SAPL/12 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 13-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 42
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - Learned lower appellate court could not have granted relief of permanent injunction without recording finding of possession of plaintiff/ respondent no.1 on basis of pleadings, evidence and material on record, particularly when land in dispute was not identifiable because suit was filed for permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed for same land - Even if, plaintiff- respondent no.1 may be in possession on said portion on basis of decree of partition passed by competent court in accordance with law because land on which relief of permanent injunction granted was not specifically in issue in instant proceedings as land in dispute found unidentifiable - Thus, impugned judgment and decree not sustainable in eyes of law and set-aside. (Para 18) Appeal allowed. (E-13)
Title: Ram Lal (Dead) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Vijay Laxmi & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
GOVA/1062 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 21-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 28
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860 - Sections 498A, 304B & 302 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section 4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161 & 313 - Appeal against acquittal - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 113-B - Death due to demand of dowry not proved as theory propounded by PW1 to PW3 regarding demand of dowry made just after four days of marriage when deceased (victim) went for first time to her maternal house from matrimonial house stands belied since FIR lodged on 22.6.2017 relating to incident dated 18.6.2017 does not show this fact - No cruelty was inflicted upon deceased - DW1 deposed that A1 was present in his house on fateful day as he came to his house to meet his ailing teacher, two or three women came from house of A1, apprised that wife of A1 consumed pesticide pills, A1 along with DW1 and villagers went to house where victim consumed by mistake thinking it to be medicine for fever - Testimony of DW1 intact, no questions for demolishing testimony has been asked by prosecution. (Para 41, 43) PW2 and PW3 deposed that accused A2 was staying for the past 30-32 years, where her husband was working - Nothing on record either in deposition of prosecution witness or otherwise suggest that A1 and A2 were involved in commission of crime - No illegality in impugned order. (Para 44, 46) Appeals rejected. (E-13)
Title: State of U.P. Vs. Manish Kumar & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajiv Gupta,Vikas Budhwar
English hearing
FAFO/44 /2021 Judgment/Order Date: 11-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 24
HEADNOTE hearing
Railway Claims - Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 -Compensation - Interest - Applicability of Rina Devi principle - Compensation determined under amended rules higher than calculated amount with interest under earlier rules - Tribunal rightly awarded compensation as per higher amount under new rules - Interest granted from date of award, not from date of accident - Held, as per U.O.I. v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572, interest on compensation is payable only on the amount accruing as per comparative calculation - No error in Tribunal's computation - Request for lump sum disbursal without pleading or cause rejected - Appeal misconceived and dismissed. (Paras 7,8, and 10) HELD: The alleged untoward incident happened on 15.06.2015, in regard to which the claim petition was filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal, which has been allowed by means of impugned judgement and award dated 18.10.2019 passed in Case No.OA/II/U/995/15 by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The amount of compensation of Rs.4 lakhs at the time of accident was enhanced to Rs.8 lakhs by means of the amendment in Part-I of the Schedule of the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 vide G.S.R. 1165 (E) dated 22.12.2016. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of U.O.I. Vs Rina Devi (supra) has concluded that the compensation will be payable as applicable on the date of the accident with interest as may be considered reasonable from time to time on the same pattern as in accident claim cases and if the amount so calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled for higher of the two amounts.... (para 7) In view of above, the compensation is to be calculated on the date of award considering the compensation applicable on the date of accident and interest thereon as may be considered reasonable from time to time and after calculating the compensation applicable on the date of accident with the interest thereon up to the date of award and on comparing the same with the present applicable compensation, whichever is higher, the same would be the amount of compensation on the date of award, for which the claimant is entitled. Once the amount of compensation is to be determined in view of paragraph 15.4 of the aforesaid judgement of U.O.I. Vs Rina Devi (supra) on the date of award, the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that on the so determined amount of compensation, the interest should have been awarded from the date of accident, is misconceived and is not tenable because once the said amount of compensation accrues on the date of award after calculating as per procedure provided in the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the interest can be awarded only for the subsequent period from the date it accrues as the interest can not be awarded for the period prior to the date on which it accrues. (Para 8) So far as the judgement relied by learned counsel for the appellants, in the case of Anju & ors. versus U.O.I. & ors.connected revisions (supra), is concerned, the appellants have not taken any ground in appeal and shown that the appellant is in need of the whole money together. It is also to be noted that despite repeated asking to learned counsel for the appellant by the Court that if required, he may move an affidavit and application for amendment, which may be considered, learned counsel for the appellants declined to do so and insisted for disposal of appeal today itself. Thus the contention of learned counsel for the appellants is misconceived and not tenable. (Para 10) Appeal dismissed. (E-14)
Title: Amrendra Bahadur Singh & Anr. Vs. U.O.I.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
FAFO/32 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 17-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 9
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Sections 96, 100 & 107 - Order 41 - Rule 17, 23, 23-A, 25 & Order 43 Rule (1) (u))-Appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(U) against the remand order passed by the Appellate Court---If particular issue of limitation was not framed by the trial court as recorded by the lower appellate court and on the basis of record the trial court has recorded a finding which shows the suit is not time barred, it could have considered the same and recorded a finding thereon, if the evidence is sufficient by framing a issue, if required as first appeal is in continuation of the suit and appellate court has all the powers for considering suit on facts as well as law---Admittedly the commission report is on record, but no objection to the same has been filed by the defendant-respondents and no finding has been recorded by the trial court that it is not satisfied with the proceedings and the report of commissioner, therefore, it stands final and if it has not been considered by the trial court and the lower appellate court was of the view that it was required to be considered, it could have considered the same and upon considering it an independent finding could have been recorded and after it if the appellate court was of the view that the matter is required to be remanded, it could have remanded recording specific findings as remand on technical ground without affecting merit is not tenable.(Para 36 & 40) The impugned order was passed without dealing with the case as an appellate court under Section 96 of C.P.C. and exercising the powers under Section 107 of C.P.C. read with Order-41, Rules-23, 23-A and 25 and passing judgment without complying with the provision of under Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C., therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside and the matter is liable to be remanded to the lower appellate court to consider and decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and the observations made herein-above in this order. (E-15) (Para 41)
Title: Prakash Narain & Ors. Vs. Hari Bux Singh & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
BAIL/39053 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 20-02-2025 (2025) 2 ILRA 4
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 306, 376, 313 & 323- Bail - Abetment of Suicide - Allegations of coercing victim into repeated abortions - Suicide note silent on applicant's role - FIR initially under Section 302 IPC, later converted to Section 306 IPC - No direct incitement or overt act attributed to applicant - Victim found hanging in locked room - No evidence of forcible entry or strangulation - Allegation of illegal influence in investigation unfounded - Held, prima facie ingredients of Section 306 IPC not satisfied - Bail granted. (Paras 33 to 37) HELD: It is settled principle of law that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial. No material particulars or circumstances suggestive of the applicant fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like have been shown by learned A.G.A. (Para 33) The FIR mentions the fact that the applicant had committed the murder of the deceased person, but the investigation St.s otherwise. It St.s that it is a case of abetment to suicide. The door of the deceased person is St.d to have been broke open by the guard and the security officer of the society. (Para 35) No direct overt act has been assigned to the applicant of having abetted the deceased to commit suicide. It is true that the deceased being a woman might have been under stress. (Para 36) It is admitted in the instant case that the applicant and the deceased person were having consensual corporeal relationship with each other. The element of abetting the deceased to commit suicide seems to be missing in the instant case. (Para 37) Bail Application allowed. (E-14)
Title: Saurabh Meena Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Krishan Pahal
English hearing
CREF/1 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 22-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 811
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 86, 341, 349, 372, 374, 377, 378, 390 & 446 - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 - Rule 18, 22 & 41 - Criminal Reference - in an appeal against acquittal while summoning the accused person under Section 390 Cr.P.C. coercive process even of the nature of bailable warrant or non-bailable warrant may be issued against the appellant having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case but it may not be construed to mean that in each and every appeal against acquittal the accused person must be summoned in variably by issuing bailable or non-bailable warrants and in an appropriate case summons may also be issued and in appeal against conviction wherein an appellant has already been released on bail and his counsel is not appearing for arguing the appeal no warrant of arrest could be issued straightaway against him and only bailable warrant be issued at the first instance to ensure his representation. (Para - 119) (B) Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 86, 341, 349, 372, 374, 377, 378, 390 & 446 - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952- Rule 18, 22 & 41 - Criminal Reference - where non-bailable warrants issued against an appellant - in appeal against conviction or against acquittal - and - as to whether such accused person or appellant against whom non-bailable warrants have been issued by High court, may be released on bail by the District Court or the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned without any such stipulation occurring in the order of the High Court - held, they have no jurisdiction to release such person on bail - thus, observation & directions as contained in order dated 18.01.2024 passed in Government Appeal No. 454/2022 and the directions dated 19.01.2024 in Government Appeal No. 2552/1981 cannot be said to be a correct appreciation of law. (Para - 120, 155) (C) Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 86, 341, 349, 372, 374, 377, 378, 390 & 446 - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952- Rule 18, 22 & 41 - Criminal Reference - Whether an appeal, either against acquittal or conviction, can be heard by appointing an Amicus Curiae for the accused- respondent or the convicted-appellant - an appellant who is avoiding his presence before the court and is not cooperating with hearing of the appeal may not be allowed to do-so - held, if the appellate court is satisfied that delaying tactics are being adopted by such an accused or appellant/convict, it may act in accordance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of 'Bani Singh & ors.Vs St. of U.P.', Surya Baksh Singh Vs St. of UP, and 'K.S. Panduranga Vs St. of Karn.' and in 'Anokhilal Vs St. of MP' - answered accordingly. (Para - 155) Disposed of. (E-11)
Title: In Re- Procedure To Be Followed In Hearing Of Criminal Appeals Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Sangeeta Chandra,Pankaj Bhatia,Mohd Faiz Alam Khan
English hearing
WRIA/17483 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 15-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 800
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Compassionate Appointment - U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 - The concept of compassionate ground appointments is a welfare measure taken by a model employer. However, an unjustified generous approach in compassionate ground which is not consistent with the applicable service rules will confer benefit to underserving and ineligible candidates, and simultaneously deny the rights and lawful claims of eligible and meritorious candidates from getting appointment to government posts. Treating compassionate ground appointments as an unconditional and vested right and making it a source of recruitment will shear the thin veil of legality which protects such appointments from the vice of unconstitutionality. The very concept of compassionate ground will then be exposed to the wrath of Articles 14, 15, 16 of the Constitution of India. (Para 14) B. The purpose of grant of compassionate ground appointments can be subserved and their constitutionality can be saved only by strict compliance of the rules governing the grant of compassionate ground appointments. (Para 15) Appointment on compassionate grounds seeks to relieve the immediate financial hardship faced by the dependants of the deceased. It acts as an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the defendant are given preferential appointment ahead of other equally meritorious candidates similarly placed and hence it cannot be claimed as a right. This appointment must be done in accordance with the rules for such appointment. The dependant seeking such appointment must be eligible for such consideration and facing financial hardship to the extent delineated by the rules. (Para 18) C. One of the mandatory prerequisites for appointments on compassionate ground as contemplated in the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 is that the application for employment should be made within five years from the date of death of the government servant. However, the said provision also empowers the St. Government to dispense with or relax the aforesaid time limit in appropriate cases. The said provision for condonation of delay by the St. Government/ competent authority after due application of mind to relevant facts is mandatory in nature. Failure to condone the delay in making the application for compassionate appointment by the St. Government/competent authority after due application of mind to relevant factors will vitiate the appointment. (Para 21) The mandatory prerequisite of condonation of delay in making the application for compassionate appointment by the competent authority under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 has been violated. The appointment of the petitioner as a contractual worker was not made under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. Consequently the petitioner cannot be treated as a regularly appointed employee and is not entitled to benefits claimed by him. Further, the petitioner cannot set up a claim for appointment on compassionate ground at this belated stage under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. (Para 29) D. Appointments based on descent or claims of appointment which rest on heredity, are abhorred in the scheme of Articles 14, 15, 16 of the Constitution of India. Delay in making a claim for compassionate ground appointment dilutes the case of immediate financial penury, and consequently negates the entitlement for appointment on compassionate ground. Appointments on compassionate ground cannot wait for the claimants to attain majority or to enable them to acquire additional qualifications and get a better deal in the said appointments. Infact, such grounds militate against claim for appointments on compassionate ground. (Para 23) In the present case, the petitioner was a minor at the time of the death of his father. No post could have been reserved for him till he attained majority. The delay of almost seven years in making the application for appointment on compassionate ground was never condoned by the St. Government/competent authority under the Dying-in- Harness Rules, 1974. (Para 28) In the facts of this case, contractual employment of the said nature cannot be converted into an appointment under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. If this course is made permissible it will become a novel device to breach specific statutory provisions. (Para 31) Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)
Title: Ashish Yadav Vs. Managing Director, U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ajay Bhanot
English hearing
WRIA/12938 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 03-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 792
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Pension - Defence Service Regulation: Regulation 333; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Second marriage can be contracted only in certain circumstances and that too after obtaining sanction from the competent authority and any violation of this provision may attract termination of service of concerned employee. (Para 16) In the present case, Late Tek Bahadur Thapa was a Nepalese Gorkha and as per Regulation 333 quoted above, he could have remarried in the following circumstances: - (i) When the wife suffers from incurable insanity (madness), (ii) When there is no birth till ten years of marriage, (iii) When the wife is paralysed and cannot move, (iv) When the wife becomes blind of both the eyes. (v) When the wife is suffering from an infectious incurable sexually transmitted disease. (Para 7) Late Tek Bahadur Thapa had four daughters and a son from his first marriage and it is nobody's case that his first wife Smt. Dalli Maya Kumal suffered from any disease/infirmity mentioned in Regulation 333(B)(a) of Army Regulations. Sri Tek Bahadur Thapa did not apply for sanction to contract plural marriages on any of the grounds mentioned in Regulation 333(B)(b). Service of the person who has contracted plural marriages without obtaining sanction from the competent authority can be terminated under the provisions contained in Regulation 333(B)(g) of Army Regulations, but the fact of Late Tek Bahadur Thapa having entered into plural marriages was not brought to the notice of the authorities during his service period or even thereafter during his life time. Therefore, no administrative action for termination of his service was taken. (Para 6, 8) B. The petitioner could not point out any provision of law under which this marriage (1st marriage) was void. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the marriage of late Tek Bahadur Thapa with Smt. Dalli Maya Kumal was void. (Para 14) C. The submission that the petitioner is an illiterate person and she was not responsible for proper upkeep of the service records of her deceased husband and it was for the authorities to correctly maintain the service records of late Tek Bahadur Thapa and record the name of the petitioner therein as wife, does not hold any force as information about family members/dependents is given to the authorities by the concerned employee/officer himself. (Para 15) The Armed Forces Tribunal dismissed the original application filed by the petitioner on the ground that her name is not recorded in the service record of the deceased soldier. (Para 9) Late Tek Bahadur Thapa had mentioned the name of Smt. Dalli Maya Kumal as his wife and it is admitted by the petitioner that Smt. Dalli Maya Kumal was in fact the wife of late Tek Bahadur Thapa. The petitioner's marriage with late Tek Bahadur Thapa was in contravention of the provisions of Regulation 333 and it would not confer any right on the petitioner so far as any benefits relation to or arising out of services rendered by late Tek Bahadur Thapa is concerned. (Para 16) Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)
Title: Smt. Pin Maya Kumal Vs. Govt. of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
WRIA/12422 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 06-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 782
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Disciplinary Enquiry - Sexual Harassment - Conspiracy - CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 - Rule 11(i), 29 - The action (revisional power) could not have been set aside merely for want of the order having been passed by an authority other than the President. Petitioners have submitted that a bare perusal of the Rule 29 indicates that besides the President, the Head of Department and the appellate authority are also empowered to exercise the revisional power under the Rule. In the present case, the fresh action has been instituted by an order passed by the appellate authority. (Para 12) B. None of the allegations levelled in the complaint make out a case "sexual harassment" as defined in the guidelines issued by the Government of India. (Para 18) C. The complainant has already written to the Additional Director, G.S.I. stating that the dispute between her and the opposite party no. 2 stands settled. In these circumstances, before directing any action to be taken against the opposite party no. 2, the authorities ought to have satisfied themselves whether any prima facie case of commission of sexual harassment by the opposite party no. 2 was made out. The authorities have not recorded any satisfaction before instituting proceeding afresh against the opposite party no. 2. After examination of record, it can be concluded that no case for instituting any fresh proceeding on the allegation of sexual harassment is made out against the opposite party no. 2. (Para 19) D.(i) The opposite party no. 2 has sent a complaint dated 07.05.2023 to the Director General, GSI against two officers, reproducing a transcript of a conversation showing that they had instigated the complainant to file a false complaint against the opposite party no. 2 and in response to this suggestion the complainant had stated that the opposite party no. 2 had not said anything to her. The opposite party no. 2 has requested the Director General to take action against the aforesaid two officers but it appears that no action has been taken against those two officers. (Para 20) (ii) The Internal Complaints Committee had found opposite party no. 2 as well as the complainant guilty of aggravating their personal issues to the extent that the whole office suffered and the committee had recommended appropriate action to be taken against both but action has been taken against opposite party no. 2 only and no action has been taken against the complainant in spite of the recommendation of the internal complainants committee. It prima facie indicates that the authorities have acted vindictively against the opposite party no. 2 while shielding the other erring persons. (Para 20) In these circumstances, no fresh proceedings can be drawn against the opposite party no. 2 on the ground that he has committed an act of sexual harassment against the complainant. (Para 21) E. Jurisdiction - Although it is a general principle of law that the validity of an order is to be examined on the basis of the reasons mentioned in the order. It is equally well settled that even if an order suffers from some illegality, the High Court will not exercise its jurisdiction to quash the same if it would result in restoration of another illegality or if it would propagate an injustice. The High Court being a court record as mentioned in Article 215 of the Constitution of India, has all powers inherent in such a court so as to secure the ends of justice. Interfering in the impugned order passed by the tribunal for on the ground that the reason assigned by the Tribunal for setting aside the order is incorrect, would result in initiation of fresh disciplinary proceedings against the opposite party no. 2, which is not warranted for the reasons mentioned in this order and which would not be in the interest of justice. (Para 22) Writ petition dismissed. (E-4) Present petition seeks quashing of the judgment and order dated 08.05.2024, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow allowing Original Application No. 332/00365 of 2023 filed by the opposite party no. 2.
Title: Union of India & Ors. Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal Lko. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
WRIA/10247 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 10-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 775
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Payment of Gratuity - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 4 - Gratuity is payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered service for not less than five years either on his superannuation or on his retirement or resignation or on his death or disablement due to accident or disease. (Para -19,22) (B) Service Law - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 4(6) - An employee's gratuity can be fully or partially forfeited if their services are terminated due to - (i) Willful damage or loss to employer's property ,(ii) Riotous or disorderly conduct, (iii) Acts or violence or (iv) Offences involving moral turpitude - Termination of service is required for gratuity forfeiture - Termination of service is the sine-qua-non to forfeiture, fully or partly, of the gratuity.(Para -20) Petitioner's husband, a storekeeper in the respondent corporation - died in harness - Employer sought to recover Rs. 6,20,101.56 from his gratuity - alleging a shortage in stores - petitioner challenged the deduction - arguing that gratuity could not be withheld as her husband was never terminated - no disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated - failed to pay the Employees' Deposit Linked Insurance (EDLI) amount to the petitioner - hence petition. (Para - 2 to 17) HELD: - Employer cannot withhold gratuity unless the employee was terminated . As the deceased was never terminated but died in harness, recovery from gratuity is impermissible. Orders impugned, forfeiting /making deductions from gratuity of the petitioner's husband, are legally not tenable in the eyes of law and merit to be quashed. Employer must pay the full gratuity within eight weeks with interest and must also decide on the EDLI payment within the same period. (Para -21,23,26,27) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Smt. Anju Srivastava Vs. U.P. State Agro Indus. Corp. Ltd. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing
WRIA/4769 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 24-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 747
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 226 - The Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974-Rule 5(1) - Petitioner claimed compassionate appointment on account of his mother's demise as well as payment of the ex gratia sum of Rs.50 lacs which was directed to be provided by the St. Government to the dependents of employees, engaged in the prevention, control and treatment of the Covid19 disease, who died in consequence of contracting the virus--- A deceased government servant's dependent is eligible for a consideration for appointment under the Rules of 1974, if the deceased's spouse is not a government servant or already employed under the Central Government or a St. Government or a Corporation, owned or controlled by the Central Government or the St. Government. The respondents have by one stroke of pen, changed all entries of 'P's in the attendance register for the petitioner's mother from 15th April to 26th to 'A's. It is a case of unmistakable forgery to the naked eye. There is not even an initial made to show if this is some kind of correction with a note indicating by which authority and under what circumstances, the correction, if any, was done. The inescapable inference, therefore, is that the petitioner's mother attended her duty in the month of April until 26th, when she was taken ill and admitted to the hospital--- The petitioner's mother was similarly exposed, contracted the virus and apparently died of the deadly disease--- Mandamus is issued to the respondents to pay the petitioner due compensation for his mother's death, treating it to be death for which compensation is payable under the Government Orders dated 11.04.2020, 22.06.2021 and 26.07.2021. (Para 10, 52 & 54) Petition allowed. (E-15)
Title: Anand Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing
SPLA/969 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 16-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 736
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952-Chapter VIII Rule V---Intra Court Appeal--- In the memorandum of petition or appeal, several points may be taken but at the time of arguments only some of those points may be pressed. In such a situation the court concerned would deal only with the points which are argued and there would be a presumption that the party concerned gave up the challenges based on the other points. There is general presumption in law that a Judge deals with all the points which have been argued before him, and in case the party seeks to contend that he had pressed certain points which have not been considered, it would be open to him to file an application before the same learned Judge which delivered the judgment, and seek an order of review. It would ordinarily be not open to the party concerned to argue a point in appeal, which even if taken in the petition before the court below, was neither argued nor pressed before the court of first instance---Even if the grounds which are now sought to be urged on behalf of the appellants are taken into consideration the controversy involved in the present case is fully covered in terms of the judgment dated 28.02.2024 passed in Special Appeal Defective No.159 of 2024 (Shradha Yadav Vs St. of UP through Secretary, Department of Basic Shiksha). (Para 15, 16 & 23) Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Naveen Kumar Srivastava & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vivek Kumar Birla,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
English hearing
SPLA/296 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 07-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 730
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Practice and Procedure - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 - Chapter VIII - Rule 5 - Special Appeal - Maintainability - Expression 'Judgment' - Meaning and Scope - Order for completing the pleading alongwith staying the ceiling/demolition of a building was passed - Maintainability of appeal against it - Held, the order under challenge does not possess the characteristic of finality. It does not adversely affect any valuable right of the appellant, who does not claim that any of his personal rights are involved in the matter - It is not a 'judgment' and the Special Appeal is not maintainable for this reason. (Para 10) B. Practice and procedure - Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 - Chapter VIII - Rule 5 - Special Appeal - Maintainability - Order before writ court was passed in exercise of appellate power under UP Planning and Development Act - Held, the order under challenge in the Special Appeal has been passed in Writ Petition under Article 226 in respect of a judgment passed by the Divisional Commissioner in exercise of appellate powers u/s 28 A (4) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, the Special Appeal filed against such an order is not maintainable. (Para 12) C. Practice and procedure - Appeal was filed by a person not a party in the writ petition - No leave to file appeal was sought - Effect - Held, the Special Appeal filed without seeking leave of the Court is not maintainable. (Para 13) D. Practice and procedure - Allegation of not filing the writ petition with clean hand was leveled by the appellant - Also allegations have been levelled against the officers/officials of Registry of the High Court for passing the writ petition in a cursory manner and the allegations have been levelled against the Court for granting permission for hearing the writ petition on the day of filing itself - Permissibility - Held, it is the normal practice prevalent in the Allahabad High Court that in matters regarding which the Court is satisfied that the same warrants an urgent hearing, the Court grants request for urgent hearing. The appellant has recklessly leveled misconceived, vague and unsubstantiated allegations against the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the officers and officials of the Registry of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Judge who has passed the order, which are wholly unwarranted and unacceptable - High Court imposed a cost of Rs. 25,000/- against the appellant. (Para 15, 19 and 21) Special Appeal dismissed. (E-1)
Title: Kalamuddin @ Shanu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
SPLAD/10 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 15-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 724
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - UP Government Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors and Foreman Instructors) Service Rules, 2021 - Post of Instructor in Sewing Technology - Qualification - Determination - Competence of the Court - Diploma in Garment Fabrication Technology/Costume Design & Dress making was required, but instead it, a qualification equivalent to it was claimed to be possessed - Permissibility - Held, any person claiming to possess any qualification equivalent to a required Diploma, would not be eligible to apply against the advertisement - The question of equivalence of qualification in the matter of examining the eligibility for the purpose of employment, is to be decided by the employer and the Courts cannot treat any qualification to be equivalent to the qualifications prescribed in the Rules. (Para 15 and 16) Special Appeal dismissed. (E-1)
Title: Saurabh Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
HABC/439 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 20-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 718
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Constitution of India, Article 226- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 427- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985- Habeas Corpus - Illegal detention - Convict undergoing sentence in two separate NDPS cases - Sentence in second conviction to run consecutively in absence of direction to run concurrently - Petitioner contended continued detention illegal since sentence served in first case - Held, Section 427 Cr.P.C. provides general rule of consecutive sentence unless otherwise directed - Discretion to order concurrent running of sentences not exercised by trial court - Convictions under NDPS Act are serious and against society - No illegality found in continued custody - Habeas corpus petition liable to be dismissed. (Paras 9, 11,12, and 15) HELD: Section 427 Cr.P.C. provides that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. In other words, subsection (1) of Section 427 confers a discretion on the Court to direct that the subsequent sentence following a conviction shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. (Para 9) It has been held that if the transactions related to the offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different in that case the subsequent sentence should run consecutively- Further, in absence of any direction as to running of subsequent sentence, as per general rule enunciated in Section 427(1), the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. (Para 11) It has further been observed that even while exercising discretion under 427(1) Cr.P.C. to run subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous sentence, the discretion is to be exercised judiciously and depending upon the offence/offences committed. Therefore, considering that offences under the NDPS Act are very serious in nature and against the society at large, held, no discretion shall be exercised in favour of such accused who is indulging in multiple offences under the NDPS Act. (Para 12) Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and from the perusal of the record and the two custody certificates, it transpires that the corpus Gurmel Singh is a repeat offender under the N.D.P.S. Act and has been convicted in two separate offences by different trial courts in two different transactions having different case crime numbers and the cases have been registered at different Police Stations in different St.s and have been decided by two different judgments. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence under Section 427 of Cr.P.C. especially when there is no specific order or direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. He is in custody since 31.12.2005. His sentence in FIR No. 306/2005 at Punjab was completed on 17.09.2019 and thereafter his sentence in FIR No.89/2006 at Uttar Pradesh started on 18.09.2019 and is continuing till date. He has served approximately seven years of imprisonment with remission. (Para 15) Writ petition dismissed. (E-14)
Title: Gurmel Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vivek Kumar Birla,Nand Prabha Shukla
English hearing
SAPL/400 /2011 Judgment/Order Date: 20-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 705
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Sections 34 & 80 - General Rules (Civil), 1957 - Rule 6 - National Savings Certificate ( VIth issue) Rules, 1981 - Rules 7, 8, 9, 11 - Government Savings Certificate Act, 1959 - Section 2(a), 12 - Maturity amount - Appellant invested amount of Rs.1,50,000/- on 27.09.1984 in NSC VIth issue and amount of Rs.3,02,250/- was to be paid on maturity on 19.09.1990, but amount was not paid on maturity - Appellant filed suit for recovery of amount , dismissed without considering pleadings, evidence and records - Appellant filed civil appeal, partly allowed and held holder not entitled for interest - The learned courts below failed to consider that NSC can be issued in name of society and appellant society rightly invested on behalf of its members in accordance with law. (Para 4) Held, appellant can't be held guilty of issuance of NSCs in name of society in irregular manner and contravention of rules but respondents are also guilty of it, as issued without verifying properly as to whether it was in accordance with law or not, respondents didn't detect during whole period of NSCs but thereafter for long time and detected after correspondence by appellant and thereafter respondents no.2 called consent of appellant for payment of SB interest on Public Accounts on deposited amount, consent was not given, invested amount was not returned and thus appellant entitled for interest of 6% p.a applicable on SB Public Accounts from date of deposit till date payment. (Para 28) Appeal partly allowed. (E-13)
Title: Zila Ganna Utpadak Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
SAPL/12 /2018 Judgment/Order Date: 16-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 701
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - Order XLI Rule 5 - Order XLII Rule 1 - Order XLIII Rule 1 - Code of Civil Procedure (UP Amendments) - Section 115, 115(4)- Second Appeal - Appeal is pending at admission stage - issue of Summoning VIS-Ã-VIS Retaining or Returning the Original Record - The respondent's counsel raised an issue regarding the return of the original record of the first Appellate Court and the trial court, which had been summoned by the High Court without admitting the appeal - Legislative Mandate on Stay of Proceedings - The court discussed the legislative mandate under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and U.P. amendments in Section 115 of C.P.C., which St. that mere filing of an appeal or revision does not operate as a stay against the proceedings - court finds that, - the Supreme Court, in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency P. Ltd., directed that photocopies or scanned copies of records should be summoned instead of the original records - However, the Supreme Court's decision in Asian Resurfacing was later reversed by the Constitution Bench in a case of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad Vs St. of Uttar Pradesh, but the directions regarding summoning photocopies/scanned copies of records remained unaffected - held, - the office is directed to summon only photocopies/scanned copies of records unless specifically directed otherwise and to remit back any original records previously summoned - directions are also issued to the Registrar General to issue necessary Circular / communication to the office of this court as well as all the district judgeships to act as per directions - Appeal is pending. (Para - 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) Second Appeal Pending. (E-11)
Title: Prem Chand & Ors. Vs. Charat Kumar Bansal
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Kshitij Shailendra
English hearing
SAPL/2 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 24-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 685
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Sections 99 & 100, - Indian Evidence Act, 1860- Section 68 - Indian Registration Act, 1908 - Section 68, - Indian Succession Act, 1925 - Section 63 - Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1950 - Section 171 - Second appeal - against the judgments and decrees - passed in Regular Suit and Civil Appeal - the appeal raises several substantial questions of law, including whether the will, which was sought to be cancelled on the grounds of fraud, was proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, and whether the lower courts were justified in dismissing the suit without considering the ample evidence on record - Suit - for permanent injunction - during pendency of suit, a will was got executed by the defendant- respondent from their father - subsequently, a prayer for cancellation of Will was added by an amendment - The plaintiff-appellant argued that the will was executed fraudulently, as the father of the parties was an educated person but only his thumb impression was on the will - the will was not proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act - The trial court, dismissed the suit on the grounds that the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove ownership and possession of the land in dispute - Civil Appeal - The lower appellate court upheld the trial court's decision - Second Appeal - court finds that, (i) the will was proved by the attesting witness and the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the grounds of challenge to the will and further, the will was executed with free will and without any influence or coercion - (ii) the plaintiff-appellant was not the real son of the deceased father and was not entitled to a share in the ancestral property in view of section - 171 of the Act, 1950 - held, . the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below cannot be set aside by this court in second appeal unless the findings are perverse and without jurisdiction which is not the case herein - hence, impugned the judgments and decrees cannot be reversed or modified in view of Section 99 of the CPC - Second appeal is liable to be dismissed.(Para - 27, 38, 39) Special Appeal Dismissed. (E-11)
Title: Sabhapati Verma Vs. Ved Prakash
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
CRLP/22470 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 08-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 675
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law -Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 316(2), 318(4) & 61(2)- Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999- Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, Section 66- FIR - Quashing of - Allegation of fraudulent investment scheme through sale and leaseback of cloud particles - Petitioner company and its affiliates accused of inducing public to invest in non-existent cloud data assets - No complaint from individual investors - FIR lodged based on ED's report - Allegation of Ponzi scheme where investor returns paid from new investments - Held, economic offences involving public interest require deeper investigation - Absence of complaint from investors not fatal where prima facie allegations disclosing cognizable offence exist - No case made out for interference under Article 226 - Writ petition dismissed. (Paras 24, 25, and 26) HELD: Even as per the FIR, the business of the petitioner and its associate entities is non- functional. There is rotation of money and the business model appears ambiguous and unsustainable. The Investigating Agency has come out with a case that petitioner is running a ponzi business, which would burst like a bubble and the investment made by the gullible investors, who at the present time is not coming up as complainant as they are receiving regular income, would be lost. The investors lured to extraordinary returns is typically attributed to something that sounds impressive but is intentionally vague, such as hedge fund in land, resorts, tours and travel plans, high yield investment programs. The allegations levelled in the FIR cannot be denied at this stage. Even petitioner has not placed any document to demonstrate that they are running a sustainable business and have earned substantial income from the customers. (Para 24) The law laid down in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) and Delhi Race Club (supra) would also not benefit the petitioner inasmuch as this Court is of the prima facie opinion that there appears commission of cognizable offence. Detailed search and seizure has been conducted by the E.D. and the same has resulted in lodging of FIR and the police authorities are not bound to conduct the preliminary inquiry, when prima facie there appears commission of cognizable offence. There are allegations of alluring the investors for investing huge chunk of money to get monthly regular income, which cannot be negated at this stage, more so, when the business model is unsustainable. The Court must be cautious while dealing with the economic offences, which would affect the public at large. (Para 25) Writ Petition dismissed. (E-14)
Title: Vuenow Infotech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,Prashant Kumar
English hearing
CRLP/4818 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 21-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 657
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law-The Uttar Pradesh Police Regulation-228 to 252 - The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14, 19 & 21-Opening of HISTORY SHEET-Before opening of history sheet of Class-A or Class-B against any citizen of the St., he should be given one opportunity to submit his objection before it is accepted by higher official of the police and before such officer directs opening of any Class of history sheet against a citizen---While directing opening of history sheet of Class -A and Class -B, the higher police authority shall record his reasons for directing opening of history sheet of any Class after considering the objection of the citizen filed against the report of the police station.---Impugned history sheet/sheets quashed---Directions issued to St. govt. to look into the procedure of opening of history sheet and make/ issue necessary amendments/guidelines for providing opportunity of objection to the person, against whom, the police submits report recommending the opening of history sheet of Class-A or Class- B before the Senior Police Official---St. Government will also provide for review of the history sheets opened against the citizen, every year, so that, in the cases where implication of persons against whom history sheet was opened and who have been subsequently exonerated/acquitted of the criminal charges, their history sheets are closed and shadow of surveillance by police on their life and liberty gets removed. (Para 26, 27 & 28) Petitions allowed. (E-15)
Title: Firoj Malik Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddharth,Subhash Chandra Sharma
English hearing
CRLA/4027 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 06-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 644
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Criminal Law - Mandatory Registration of First Information Report - Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 4 - Under the Act, it is the duty of a public servant to read out to an informant the information given orally and reduced to writing, and to register a complaint or a First Information Report. Under Section 18A(1) of the Act, preliminary enquiry is not required for the registration of a First Information Report against any person - Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 5 - It is the statutory duty of the concerned police station, including its officers, to follow the mandate under the SC/ST Act, and an FIR should be registered. (Para 5) B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 - Registration of First Information Report - In the instant case, the First Information Report was not registered by the concerned Police Officer at the Police Station. Since the F.I.R. was not registered, the victim approached the Superintendent of Police. The S.P. also did not follow the mandate u/s 4 of the SC/ST Act as well as Rule 5 of the SC/ST Rules. Thereafter, the learned Special Court rejected the complaint of the victim. Held : Learned Special Court, while passing the impugned order, instead of directing the concerned Police Station to register the First Information Report, conducted the inquiry himself, which is prohibited under Section 18A of the SC/ST Act. Impugned order set aside. (Para 11) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Asha Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Karunesh Singh Pawar
English hearing
CRLA/165 /2001 Judgment/Order Date: 08-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 612
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Criminal Law - Murder - Dying Declaration - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 32 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161 & 162(2) - Admissibility of Statement to Police- Under Section 162(2) CrPC, any statement falling under Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is admissible, even if recorded under Section 161 CrPC. A statement by a person, who later dies, regarding the cause or circumstances of his death, is relevant and may be treated as a dying declaration. Such a statement, if voluntarily and truthfully made by a person in a fit mental state, is admissible even without medical certification. Requirement of certification is a rule of caution and not mandatory. In the present case statement of the injured/deceased was recorded by the Investigating Officer while he was admitted in the hospital. In his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., he categorically stated that the accused persons had assaulted him with 'lathi', and the appellant Ram Vishal was carrying a 'kulhari' and had assaulted him with its blunt side. After his death, the said statement-being related to the cause of his death-is admissible in evidence by virtue of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act (Para 21, 22) B. Criminal Law - Murder - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 147, 148 & 149 - Common Object, Common Intention - Most important ingredient of unlawful assembly is common object. Common object of the persons composing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated in clauses "First", "Second", "Third", "Fourth" and "Fifth" of that section. In order to fasten vicarious responsibility on any member of an unlawful assembly the prosecution must prove that the act constituting an offence was done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the act done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed. If an offence is committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, any member of the unlawful assembly who was present at the time of commission of offence and who shared the common object of that assembly would be liable for the commission of that offence even if no overt act was committed by him. Active participation is not a necessary condition under Section 149 IPC; knowledge of the common object suffices. (Para 37) C. Criminal Law - Murder - Deceased, returning home after purchasing a tractor part, was ambushed by the accused hiding near the roadside. He was pulled off his bicycle and assaulted with lathi-danda and kulhari; Kulhari was used by appellant Ram Vishal from its blunt side. Witnesses rushed to the spot and took the injured to the hospital, where he later succumbed to his injuries. He sustained 21 injuries, including a fractured skull, and death occurred due to their cumulative effect. Formation of unlawful assembly by the accused persons was well-established. Though it is not necessary for every member of the unlawful assembly to take active part, it was evident that all the accused had participated in the 'marpeet', and considering the fact that 21 injuries were found on the person of the deceased, it was inferred that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit the murder of the deceased by beating him to death. The fact that after the deceased had been assaulted by the accused persons with 'lathi', it is thereafter the accused Ram Vishal assaulted the deceased on his head with the blunt side of the 'axe' would not be sufficient to assume/presume that the common object of the assembly was not to cause the death of the deceased or to infer that it was only Ram Vishal who could be responsible for the death of the deceased. Once all the accused persons had formed an 'unlawful assembly' and they had acted in a concerted and well-planned manner and had inflicted around 21 injuries on vital parts of the body in furtherance of common object established that all the members of the unlawful assembly were in knowledge of the common object of the assembly, which was to cause/commit the murder to beat Ram Jas to death. The common object of the unlawful assembly to cause the death of the deceased stood established beyond reasonable doubt. Trial court's judgment was based on proper appreciation of evidence. Court found no merit in the appeal, and accordingly, the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed. Conviction Affirmed. (Para 18, 38, 40) Dismissed. (E-5)
Title: Raj Deo & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Sangeeta Chandra,Mohd Faiz Alam Khan
English hearing
BAIL/7768 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 09-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 607
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 498A, 304B & 328 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section ¾ - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Bail - In FIR, there was demand of additional dowry from deceased person by applicant along with other family members, forcibly administered her some poisonous material in night of 04/05.06.2023 at about 1:33 a.m., she informed said fact to her father, who rushed to house of in-laws of his daughter and took her to Hospital, froth was coming up from her mouth, it was smelling pungent and during treatment she expired. (Para 4, 5) Contention by applicant, FIR was delayed by about ten days, no explanation given by prosecution - Cause of death could not be ascertained, case of suicide as victim consumed aluminium phosphide as common pesticide used in house - During inquest proceedings, informant not whispered about demand of dowry and St.d she expired under mysterious circumstances - Further argued that she had close relationship with Devar of her elder sister , talked to him in late hours of night, confirmed by CDR - During investigation, mobile numbers of Devar not supplied to Investigating Officer deliberately so that WhatsApp chats are not retrieved. (Para 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15) Held, conversations between them are admitted and cast doubt on case, defence has to put its case on basis of preponderance and probabilities only - There was presumption u/s 113B, Indian Evidence Act which may be raised in case but prior to it, duty of prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 31) Bail application allowed. (E-13)
Title: Raghvendra Singh Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Krishan Pahal
English hearing
A482/6982 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 31-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 589
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860 - Sections 107 & 306-no evidence in the case of alleged abetment of suicide - no active act shown on the part of the applicants - the loan was sanctioned in the name of the deceased, who could not repay the same-the applicants being brothers could not have been held responsible for abetment in commission of suicide by the deceased- no evidence to establish that applicants were responsible to repay the loan amount which was advanced in the name of the deceased-continuance of the present criminal proceedings is nothing but an abuse of process of law. Application allowed. (E-9)
Title: Sharad Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Brij Raj Singh
English hearing
A482/2440 /2016 Judgment/Order Date: 03-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 582
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure1973 - Section 482-Final report in favour of the applicants-accused-allegations relate to the forged compromise-got the said land entered in their favour- but once the said consolidation proceedings were finally adjudicated on the strength of the said document- it does not appeal to prudence that the complainant would not challenge the said proceedings- inconsistency in their St.ments-trial court has only referred to the St.ments of the witnesses-not on the substance of the said St.ments while summoning the accused- impugned order is not sustainable. Application allowed. (E-9)
Title: Ram Surat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manoj Bajaj
English hearing
A482/724 /2012 Judgment/Order Date: 08-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 575
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860- Sections 406, 504 & 506-No specific threats amounting to criminal intimidation-alleged offences u/s 504 and 506 not prima facie made out-ingredients to constitute the offence u/s 406 IPC are also absent, no voluntary entrustment by complainant to the accused persons-merely pendency of civil suit and non-payment of the amount would not constitute the offence u/s 406 IPC. Application allowed. (E-9)
Title: Dr. Rajesh Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manoj Bajaj
English hearing
A482/418 /2008 Judgment/Order Date: 07-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 570
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Criminal Law - Summoning of Additional Accused - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 302 & 406 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence - Degree of satisfaction required for invoking the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. - discretionary and an extraordinary power - to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant - not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence - Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. (Para -12,14,15) (B) Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319 - Process under Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be issued by the trial court in a casual manner - Court has to consider substance of the evidence, which has come before it - Test to apply - "more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction." (Para - 14) Applicants aggrieved by impugned order - trial court summoned them as additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. - case arose from an FIR registered on the complaint PW-1 - alleging that his son was administered poison on 14.07.2000, leading to his death - initially applicants were declared innocent - based on testimony of prosecution witnesses during trial - an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed - leading to impugned order summoning applicants - hence this application.(Para - 1 to 5) HELD: - Trial court erred in summoning the applicants as additional accused without strong and cogent evidence. Impugned order suffers from grave illegality and impropriety and warrants interference by Court. Petition succeeds. Impugned order set aside. Application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. dismissed. (Para - 15,16) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Smt. Rekha & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manoj Bajaj
English hearing
WRIC/1000717/1997 Judgment/Order Date: 28-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 566
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - The U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 - Sections 59 & 275 - U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 - Section 49 - Land was recorded in name of father of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in 1366 fasli settlement year - Survey made in 1964 - 65 of notified area, where plots are situated and petitioners father name found to be recorded - Plots are non- zamindari abolition land and on 7th July, 1949 , plots included in notified area under provisions of United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 and provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act not made applicable - Proved by Khasra and settlement of khatauni. (Para 4, 6) Respondent No.5 interfered with possession of petitioners by alleging he was owner of land, petitioners filed suit, claimed their title - Respondent contended that land was his self acquired property and in possession prior to zamindari abolition and few plots fall within scope of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act - Further admitted only one plot was beyond purview of said Act and consolidation held in 1973 and suit barred by provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act and not maintainable. (Para 8) Petitioner filed interim injunction application, Sub Divisional Officer granted, maintaining status quo and order was not vacated after hearing stay vacation application. (Para 9) The Sub Divisional Officer after hearing preliminary issues and preliminary objections with respect to maintainability of suit, concluded suit was maintainable and decided in favour of petitioners - Respondent preferred Revision before Additional Commissioner (Judicial) and reference made to Board of Revenue, allowed - Impugned order. (Para 10) Held, on perusal of last column of khasra, it has been incorporated that land and gata numbers does not come under ambit of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act - Documents were before Board of Revenue but not considered - Due to non-consideration of documents and case of Nagar Palika, order was devoid of merit and liable to be set aside. (Para 15, 16) Writ petition allowed. (E-13)
Title: Shyam Lal & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali
English hearing
WRIC/40479 /2018 Judgment/Order Date: 09-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 562
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Administrative Law - Cancellation of Fair Price Shop licence - Principle of Natural Justice - An order of cancellation of a fair price shop licence must be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing and must be based on independent findings rather than reiteration of previous conclusions. (Para - 2,4,6,12,13,14) Petitioner's fair price shop licence was suspended on 25.3.2006 - appeal against suspension was pending - licence was cancelled on 25.5.2006 - No opportunity of hearing was granted to petitioner - Subsequent appeals were dismissed - matter was ultimately remanded by Supreme Court for fresh consideration by SDM - SDM reiterated the earlier cancellation order without independent findings - hence petition. (Para - 2 to 5 ) HELD: - Since the order of the Supreme Court was not complied with by the SDM and the appellate authority, the orders passed by both authorities were set aside. Matter was remanded to the SDM for taking decision afresh in light of the Supreme Court's order dated 4.12.2017 with proper opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned. (Para -14,15) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Ram Sajiwan Kori Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vikram D Chauhan
English hearing
WRIC/38488 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 09-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 558
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-The petitioners , homebuyers in the Knights Court project by Jaiprakash associates Ltd. filed petitions due to delay in possession of their flats-The UPRERA had earlier directed the builder to either hand over possession within 45 days or refund the amount with interest-Due to non-compliance, recovery certificates were issued-Subsequently the builder entered insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code(IBC), and a Resolution Professionals(RP) was appointed-The petitioners, now creditors in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process(CIRP) challenged decisions made by the Committee of Creditors(COC) arguing their claims for possession were not properly considered-Held, The UPRERA orders were valid, and the petitioner had previously consented to a rehabilitation plan-Interference in Insolvency proceedings under Article 226 was not justified as the resolutions plan was still under consideration-The Petitioners should seek relief within the CIRP framework.(Para 1 to 19) The writ petitions are disposed of. (E-6)
Title: Mrs. Manju Rakesh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
English hearing
WRIC/35310 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 24-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 557
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-V-Marc India Ltd. challenged an order dated 10.10.2024 issued by the Superintending Engineer(Material Mgmt-I) Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. which blacklisted the company and imposed other penalties, including contract termination-order was passed without providing a copy of the three- member committee report which formed the basis of the decision-Held, The three -member committee report should have been provided to the petitioner, and an opportunity to respond should have been given before issuing the blacklisting order-failure to do so violated the principles of natural justice- blacklisting is a harsh and stringent penalty that should be imposed only in exceptional cases, authorities should not misuse it for extraneous reasons-Hence, the impugned order dated 10.10.2024 was quashed-The authority must conduct a fresh hearing within two months and pass a reasoned order-Until then, the petitioner will not be considered blacklisted and can participate in government tenders. The writ petitions are disposed of. (E-6)
Title: V-Marc India Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Vipin Chandra Dixit
English hearing
WRIC/30440 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 07-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 542
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Land Acquisition Act,1894- Section 28A-Re-determination of Compensation-Maintainabilty of Application based on High court's award- The petitioners' land was acquired under a notification dated 30.04.1976 by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authorirty- Compensation was awarded on 15.02.1977, which the petitioners' ancestors accepted without challenging it under section 18 of the Act,1894- Some other land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification, challenged the award-The reference u/s 18 was initially rejected but was later enhanced by the High court , based on this, the petitioners filed an application u/s 28A of the Act,1894 seeking re- determination of their compensation-Held, a landowner who did not seek reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can apply for re-determination of compensation u/s 28A based on an award passed by the High Court in a First Appeal ,provided the application is filed within prescribed three month limitation period- -The court relied on Banwari Vs Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corp. Ltd where the Apex Court ruled that if the reference court denies enhancement but the High Court grants it on appeal, similarly placed landowners can file for re-determination u/s 28A-Hence, the rejection order dated 29.07.2022 was set aside-The collector must re-determine the compensation at Rs. 28.12 per square yard, as awarded in First Appeal.(Para 1 to 23) B. Section 28A applies even when compensation is enhanced by a High Court in an appeal, not just by a reference court- An appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings, therefore a High Court's decision enhancing compensation is equivalent to an award u/s 28A-The provision must be read in favor of affected landowners to remove disparities in compensation-Landowners who missed filing a reference u/s 18 can still claim parity if compensation is later increased by the High Court.(Para20 to 22) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manoj Kumar Gupta,Anish Kumar Gupta
English hearing
WRIC/22636 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 10-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 525
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Land Law - Condonation of delay - Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections 3 & 5 - Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901 - Sections 200 & 201 - Delay in filing an application can be condoned if the sufficient ground exists, in the opinion of the Court, which prevented the party to approach the Court within time, even on an oral prayer made by the party. Not necessarily in every case, a written application has to be insisted upon. (Para 30) In view of Section 201 of the Act, 1901, an ex-parte order can be recalled on sufficient cause being shown by either the plaintiffs or the defendants for their non- appearance. The provisions of Section 201 are similar to those of Section 5 of the Limitation Act except for the party has to satisfy that there has been failure of justice. In the present case, the proceedings were decided against respondent Nos. 4 to 6 ex-parte in exercise of powers u/s 200 of the Act, 1901. Section 201 of the Act, 1901 provides that if a plaintiff, within 15 days from the date of order, and if a defendant, within 15 days after the order has been communicated to him, or after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed or at any earlier period shows good cause for his non-appearance, and satisfies the officer making the order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he thinks proper, revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case. In the present case, the power has been exercised u/s 201 of the Act, 1901. (Para 31) There is no denial of the facts as St.d by the contesting respondents in their application for restoration and the courts below have committed no illegality in recalling the ex-parte order dated 08.06.2017 and condoning the delay in filing the restoration application. (Para 33, 34) Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)
Title: Surendra Mani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manish Kumar Nigam
English hearing
WRIC/3700 /2019 Judgment/Order Date: 02-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 519
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Indian Stamp Act, 1899- Sections 2(10), 2(14), 14 & 15 - Article 18 r/w Article 23 of The Schedule 1(B) - Clause 18 & 34(A) of The Appendix 1(B)- For a deed to be termed as a deed of conveyance, the same should indicate provisions in terms of a sale as indicated in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as per which a sale is transfer of ownership in exchange for price paid or promised or part paid and part promised--- That for a deed to come within definition of conveyance, transfer of rights and liabilities and interest upon the property indicated in the instrument is necessary--- That only effect of the deed is deletion or ignoring the gata No. 215/1289 against the plot defined in the sale deed---Evident from the wordings of the deed that there is no concomitant change either in the area of property or even in the boundaries---The deed dated 17th October, 2015 by any stretch of imagination can not be construed to be a second instrument chargeable with duty upon a piece of stamped paper on which duty has already been written since it is primarily a corrigendum issued for correcting a mistake indicated in the first deed of conveyance--- Opp. parties to ensure payment of 8% per annum simple interest to petitioner on the amount of deposit made by petitioner in pursuance of impugned orders from the date of deposit till the date of refund. (Para 15, 16, 17, 18 & 20) Petition allowed. (E-15)
Title: Rakesh Tekariwal Vs. Addl. Commissioner Admin-I Devipatan Division Gonda & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manish Mathur
English hearing
WRIC/2228 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 21-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 507
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Banking and Recovery Law - Payment of balance amount of purchase price - SARFAESI Act, 2002 - Section 13(4) - Security Interest (enforcement) Rules, 2002 - Rule 9 (4) - Even the plenary powers of the Supreme Court u/Article 142 of the Constitution could not be invoked to supplant the substantive law, ignoring the express statutory provisions dealing with the subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly, which could not be achieved directly. The balance amount of the purchase price has to be paid by the auction purchaser to the Authorized Officer on or before the 15th day of confirmation of sale or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months. (Para 27) Provisions contained in Sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 - A discretion is available to the Authorized Officer of the secured creditor for extension of time for depositing the balance consideration, but not exceeding the prescribed limit of ninety days. The objective and necessity of enactment of the powers of forfeiture of deposited amount of the secured creditor u/sub-rule (5) further clarifies that the legislature had visualized that there was a need to arrest cases of deceptive manipulation of prices at the instance of unscrupulous borrowers by thwarting sale processes. The purpose of the provision was aimed at instilling a sense of discipline in the intending purchasers while they proceed to participate in the auction-sale process. (Para 28) In the present case, there is no material on record, which may persuade this Court to come to a conclusion that there has been any manifest arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the respondent-Bank in not acceding the repeated requests of the petitioners for depositing of the balance 75% amount of the bid amount beyond the time period stipulated u/Rule 9(4) of the Rules, 2002. The maximum permissible limit of three months, as provided under the relevant statutory rules, having already been granted by the secured creditor, there is no plausible reason which may warrant issuance of any direction for further extension of time period, as sought by the petitioners. (Para 30, 31) B. When a statute requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all, and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. (Para 32) Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 2002, as amended with effect from 4.11.2016, contains an ordainment that on mutual agreement, the time for making deposit of the balance amount of sale price can be extended for a period not exceeding ninety days; however, extension beyond ninety days would not be permissible in any case. (Para 33) The secured creditor is entitled in law to enforce the security interest and in the process, to initiate all such steps and take all such measures for the protection of public interest by recovering public money lent to a borrower, who has defaulted in its repayment. (Para 35) Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)
Title: Anil Pathak & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
English hearing
WRIC/953 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 31-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 505
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Indian Contract Act,1872- Mukhyamantri Kishan Evam Sarvhit Beema Yojna-Delay in claim-The petitioner's claim under Mukhyamantri Kishan Evam Sarvhit Beema Yojna was rejected by the District Level Committee on the ground of delay, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period of two months from the date of death-The petitioner relied on The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Sanjesh & Anr where the Supreme Court held that such time restrictions in insurance schemes are void under section 28 of the Act,1872-Held, the District Level Committee's rejection on grounds of delay is unsustainable as the condition of lodging claim within a period of one month, extendable by another one month is contrary to section 28 of the Act- The claim must be reconsidered on merits within three months.(Para 1 to 9) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: Smt. Rachana Soni Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajan Roy,Brij Raj Singh
English hearing
WRIB/47925 /2014 Judgment/Order Date: 22-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 498
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Consolidation proceedings - Effect of denotification of village under Section 52 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 - Objection under Section 20 of the Act filed after denotification - Held, not maintainable unless filed with prayer for condonation of delay and shown to be recorded in Misilband - Mere delay in registering or misplacement of objection not fatal where filed prior to denotification and substantiated through evidence - Record showed respondent's plot adjacent to National Highway had commercial value - Declaration of such plot as C.H. 18 found valid - No interference warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. (Paras 11 to 16) HELD: There is no dispute about the fact that village in question was brought under the Consolidation and notification under Section 20 of U.P. C.H. Act was published on 24.03.2023, notification under Section 20 of U.P.C.H. Act was published on 27.03.2003, notification under Section 52 of U.P.C.H. Act published on 27.06.2007. There is also no dispute about the fact that Consolidation Officer vide order dated 26.02.2009 granted benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act in the proceeding under Section 21 of U.PC.H Act and vide order dated 27.05.2009 declared plot No.454/525 area 0.049 hectare as C.H. 18. There is also no dispute about the fact that in revision No.42 filed by respondent no.4 (Lata Devi) plot No.455 was also declared C.H.18. (para 11) It is material to mention that plot N.454/525, 455 are situated adjacent to N.H. 24 and objection was filed on behalf of respondent no.4 (Lata Devi) along with prayer for condonation of delay before denotification of the village as such there is no illegality in the order passed by the Consolidation authorities for declaring the plot No.454/525 area 0.049 hectare as well as plot No.455 area 0.543 hectare as C.H. 18. The entry in Misil Band also demonstrate that objection was filed by Lata Devi before denotification of the village. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding every revision has rightly considered the claim of the parties and dismissed the revisions filed by respective parties except revision NO.48 filed by Lata Devi. (Para 12) This Court in the case reported in 1985 RD 71 Paras Nath Singh versus Deputy Director of Consolidation & ors. has held that an order which is illegal cannot be quashed or set aside in Writ jurisdiction if quashing of it results in bringing on record another illegal order. (Para 15) Petition dismissed. (E-14)
Title: Rajeshwari Devi Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Shahjahanpur & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Chandra Kumar Rai
English hearing
WRIB/39710/2003 Judgment/Order Date: 21-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 491
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Civil Procedure Code,1908 - order 41 Rules 27 - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 195, 197, 198(4), 333 & 333(2) - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 - Sections 173(kha), 174 & 175:- Writ Petition - questioning the impugned orders passed by Board of Revenue whereunder Board allowed the Revision and rejecting the recall application - Allotment of land by the village LMC in favour of 164 ineligible persons - approved by SDO - being aggrieved petitioners filed a Complaint Case - allowed - Revision - dismissed, holding that the allotment in question had been made against the relevant provisions of Rule, 1952 - second revision, before the Board - dismissed, holding that second revision is not maintainable by same persons - recall application - rejected - Writ Petition - opposed on the ground that petitioners are not persons aggrieved or falling within the category "of a person aggrieved" - court finds that, allotment of land was in complete violation of the Rules of allotment prescribed, and the respondents obtained allotment in their favour by misstatement of facts - this court cannot shut its eye to the aforesaid facts - held, a writ petition by a member of Gaon Sabha raising allegations against the action of the Gaon Sabha in allotting the land in violation of the norms can be assailed - there is a public element involved and hence, the complaint as also the instant writ petition is maintainable - petition allowed, accordingly. (Para - 19, 20, 21) Writ petition Allowed. (E-11)
Title: Hari Chand & Anr. Vs. The Board of Revenue & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ashutosh Srivastava
English hearing
WRIB/13084 /1983 Judgment/Order Date: 23-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 483
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 - Section 49 - Bar of jurisdiction - Declaratory suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act filed by persons declared Sirdar in consolidation proceedings - Board of Revenue set aside concurrent findings of Trial and Appellate Courts - Held, when right of tenure-holder adjudicated under Section 9A(2) during consolidation and recorded in Misilband register, bar under Section 49 does not apply - Board of Revenue erred in reversing findings without framing substantial question of law - Order set aside. (Paras 13, 14, 17, 18, and 20) HELD: This Court in the case reported in 2016 (133) RD 800, Adalat Yadav vs. D.M./ D.D.C. & Others has held that if question relating to genuineness of any record has to be decided then its entry in misilband has to be examined.... (Para 13) Since, the order passed during consolidation operation could not be incorporated in the revenue record, accordingly, suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was filed on behalf of the petitioners to declare them as Sirdar of the plot in question and trial Court has not decreed the plaintiff's suit only on the basis of order passed by the Consolidation Court rather on the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs as well as defendants. On behalf of the St. Lekhpal concern was examined and on behalf of gaon sabha Pradhan was examined. The entry in C.H. Form 2A, 41 & 45 were taken into consideration by trial Court in holding that plaintiffs are Sirdar of the plot in suit. The finding of fact has also been recorded by trial Court that suit is not barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act as there was adjudication by consolidation Court in favour of petitioners/ plaintiffs. The first appellate Court has maintained the judgement and decree of the trial Court by dismissing the first appeal filed by the St.. Board of Revenue while allowing the second appeal filed by the St. has set aside the judgement and decree of trial Court as well as appellate Court without reversing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court in proper manner. It is also material to mention that no substantial question of law / point of determination have been framed by the Board of Revenue while passing the judgment allowing the second appeal setting aside the judgement and decreed passed by the trial Court as well as first appellate Court and dismissing the plaintiff's suit. (Para 14) On the point of Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2024 (163) RD 691, Prashant Singh & Others Vs. Meena & ors. has considered the scope of Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act. In the aforementioned case, Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the judgement of Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd. Sayeed (1980) 4 SCC 396 as well as judgment of Sita Ram vs. Chhota Bondey & Others 1991 Supplement (1) 556. (Para 17) Considering the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court from the case of Karbalai Begum (supra) up to Prashant Singh (supra), it is very much clear that claim of co- tenancy will not barred under Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act but other claim will be barred under Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act. (Para 18) The order passed by the Board of Revenue allowing the second appeal and dismissing the plaintiff suit for declaration by passing cryptic judgment cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The manner in which impugned judgment has been passed by the Board of Revenue, can be a judgment of dismissal of second appeal, affirming judgment of courts below but this cannot be a judgment of reversal by which the second appeal has been allowed and the suit under Section 229 B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has been dismissed in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. (Para 20) Petition allowed. (E-14)
Title: Mst. Purshottami Vs. Board of Revenue & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Chandra Kumar Rai
English hearing
WRIA/11282 /2018 Judgment/Order Date: 31-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 465
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Labour Law - Regular appointment - Once the objections regarding the eligibility of the writ petitioners stands decided by a judicial forum and the same has attained finality by dismissal of the writ petition preferred by the respondent- railways then the same cannot be used as a tool to deny the benefits to the writ petitioners. The respondents are again raising same objections questioning the eligibility of writ petitioners while alleging that the writ petitioners do not possess 120 days of minimum required engagement, there had been no ex post facto approval of the General Manager, they are overage and the judgment in the case of Uma Devi (infra) would come in their way. Apparently, barring the said objections no new objections have been raised which goes into the root of the matter regarding the eligibility of the writ petitioners and the position being so the Tribunal was not justified in negating the claim of the writ petitioners. (Para 23, 25) It is not open for the respondent-railways to question the suitability of the writ petitioners on the grounds which had already been adjudicated. Might be, there appears to be certain relevant grounds regarding the objection to the suitability of a candidate which in the facts and circumstances of the case may occur due to various factors, however, in the present case, the same old objections are being raised questioning the eligibility of the writ petitioners. (Para 28) In the present case there happens to be a positive finding in favour of the writ petitioners holding them to be eligible and the only task which was entrusted to the respondent-railways by virtue of the order of the Tribunal in the earlier spell of litigation was to declare their result, in case, they were successful, but by no stretch of imagination it can be said to have granted any leverage to the respondent-railways to reopen the issues which had already been decided. (Para 30) The original applicant, has expired and rest of the writ petitioners as on date are beyond the prescribed age for being accorded temporary/regular status. Since the writ petitioners are out of employment for a long time, for several decades, thus, it would not be appropriate to issue direction for according regular status to them. The writ petitioners had been agitating their claims before the judicial forums and they possess positive order declaring them to be eligible coupled with an order for declaration of results and the fact that the objections raised by the respondent-railways regarding the entitlement of the writ petitioners are the same which stood adjudicated by the Court of law and there is no new and valid objections available on record so as to deny benefits to the writ petitioners, thus, as per the overall facts and circumstances of the case appropriate compensation in lieu of reinstatement is awarded. (Para 32) The judgment and order dated 16.02.2018 passed in OA No. 330/00370 of 2015 is set aside. The relief for issuance of the appointment order to the writ petitioners against the regular vacancies in pursuance of the notification dated 17.12.2005 and the screening test held in the year 2007 is declined. (Para 33) Writ petition partly allowed. (E-4)
Title: Ramesh Chandra Bari & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Arun Bhansali,Vikas Budhwar
English hearing
WRIA/9913 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 31-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 452
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Promotion and Seniority Dispute - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Rules, 2013, Tehsildar Service Rules, 1966 - Rule 6 & 4 - The Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Revenue (Tehsildar) Service Rules, 1966 - Rule 6 , The U.P Government Servant Relaxation in Qualifying Service for Promotion Rules, 2006 (amended in 2013) - Rule 2 & 4, The Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Criteria for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 1998 - Arbitrary Appointment - Breach of Seniority Principle - Promotion - Seniority List - Relaxation in Eligibility - Seniority must be maintained as per the select list issued by the Public Service Commission - Grant of relaxation in qualifying service is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right - Promotions should be considered based on final, not tentative seniority lists - Employee only has the right to be considered for promotion but there is no right to be promoted, if conditions are satisfied. (Para -23,24,27,35,36,39 ) Petitioners were selected as Naib-Tehsildars in 2016 batch - were issued appointment letters at different times, leading to delays in joining - Board of Revenue prepared a seniority list in 2020 - did not initially include petitioners due to their delayed joining - subsequent relaxation in qualifying service was granted only to those who had joined before 31/12/2019, excluding the petitioners - petitioners challenged the promotion of junior candidates before their own consideration.(Para - 2 to 27) HELD: - State must ensure that relaxation in eligibility does not violate the seniority principle; promotions should be made based on finalized seniority lists. State Government was directed to consider and decide the proposal dated 17/10/2024 expeditiously, with further direction to consider and make the promotions to the post of Tehsildar also expeditiously. Interim order restraining promotions vacated. (Para - 29,38,41) Writ A No.9913 of 2023 disposed of. writ A No.4808 of 2024 dismissed. (E-7)
Title: Ashutosh Pandey & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing
WRIA/9166 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 10-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 444
HEADNOTE hearing
CIVIL LAW - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226, - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 10(2) - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1956- Writ Petition - The petitioner was involved in a dispute over the charge of Executive Engineer, Irrigation Construction Division-II, Lalitpur - The Engineer-in-Chief ordered that the charge be handed over to Chhatrapati Singh, but Bhagirathi Singh refused to comply, leading the petitioner to enforce the directive - subsequently, a manipulated complaint resulted in Chhatrapati Singh's suspension, prompting him to file a writ petition, which led to an interim order - While responding to the writ petition through a narrative para no. 11 remained unanswered - Among five responsible officers who vetted the narrative, only the petitioner was issued a show cause notice, alleging service misconduct - The petitioner argued that the charges were baseless and motivated by malice, while the respondents claimed misuse of power and collusion - The court found no substantive evidence proving that the petitioner deliberately ensured a deficient narrative - In the absence of material linking the petitioner to the omission of para no. 11, the impugned order, which held him guilty of misconduct, lacked merit - because mala fides has not been urged against a definitive persons with sufficient pleadings or the man impleaded eo nomine - held, the impugned order cannot be sustained and must perish - petition succeeded and is allowed.(Para - 19, 24, 25, 26, 28) Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)
Title: Gopal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing
WRIA/8637 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 23-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 435
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law-Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Petiioner retired on 30.04.2021-initially his pension was fixed at Rs. 56,200-Later authorities reduced his pay and ordered recovery, leading to multiple writ petitions-High court quashed the recovery order and directed fresh proceedings after issuing a show cause notice-A new recovery order was challenged where the court stayed the recovery-Held, As per Supreme Court judgment in Rafiq Masih and Jagdish Singh Case, retrospective recovery from retirees is impermissible-The petitioner's undertaking was given post-retirement making Jagdev Singh inapplicable-Pay fixation cannot be done after a long time gap-The reduction in pension and recovery were quashed and the court ordered the restoration of Rs. 56,200 pension with all consequential benefits. (Para 1 to 42) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: Anil Kumar Gangwar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing
WRIA/4610 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 08-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 424
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law-Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-U.P. Police Radio Adhinashth Sewa Niyamawali 2015-Clause 8(c)- Niyamawali 2015 prescribes diploma as the minimum qualification for the post of Head Operator(Mechanical) in U.P. Police Radio Cadre-The police recruitment board exceeded its jurisidiction by issuing a 2021 order equating a B.E./B.Tech degree to a diploma without State Government approval-Candidates who participated in the recruitment process based on 2021 board decision had a legitimate expectation of eligibility-The midway change in eligibility after the exam was conducted was illegal violating principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness- Recruitment rules. once set in an advertisement cannot be altered during the process-Held, the entire selection process is vitiated and set aside due to administrative mismanagement and lack of clarity on eligibility-The entire selection process is canceled, and a fresh recruitment drive must be initiated. (Para 1 to 33) The writ petitions are partly allowed. (E-6)
Title: Ravi Kumar Shukla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing
WRIA/1416 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 31-01-2025 (2025) 1 ILRA 421
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Service Law - Medical Officers - Petition seeking grant of 'No Objection Certificate' for participation in NEET PG Examination-2024 - Provincial Medical Health Services (PMHS) - Government Order dated 15.03.2022 - Rural Posting - Determination of 'rural posting' based on distance from the district headquarters and inclusion in the Government Order - Requirement of three years of rural service for eligibility to obtain 30% weightage in NEET PG Examination-2024 - Once a Community Health Centre at a particular location is classified as a rural posting, another hospital in the same premises cannot be excluded from rural classification without valid justification. (Para - 4,6,9,13) Petitioner (Medical Officer) was selected through Public Service Commission - posted at Community Health Centre in 2014- classified as a rural posting - Later, she was directed to work at the newly established 100 Beded Combined Hospital in the same premises - petitioner sought a 'No Objection Certificate' to avail the rural service benefit for NEET PG Examination-2024 - denied on the ground that the hospital was not listed as a rural posting. (Para -4,6 ) HELD: - Petitioner was duly entitled to be granted a 'No Objection Certificate' for having worked in the rural area for the period she had worked at Community Health Centre as well as the 100 Bedded Combined Hospital. Impugned order was set aside. Respondents were directed to grant a 'No Objection Certificate' forthwith to the petitioner, so that she could participate in the NEET PG Examination-2024. (Para - 15,16,17) Petition allowed. (E-7)
Title: Dr. Meenakshi Saxena Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Alok Mathur
English hearing