Period - Integrated Township Project - Once the lead member opted out and ceased to hold the minimum mandated shareholding of 30%, it lost the right to seek any relief under the Scheme.(Para - 60) Sports City-II Scheme launched by NOIDA in 2011 for integrated development of sports and ancillary facilities in Sectors 78, 79 & 150 - Land allotted to consortium led by petitioner - Sub- division approved at petitioner's request - Petitioner subsequently opted out - Despite holding no share or stake, petitioner sought reliefs including extension of Zero Period, approval of revised Master Plan, enhancement of FAR, and Rs. 200 crore compensation -hence petition. (Paras 2 to 19) HELD: - Petitioner having opted out of the project and holding no share or interest in the development of Sports City, has no locus standi to file the writ petition. Reliefs claimed including rescheduling of dues, FAR enhancement, and compensation cannot be granted in writ jurisdiction. (Paras - 60, 63 to 66) Petition dismissed. (E-7)
Title: M/s Xanadu Estates Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,Prashant Kumar
English hearing

WRIC/21238 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 24-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 561
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Constitutional Law - Corporate Insolvency & Fraud - Urban Planning and Development / Real Estate - Insolvency and Bankruptcy - Revalidation of Map - Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 254 - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Sections 7, 14, 29A , 65 & 238 - The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment), 2018 ,U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 - The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Sub- Clause (p), (u), (v), (y) and (za) of Clause 2 of Chapter I - Doctrine of Repugnancy - Moratorium - Reverse CIRP as Abuse of Process - Fraudulent Insolvency - Integrated Project Obligations - Public Interest & Fraud Prevention - Consortium Liability - Doctrine of Piercing Corporate Veil - In the event of a conflict between the Union law and a State law in concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter - Orders of NCLT/NCLAT passed under IBC, 2016 override decisions of State Authorities under U.P. Industrial Area Development Act - Reverse CIRP cannot be invoked to bypass liabilities in cases of fraudulent insolvency engineered to evade dues and obligations under an integrated project. (Para - 45 to 49, 120 to 123 ,136 ) NOIDA launched a Sports City Scheme in 2011 - Petitioner, a consortium member, was allotted land - Sub-divisions and lease deeds were executed - After failure to deliver the project, homebuyers filed insolvency against petitioner - Reverse CIRP was initiated under NCLT/NCLAT orders - IRP and stakeholders sought map revalidation from NOIDA - which was refused citing Board resolutions and CAG report - petition was filed challenging the refusal. (Para - 2 to 28) HELD: - Orders passed by the NCLT and NCLAT have to be complied with and Noida Authority cannot raise any objection or create any hindrance in compliance of the order. Reverse CIRP is inapplicable in cases of fraudulent insolvency designed to evade dues and project obligations. Corporate veil of the companies pushed into insolvency can be lifted to prosecute the directors for committing fraud for syphoning funds and neglecting integrated project duties. NOIDA's refusal to revalidate maps is justified given the fraud and CAG findings. (Para -50,120 to 123 ,136) Petition disposed of. (E-7)
Title: M/s Sequel Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,Prashant Kumar
English hearing

WRIC/10671/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 13-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 535
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Environmental Law - Cancellation of authorization - Slaughter house - Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 - Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to prepare an index of the relevant laws for circulation to all the concerned so that the management of slaughtering the animals and slaughter house should be done more efficiently, can by no stretch of imagination be interpreted in a manner that the requirements of all the 24 laws mentioned in the compendium have to be fulfilled before establishment of a slaughter house. (Para 64, 66) B. By mere supersession of an earlier GO a subsequent GO, would not become effective retrospectively and any GO issued by the St. has a prospective application. The GO dated 07.07.2017 does not nullify the no objection certificate dated 21.05.2015 granted by the District Level Committee, the no objection certificate dated 21.10.2016 granted by the St. Level Committee and the C.T.E. dated 04.01.2017 issued by the U.P. Pollution Control Board. (Para 67, 68) C. The judgment rendered by a coordinate bench in an earlier Writ Petition would be binding as a precedent on subsequent benches in respect of the points raised and decided in the earlier judgment. But will not operate as a binding precedent in respect of the points which have not been decided therein. The scope and effect of the GO dated 07.07.2017 and its prospective operation has not been decided in the judgment dated 31.05.2023. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment will not be a binding precedent in respect of the points which have not been decided in that judgment and it will not restrain this Court examining the issues raised in this Writ Petition. (Para 71) The petitioner's applications for grant of C.T.O. were rejected repetitively and ultimately Writ-C No. 4368 of 2022 filed by it challenging the validity of rejection order dated 11.07.2020 was also dismissed by means of an order dated 31.05.2023 without deciding the questions whether the GO dated 07.07.2017 had retrospective effect and whether the requirements of all the 24 sets of laws indexed in the GO dated 07.07.2017 could be complied with before grant of C.T.O. to the industry. (Para 74) The subject matter of the earlier Writ Petition was an order refusing to grant CTO, whereas the subject matter of the instant Writ Petition is an order revoking the C.T.O. granted to the petitioner. The issue involved in the previous Writ Petition was regarding legality of an order refusing to issue the C.T.O. whereas the issue involved in the instance Writ Petition is regarding the validity of the order revoking the C.T.O. granted to the petitioner. D. The bar of res-judicata is attracted when the matter directly and substantially in issue in a case has been finally decided by the Court in a former proceeding. The issues involved in the present Writ Petition and the previous Writ Petition are not the same, so as to attract bar of res-judicata. (Para 70) E. The Fundamental Right under Article 19 (1) (g) to carry on any occupation, trade or business is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by any law made by the St.. It can only be regulated by a law made by the St. and it cannot be taken away by a mere GO, more so, when the same cannot have any retrospective operation. This aspect was not considered by this Court in the judgment and order dated 31.05.2023 passed in Writ-C No. 4368 of 2022. (Para 79, 80) F. U.P. Pollution Control Board has no authority to direct the petitioner to obtain a revalidated no objection certificate. The U.P. Pollution Control Board has jurisdiction under the Air Act and the Water Act to pass appropriate orders to control air and water pollution only. It has no authority to pass any order regarding any subject which is not concerned with the air and water pollution. The authority which had granted the no objection certificate dated 21.05.2015 is the District Magistrate, who has not revoked the no objection certificate and who has not directed the petitioner to get the no objection certificate revalidated, of which there is no requirement as per the GO dated 07.07.2017 as well. (Para 82, 83) G. The opposite parties have treated the petitioner with hostile discrimination in revoking the C.C.A granted to the petitioner for the reason that the petitioner had not submitted a revalidated no objection certificate - The petitioner was granted C.C.A. after successful trial run of the industry. However, its commercial operations could not commence because it has established an export oriented industry which is mandatorily required to be registered with Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA). The inspection of a fully operational plant by the officers of APEDA is necessary for registration of the petitioner with the aforesaid authority. Attachment of a veterinary doctor from the department of animal husbandry at the petitioner's industry is necessary as per the provisions contained in a GO dated 13.01.2016. Although the Animal Husbandry Department had attached a veterinary doctor to the petitioner's industry vide order dated 27.12.2024, this order was cancelled by means of another order dated 31.12.2024 and the petitioner could not get itself registered with APEDA for want of attachment of a government veterinary doctor. It is not the case that the petitioner is not operating the industry, but the authorities are not permitting the petitioner to run the industry by creating obstacles in its operation. (Para 85, 86) The impugned order has been passed by the U. P. Pollution Control Board in disregard to the St.'s policy to promote industries in the St. so as to increase the opportunities of employment and attract inflow of foreign currency to the St.. It has been passed in utter disregard to the MOU dated 22.02.2018 entered into by the Hon'ble Governor of the St. agreeing to facilitate the establishment of the industry. (Para 88) Writ petition allowed. (E-4)
Title: M/s Al-Haq Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing

CRLA/659/1984 Judgment/Order Date: 25-11-2024 (2025) 1 ILRA 120
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section - 313 - Indian Penal Code,186 - Sections - 147, 148, 149, 302 & 307- Appeal - against conviction & sentence - FIR - offence of murder - investigation - PMR - site plant - charge-sheet - plea taken that they were falsely implicated due to enmity - conviction & sentence - court finds that - (i) during pendency of appeal out of 8 accused persons 6 were died therefore against them appeal had abated, (ii) pw-1 who was an injured witness was not there on spot, (iii) there was an enmity between the injured and accused persons, (iv) pw-1 had not informed the first informant about incident himself, (v) pw-1 was such a witness who could not be absolutely relied upon for the purpose of convicting the accused, (vi) surviving both appellants were carrying lathies were not armed in such a manner as would make it evident that they had gone with a premediated mind to do away with the deceased - court inclined to hold that, Conviction of the accused persons could not be based on the testimony of an eye-witness who was not believable -- hence, appeal succeeds and is allowed - conviction and sentence is set aside - direction issued, accordingly. (Para - 11, 13, 14, 15) Criminal Appeal Allowed. (E-11)
Title: Iqbal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi
English hearing

WRIC/10598/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 19-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 528
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law -Constitution of India,1950- Article 226, 14 &19(1)(g)-Drugs and Cosmetics Act,1940-Section 23 - Rules,1945-Cancellation of Drug Licence- Improper Sampling -Show cause notice Deficiency-The petitioner challenged the cancellation of its retail drug licence and the dismissal of its statutory appeal-The court held that the sampling process violated the mandatory provisions of section 23 of the Act,1940 as only one sample was drawn instead of required three or four-the second show cause notice failed to propose cancellation or allege that the petitioner was the manufacturer of the substandard drug-the final order, presumed illegal manufacture by the petitioner without supporting evidence or confrontation with contradictory distributor replies-the court held that this violated the petitioner's rights under Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and was a clear breach of Rule 66 of the ,Rules 1945-consequently, both the cancellation and appellate orders were quashed and the petitioner's licence was restored.(Para 1 to 21) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: M/s Shree Shanker Medicals Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia
English hearing

WRIC/7948/2019 Judgment/Order Date: 19-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 526
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - THE ARMS ACT, 1959 - Section 17(1)(b) - The licensing authority may by order in writing revoke a licence if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the licence - District Magistrate, cancelled the arms licence on account of misuse of weapon by threatening the police. F.I.R. in respect of the same incident lodged. In the said criminal case charge sheet submitted against the petitioner and charges framed. Criminal case pending against the petitioner. Held : Findings recorded in the criminal case may have an important bearing with regard to the cancellation of arms licence of the petitioner as the present proceedings are summary proceedings. However, in the trial if the petitioner is convicted, the same may fortify the stand taken by the State for cancellation of arms licence. However, the acquittal order would also equally effects the cancellation of the arms licence. Defence of the petitioner qua the cancellation of the arms licence was required to be proved by the petitioner by leading evidence. Petitioner did not lead any evidence, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has not misuse the firearm. It was also not demonstrated that the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, was incorrect. No error in the impugned order. (Para 9, 11) Dismissed. (E-5)
Title: Sanjeev Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vikram D Chauhan
English hearing

WRIC/3948 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 19-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 524
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Constitutional Law - Victim Compensation - Non-payment of additional compensation to acid attack victim - Prime Minister National Relief Fund - Executive Directions - Authorities required to fulfill their primary duty to serve the people, especially ones who have been disabled by egregious acts of violence - State Government directed to issue a circular to all the District Magistrates to ensure that delay of such nature is not repeated in future - Lackadaisical approach - incompetency and lack of compassion - war footing - Authorities directed to ensure payment of additional compensation to acid attack victim within stipulated time. (Para -6,7, 8) Petitioner, a victim of acid attack in 2013 - received certain compensation but not the additional compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- payable under the Prime Minister National Relief Fund - Despite instructions from the Union of India, no response was given by the District Magistrate regarding the required proforma and documents. (Para - 2 to 7) HELD: - Court directed the authorities to ensure prompt payment of additional compensation by the Union of India to the petitioner and mandated the State Government to issue a circular to all District Magistrates to prevent future delays. (Para - 6 to 8) Petition disposed of. (E-7)
Title: Rajneeta Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Vipin Chandra Dixit
English hearing

WRIB/4491 /1999 Judgment/Order Date: 17-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 518
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - U.P. Land Revenue Act,1901 - Name recorded in revenue records-Order passed to record the disputed plot in the name of the Gram Sabha-Revision filed by Petitioner- allowed stating that the Consolidation Officer's order has attained finality- opposite party filed a revision before the Board of Revenue - set aside the order of the Additional Commissioner -that the Commissioner cannot allow the revision rather he can make reference to the Board of Revenue for allowing or dismissing the revision-exercise of jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner is in accordance with law-amendment made in U.P. Land Revenue Act by U.P. Act No.XX of 1997 - the date of enforcement of amendment is 18.8.1997 and revision in the instant matter has been filed on 3.11.1997 - no illegality to decide the revision on merit rather to make reference before the Board of Revenue. W.P. allowed. (E-9)
Title: Lalsa Yadav Vs. Board of Revenue & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Chandra Kumar Rai
English hearing

WRIA/19167/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 20-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 509
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Administrative Law - Role and responsibility of State and Society - The families of defence personnel cannot be abandoned or left to their own devices by the State. The sacrosanct promise of the State and the pious duty of State officials is thus to ensure the safety, well being and welfare of families of service personnel who are separated due to exigencies of military service. (Para 15) The State authorities/local administrations have to ensure that any communication sent by a serving military officer/formation commander/Commanding Officer in regard to harassment or other problems or welfare issues being faced by the family members of defence personnel posted elsewhere are promptly attended to and efficaciously redressed by the competent State authorities. True also for family members of those military personnel who embrace martyrdom in the line of duty. For this purpose a system of accountability also has to exist in the State Government. (Para 17) B. The deficiencies in the existing system of grievance redressal - A proper system has to be put in place and made to function to meet the demands of emergent situation. Various GOs dated 17.09.2008, 30.03.2015, 06.05.2015 and 30.06.2016, which direct the local administration to promptly response to grievances of defence personnel have been brought in the record by the State. (Para 21) The aforesaid system of GOs is clearly inadequate and not delivering the desired results. The infirmities in the existing system are these. There is no oversight of a High Powered State Level Committee. Proper representation of military authorities is absent. Meetings of civil administration and military authorities are not held with prescribed regularity. There is no accountability in the functioning of the said committees. (Para 22) C. Inter Services Coordination - The three services shall establish full inter services coordination for the securing the welfare of the separated families of serving personnel. Concert in peace is precursor to synergy in war. The three services shall create proper SOPs for sending the representations /complaints of various serving armed forces personnel through their Commanding Officers to the concerned committees. All Commanding Officers and service personnel in the country be duly intimated about the existence of the above said committees and their purpose. (Para 42) D. Conclusions - The High Powered State Level Committee should ensure that the model created by the State of Uttar Pradesh becomes a benchmark of excellence and a template for other States in the country. (Para 43) Writ petition disposed of. (E-4)
Title: Sheetal Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ajay Bhanot
English hearing

WRIA/17707 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 07-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 493
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings - Uttar Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7 - Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 Section 98 - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 - Rule 3 - Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code Rules, 2016 - Rule 99. The principle is that for errors of judgment on law or facts, or even perverse conclusions or negligence of a quasi- judicial officer or a judicial officer, is not to be proceeded with in the disciplinary jurisdiction. If his errors or even perversities were to be regarded as misconduct, punishable in the disciplinary jurisdiction, the wheels of dispensation of justice or disposal of quasi- judicial business would come to a standstill. It would, most certainly, slow down to a snail's pace, never to achieve the purpose for which it is there. (Para 15, 18) In the present case, the charge cannot be said to be one that is just about an error of judgment, mistake or mere negligence in the passing of his quasi- judicial orders by the petitioner. The charge is about the petitioner's involvement, apparently for extraneous reasons or on account of improper motive. It is true that the way the charge is worded at the tail-end and in its formal close, it does appear to be nothing more that an allegation of negligence in the discharge of his quasi-judicial functions by the petitioner. But, the charge is way beyond it, with ample St.ment of imputations in the body thereof, that are suggestive of both an improper motive and extraneous consideration in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by the petitioner in the grant permission to transfer. The petitioner may not have been around in the year 1985, when bogus patta were granted in favour of the land holders, through whom it is claimed that the land belonging to the Gaon Sabha was transferred to vendees not belonging to the SC and then sold to the UPEIDA, but he was certainly around, as it appears, when rights of many of the patta holders were enlarged by conniving revenue officials. On facts such as these, he passed order granting transfer of land held by bhumidhar of the SC to vendees not of that class, without looking into the report of the Tehsildar or the SDM or without considering the fact that some files had the relevant certificates, but not placed through the SDM's report. (Para 27) This is a charge which is required to be determined at the inquiry, which will have to take its own course. Thus, it is perhaps for this reason that the petitioner has come up with the alternative prayer to the effect that a mandamus be issued to conclude the disciplinary proceedings against him expeditiously. While we are of opinion that the charge-sheet in this case cannot be quashed at the threshold, considering the fact that the petitioner's promotion is due, it is imperative that the disciplinary proceedings (not just the inquiry) be expedited. (Para 28) Writ petition disposed of. (E-4) Present petition assails the charge-sheet dated 18.08.2023, issued to him by the St. Government, initiating proceedings u/Rule 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. And alternatively prays for an order to conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner expeditiously.
Title: Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing

WRIA/15433 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 17-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 486
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service/Education Law - Appointment - When the selected candidate is placed in a College, he has no right to change his placement. (Para 23) Dr. Sachidanand Sharma was appointed as permanent Principal on the basis of the recommendation made by the Commission in the institution. He resigned from the said post and Dr. Anjali Mittal, who was senior most teacher in the institution was appointed as Officiating Principal. Upon her retirement, petitioner was given charge of Officiating Principal on 14.6.2024. After resignation of Dr. Sachidanand Sharma, the Director of Education (Higher) passed an order dated 15.01.2024, directing the Secretary/ Manager of the Committee of Management to appoint respondent no. 6, who was in wait list of the selected candidate, at sl. no. 59 as Principal in the institution in question. (Para 19) It is not disputed that prior to issuance of the letter dated 15.01.2024 by the Director of Higher Education, U.P. Prayagraj, the respondent no. 6 had been appointed as Principal of Bajrang P.G. College, Dadar Ashram, Ballia and a letter dated 03.08.2022 was issued by the Director of Higher Education to the Committee of Management of the said institution to issue letter of appointment to the respondent no. 6. (Para 19) It is also not disputed that on behalf of the Director of Higher Education and Joint Director of Education an order dated 17.08.2023 has communicated to the Special Secretary. Higher Education, Anubhag-2, Lucknow that Manoj Kumar Rawat, respondent no. 6, who was in wait list of the selected candidate of Advertisement No. 49 of 2019 had been allotted Bajrang P.G. College, Dadar Ashram, Ballia and accordingly placement had been completed on 03.08.2022. It is further intimated by the Director that there is no provision in the Act or GO for change of allotment of the College. Further the Director of Higher Education by letter dated 13.12.2023 has intimated that there is no provision in the Act of 1980 for change of place of allotment/college. Thus, the Director of Higher Education has already rejected the prayer of respondent no. 6 for change of allotment of College. Moreover, the respondent no. 6 in his counter affidavit has not stated anything about the said orders, which infact rejects the claim/request of the respondent no. 6 for change of the College. (Para 20) B. Locus Standii - The petitioner being appointed as Officiating Principal, has locus to challenge, the appointment of respondent no. 6. (Para 25) In the present case, the Director of Education (Higher) having passed an order for appointment of respondent no. 6 in Bajrang P.G. College, Dadar Ashram, Ballia, the appointment process come to an end and the Director is ceased with the power to make recommendation or appointment of such candidate to any other College, as has been held in case of Km. Ragni Srivastava (infra). Moreover as the Director himself has rejected the claim of respondent no. 6 for his transfer from Bajrang P.G. College, Dadar Ashram, Ballia to Meerut College, Meerut by orders dated 17.8.2023 & 13.12.2023, the subsequent order dated 15.1.2024, directing the management to appoint respondent no. 6 as Principal is wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained and hereby quashed. (Para 26) Writ petition allowed. (E-4)
Title: Yudhveer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Prakash Padia
English hearing

WRIA/10045 /2020 Judgment/Order Date: 06-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 482
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Service Law - Backwages during the period of imprisonment - Principle of "no work no pay" - Petitioner was imprisoned from 23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 after a criminal case was registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by the Anti-Corruption Department on the complaint of a private electricity consumer. Criminal case was not instituted at the behest of the Corporation/employer. By the impugned order, arrears of salary to the petitioner for the period from 23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 were declined on the principle of "no work no pay." Held: The principle of "no work no pay" is subject to exception only in rare instances, such as when an employer prevents an employee from discharging duties or creates impediments thereto. In the instant case, the petitioner has no lawful entitlement to backwages during the period of his imprisonment. The Corporation/employer neither created any hindrance nor prevented the petitioner from performing his duties. Granting backwages in violation of the principle of "no work no pay" would amount to unjust enrichment of the petitioner and an unfair loss to the State exchequer. Prayer for grant of backwages rejected; however, the petitioner is entitled to continuity in service for the said period for the purposes of pension. (Para 11) Dismissed. (E-5)
Title: Shivakar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ajay Bhanot
English hearing

WRIA/9193 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 24-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 459
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - UP Government Servant Seniority Rules, 1991 - Rules 8 & 9 - Seniority - Earlier inter-se seniority has been finalized after deciding the objections - Seniority list was published and acted upon too - Effect - How far it create rights - Permissibility of its review - Held, a vested right is created by issuance of the seniority list in as much as a government servant acquires a right to be considered for promotion in case any person lower in the seniority list is promoted, similarly he can claim parity in pay scale and other service benefits based on seniority - It has all the trappings of a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the St. government was denuded of its powers to embark to review of the order dated 13/07/2016 and the subsequent seniority list on merits at the subsequent stage. (Para 36 and 42) B. Service Law - UP Government Servant Seniority Rules, 1991 - Rules 8 & 9 - Seniority - Long-standing seniority - Inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees was determined - Scope of review - Doctrine of functus officio - Applicability - Held, once a final seniority list has been issued after deciding the objections filed by the concerned parties against the tentative seniority list, finding authority becomes functious officio and does not retain any power to repeatedly exercise the same power to redetermine the seniority between the same group of persons again and again - The longstanding seniority which is in existence for 3-4 years may not be unsettled. (Para 52 and 78) C. Service Law - Seniority - Process of its determination - Nature - Held, the appointing authority is exercising quasi- judicial powers of determination of seniority and his actions would be subject to the same limitations as that of a judicial/quasi judicial authority. (Para 55) D. Judicial review - Scope - Administrative action - Ministerial action and administrative decision - Distinction - In the ministerial action, the reasoning processes is minimum and almost routine - On the other hand, the administrative decision the process in which a decision is taken on objective standard of determination of which opinions may differ. The reasoning process takes into account the rival contentions and then comes a decision. This distinction is important because an administrative action is always reviewable while an administrative decision is the reviewable in special circumstances. (Para 33) E. Principle of res judicata - Distinct applicability to judicial decision and administrative decision - Held, a judicial decision is res judicata between the parties and it is for this reason it is not only the parties who cannot reopen the said decision but even the judicial authority which made the decision is prevented from reviewing it on merits. On the other hand an administrative decision which is not based on a dispute between two parties and which has not given after hearing the parties does not operate as res judicata. (Para 33) F. Principle of res judicata - Nature and Applicability - Held, the principle of res judicata is species of the principle of estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has attained finality, the principle of res judicata shall fully apply. (Para 44) G. Estoppel - Cause of action estoppel and Issue estoppel - Distinction - Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject-matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged - Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant, one of the parties seeks to reopen that issue. Here also bar is complete to re-litigation but its operation can be thwarted under certain circumstances. (Para 50) H. Expression 'functus officio' - Meaning - A person who has discharged his duties, or whose office or authority is at an end. (Para 53) I. Seniority - Determination thereof - Date of substantive appointment - Relevancy - Appointment from back date - Competence of government to make it - Held, proviso to Rule 8 empowers the Government from making appointments from a back date which would be the deemed date of substantive appointment - The statutory rules having provided for the same it cannot be said that the same would be illegal or without jurisdiction. (Para 67) J. Interpretation of statute - UP General Clause Act, 1897 - S. 13 - Word 'Person' - A singular include plural - Applicability - Held, the interpretation which is reasonable and is in conformity with the Constitutional scheme, is liable to be accepted and followed rather than any interpretation which would lead to absurdity and arbitrariness - In interpreting the proviso to Rule 8 appointments can be granted from back date either to a single individual or to a group of individuals. (Para 73) K. Doctrine of Precedent - ' Stare decisis et non quieta movere' - Meaning - To stand by decided matters and not to disturb settled points. (Para 75) L. Practice and procedure - Non-joinder of party - Challenge to promotion order - All the affected person were not impleaded - Effect - Held, impleading a long list of parties will not only unnecessarily stretch the process of dispensation of justice but will also involve extravagant expenses in serving all the parties. In cases where there is a common grievance of a large number of employees, impleading few affected employees would be sufficient compliance with the principle of joinder of parties. (Para 81) Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
Title: Shiv Datt Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing

WRIA/2211 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 24-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 452
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - UP Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 9 - Punishment - Stoppage of two increments - Inquiry report was submitted - However, the disciplinary authority, while holding the petitioner guilty, relied upon some independent report of other authority - Permissibility - Held, the disciplinary authority is bound to consider only the material, which has been adduced during the inquiry proceedings. If on perusal of the material which has been adduced during the inquiry proceeding, lead him to take a different stand what has been recorded by the inquiry officer, he is within his competence to issue a notice to the petitioner disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer but at this stage he cannot enlarge the scope of inquiry and take the opinion from a third person and relying on the said material imposed punishment upon the government servant - Rule 9 of the Rules of 1999 has been grossly violated. (Para 13, 15 and 16) Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
Title: Dineshwar Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing

WRIA/2077 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 19-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 445
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Financial Hand Book - Rules 53 & 54 - ReinSt.ment in service - Entitlement of back-wages - Relevant issue, which is required to be take into consideration - No allegation of delaying the expeditious disposal of disciplinary proceeding was there - Effect - Respondent considered the gainful employment after dismissal - Permissibility - Held, only relevant consideration in reducing the back wages paid to a government servant, if any, on his reinSt.ment after dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, would be the fact that he had not obstructed in expeditious disposal of the disciplinary proceedings - The ground considered by the respondents was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of grant of back-wages - The petitioner would be entitled to full back wages from the date of his suspension to the date of his reinSt.ment. (Para 14, 15 and 18) Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
Title: Gorakhnath Shukla Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing