CLRE/80/2011 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1767
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law -The Provincial Small Cause Court Act 1887-Section 23 & 25---The Court of Small Causes is not denuded from considering the issue of title which incidentally arises in a suit before it. While considering an application under section 23 PSCC, the SCC court is not obligated to mechanically refer the suit to be decided by a regular court. In all cases where the issue of title is raised, the Court is required to consider the case and only if it finds that intricate questions of title are involved can it refer and return the plaint to be presented before the regular court. The power conferred under section 23 is discretionary in nature but even discretion which is to be exercised, should be within the four corners of law--- A suit for arrears of rent and ejectment is seen on the parameters of subsistence of relationship between the parties as that of landlord and tenant. The question of title is never to be decided by the SCC Court and in case if it is incidentally raised by a party then the Court is competent to decide the same, prima facie, for the purposes of adjudicating a SCC Suit and in any case any such incidental finding is always subject to the decision of a suit filed and decided by regular courts. Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Jugeshwar Prasad Vs. Hanuman Prasad
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Jaspreet Singh
English hearing
FAFO/37 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 08-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1756
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Section 147--- The accident is said to have occurred on 08.01.2016 and the policy which had been issued on 28.11.2014 was cancelled on 09.01.2015 and the intimation to the insured was sent on 11.02.2015 i.e. the policy having been cancelled and the holder having been informed are all events which took place prior to the accident consequently there cannot be any occasion for an insurance policy to have subsisted on the date of accident i.e. 08.01.2016 and as such, the insurance Co. cannot be held liable to pay the amount at the first instance and to recover from the owne. Matter remitted. (E-15)
Title: The National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Reetu Devi & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing
CRLR/478 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1745
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120-B & 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) - Discharge - Scope - Subletting of Government contract by public sector company through pre-tender tie-up - Allegation of conspiracy causing loss to public exchequer - Plea that no person cheated and offence compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. - Held, cheating of Government constitutes offence under Section 420 IPC as 'St.' falls within definition of 'person' under Section 11 IPC - Charge not speculative merely because exact loss not quantified - Offences under Sections 120-B IPC and 13(1)(d), 13(2) PC Act non-compoundable - No ground for discharge - Revisions dismissed. (Paras 27, 28, 32, 37, 39 and 41) HELD: The second submission of the learned counsel for the revisionists is the amount of losses has not been quantified and the charge is merely speculative. When it is apparent from the material available on record that the Government had awarded the contract to NPCC for Rs.14,60,62,604/-, NPCC sublet the contract to UCC for Rs.13.82 crores and UCC further sublet the contract to Sat Sai Earth Works Rs.7.16 crores i.e. almost half the amount of contract value of NPCC and the contract has been awarded without following the usual process of inviting tenders so as to ensure availability of best rates, prima facie a case of causing wrongful loss to the Public Exchequer is made out which needs to be tried by the trial Court. (Para 28) Definition of the word 'person' given in Section 11 of the Penal Code is wide enough to include any association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. It would certainly include within its ambit the St. Government, which is a body of persons. If the accused persons have deceived the Government by fraudulently or dishonestly inducing it to enter into a contract with NPCC, which contract was first sub-let to UCC and thereafter it was further sub-let to M/s Sat Sai Earth Works at almost half of the contract value and thereby an excessive amount was paid to NPCC, which act has caused financial loss to the Government, the accused persons have committed the offence of cheating. If any person was involved in the criminal conspiracy to commit the offence of cheating, he is liable to be prosecuted. Therefore, I find no force in the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the revisionist. (Para 32) The revisionist has been charged for commission of the offence of criminal conspiracy for committing the offence punishable under Section 420 I.P.C. The revisionist has also been charged for commission of offences under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which offences are also non-compoundable offences. Therefore, the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the revisionist is misconceived. (Para 37) When the offences under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are not compoundable offences, the alleged lack of opportunity of compounding for want of any natural person having been cheated, with whose consent the offence could have been compounded, does not make out a ground for quashing of the criminal proceedings. (Para 39) Application allowed. (E-14)
Title: Praveen Pratap Singh & Anr. Vs. C.B.I.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
CRLA/11357/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1733
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law-The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973-Section 374-Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence--- Prosecution story relies on the narration that the deceased was done to death on 10.01.2023--- Theory is unbelievable in face of clear medical opinion that the death was caused on 21.01.2023--- The evidence of last seen and the occurrence caused on 21.01.2023, is so far distant in time that it renders it wholly uncredible and unreliable to the point of being extraneous to the essential facts that the prosecution set out to prove--- Occurrence/manner of death was never proven on the strength of any circumstantial evidence. In fact, the homicidal nature of that occurrence itself was not established--- Prosecution story based solely on such circumstantial evidence is wholly disjointed, there is a complete break of the chain of evidence which remained unexplained by the prosecution --- merely because the occurrence may have been caused and merely because one accused may have been named for reason of motive disclosed, it may not be enough for the prosecution to claim that it had proof of the occurrence caused by such accused. The test of proof beyond reasonable doubt would remain to be satisfied by the prosecution by proving each circumstance in the chain of circumstances relied by it, motive being one but not the only material circumstance. Judgment of conviction set aside. Appeal allowed. (E-15)
Title: Sukh Lal Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain
English hearing
CRLA/10492 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 01-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1729
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 386 - Cross-cases - Common Judgment - Illegality - Separate evidence in cross-cases to be considered independently - Passing of common judgment on appreciation of joint evidence in distinct case crimes held impermissible - Principle of Nathi Lal Vs St. of U.P., (1990 Supp SCC 145) reaffirmed - Order of conviction set aside and matter remitted for fresh decision - Appellants, who were on bail during trial, directed to be released on bail pending retrial. (Paras 6, 9, 11 and 12) HELD: The procedure adopted by the learned court below is described, manifestly erroneous and wholly impermissible in law. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nathi Lal & ors. Vs St. of U.P., 1990 Supp SCC 145, as consistently followed in Sudhir & ors. Vs St. of M.P, (2001) 2 SCC 688, St. of M.P. Vs Mishrilal (dead) & ors., (2003) 9 SCC 426, as considered and applied by a three-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in A.T. Mydeen & anr. Vs Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department, (2022) 14 SCC 392. The principle of law invoked by in these sets of appeal is beyond shadow of doubt. It is described as an absolute proposition in criminal jurisprudence. (para 6) Appeal allowed. (E-14)
Title: Rajendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain
English hearing
CRLA/7898 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1715
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 363, 366 & 376-D - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 4 - Evidence - Sole testimony of prosecutrix - Contradictory St.ments under Section 164 Cr.P.C. - Absence of corroboration - Victim's first St.ment exonerating the accused and second St.ment implicating them after 40 days - Unexplained delay, material improvements and improbabilities in prosecution case - Denial by informant of having lodged FIR - Held, conviction cannot rest on inconsistent, uncorroborated, and unreliable testimony of prosecutrix - Benefit of doubt - Accused acquitted. (Paras 28, 33, 34, 37, 39, and 41) HELD: Yet the informant 'M' P.W.-2 has simultaneously accepted that the Tehrir paper No. 5Ka, does not bear her signature and she had also not submitted it to the police. It is pertinent to mention here that on the basis of informant's application (paper No. 5Ka) F.I.R regarding the incident has been registered on 08.04.2014 at 11:30 a.m. Since the informant has denied that the basis of F.I.R i.e. her purported application (paper No. 5Ka) was not given by her, as such the whole prosecution story becomes doubtful. It is true that F.I.R is not a substantive piece of evidence, but it's contents are required to be proved in accordance with law, which the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt in this case. This will become apparent from our subsequent analysis. (Para 28) From the perusal of the first St.ment of the victim 'X' recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, proved by the accused as Ex. Kha-1, it is evident that she had gone with accused Malik Chandra of her own sweet will. She had thus eloped with him and gone to Gujarat, where she resided with him and no physical relations established between them. The victim has mentioned in her St.ment that the accused Malik Chandra had not raped her and she wanted to stay with him. The victim 'X' had also told the Doctor P.W.-3 at the time of her medical examination, (P.W.-3 has also proved in her examination-in-chief) that on 31.03.2014 at 05:00 a.m. she had left her house with a boy and gone by a truck to Auraiya, who had left her in the way, and then the son-in-law of her aunt had taken her to Gujarat, where she had solemnized marriage in a temple with him. Both the above St.ments have been proved in accordance with law, according to which, the accused Shailendra Kushwaha, Manvendra Singh @ Jhamman Pal and Malik Chandra, neither were involved in the enticement nor they had committed rape upon the victim. In fact the victim has mentioned that she was not raped by anybody. (Para 33) From the testimony of the victim 'X' P.W.-1 in Court, it is evident that all the three accused had forcibly kidnapped her from her house and taken her to Gujarat, Hyderabad, Delhi, but she could not tell the name of mohalla, city, name of landlord, who resided in that house, date and month of first rape, how many times she was raped. She has deposed that she had raised alarm but no person residing nearby ever came to help her. That is not reliable. She has also St.d that she, remained unconscious during her various journeys, which too is totally unreliable. The victim has also mentioned in her cross- examination that she had telephoned the police on No.100 from Gujarat, Har. and Delhi, but none came to her rescue, which is also improbable. The victim has been unable to tell whether she was taken by car, or bus, or train. It is highly improbable that from 31.3.2014 to 19.5.2014, a duration of 49 days , the victim remained unconscious, and was not in a physical and mental condition to resist the accused, moreso, when she was living in public place and travelling in public transport. (Para 37) It is also evident that after recording the first St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C, the victim's custody was handed over to her mother P.W.-2 and thereafter about 40 days later, her second St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C (Ex.Ka-1)was recorded on 03.7.2014. S.I. Mohd. Sattar Beg, P.W.-5, has accepted in his crossexamination that he had not given any application for recording the second St.ment of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C and the Court has suo- motu ordered it. It is very surprising that in the absence of any application on behalf of the investigating officer, why second St.ment of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C has been recorded by the Court. All the improvements made by the victim in her subsequent St.ment under Section 164 Cr.P.C and in the testimony given in the Court, during trial, have been proved, in accordance with law by the accused, which makes the testimony of victim highly unreliable and in the absence of corroboration, it cannot be relied upon. (Para 39) Application allowed. (E-14)
Title: Shailendra Kushwaha Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saumitra Dayal Singh,Sandeep Jain
English hearing
A227/11867/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 02-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1709
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Registration Act,1908- Sections 17(1), 23 & 32 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XII, Rule 6--- "Whether the judgment and decree of the year 1988 needs registration under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1908 being the compromise decree or otherwise?"--- Compromise decree dated 30.05.1988 and decree on the basis of admission under Order XII, Rule 6 dated 12.08.1988 does not require registration in view of exclusionary clause of Section 17(2) (vi) --- Section 23 of clearly provides for time limit for registration of an order or decree, which is four months when it becomes final. In the instant case, application has been moved after thirty- five years, which is barred by provisions of Section 23--- Section 32 clearly provides for the person who shall present the document for registration. The Act does not envisage any provision requiring the Court to get the order or decree registered--- The application moved by the plaintiff was defective and not maintainable due to non-joinder of necessary parties. Petition allowed. (E-15)
Title: Sukhdev Singh Majithiya & Ors. Vs. Bhavnesh Kumar Jindal & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
A227/4101 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 02-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1705
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XLI Rule 27 - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-Section 34--- The court below had wrongly interpreted the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 as it is applicable in the case of an appeal where the party to an appeal makes an application for production of additional evidence at appellate stage. Section 34 is summary proceeding and is not an appeal as court below has held. The invocation of provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 by court below in rejecting the application of petitioner is wholly misconceived. It seems that court concerned does not know the scope of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC as well as Section 34 of the Act of 1996--- The court below on the wrong assumption has proceeded to reject the application on the basis of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC--- matter is remitted back to court below to consider the application of petitioner afresh. (E-15)
Title: Kamta Prasad Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
CLRE/4/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 19-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1673
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Sections-115 & 80(2) - Order XXVI Rule 9--- Revision filed under Section 115 against orders for grant of leave to institute the suit before expiry of period of notice under Section 80 (2) CPC, and the order for appointment of Commission for local investigation under Order XXVI Rule 9 and 10 CPC--- Revisionist being a private individual cannot object for want of notice under Section 80 which is for the benefit of Government and its officers--- The order was strictly passed in consonance with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order XXVI CPC read with Rule 68 and 69 of the General Rules Civil, as the court while appointing an Advocate Commissioner had directed for the survey to be made with the help of police force and necessary photography and videography was to be carried out of the site to be inspected and surveyed--- Present suit is not prima facie barred by provisions of The Place of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, in fact, it has been filed seeking right to access to property in dispute under Section 18 of The Ancient Monument and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 being a protected monument. Revision dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Committee Of Management, Jami Masjid Sambhal Ahmed Marg Kot Sambhal Vs. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
BAIL/40954/2023 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1667
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B - Bail - Delay in lodging FIR - Counter-blast to earlier complaint - Applicant accused of cheating and forgery in alleged sale of teaching post - Six-year delay unexplained - Criminal history not resulting in conviction - Pre-trial incarceration and Article 21 - Imposition of monetary condition on bail deprecated - Held, prolonged custody without trial violates Article 21 - Delay in FIR and absence of conviction entitle applicant to bail - Courts not to act as recovery agents or impose deposit conditions for bail. (Paras 5, 12, 15, 16, 17 and 19) HELD: It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that accused of an offence is presumed to be innocent till he is convicted. Thus though the applicant herein has been involved in various cases he has not been convicted in any of the cases till date. Therefore a presumption of innocence is in his favour. Pre trial incarceration is a serious matter, which is violative of the fundamental right of an accused. (Para 15) The Apex Court has deprecated the practice of imposing the amount as a condition for payment as a condition for release on bail at pre trial stage. It cannot be said that the amount alleged to be paid by the complainant was actually paid to the accused at this stage. In such circumstances direction for payment cannot be imposed while granting bail to the applicant. (Para 16) In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the case in its entirety specifically the delay in lodging the FIR that too as a counter blast to the FIR lodged by the applicant against the relatives of the informant and further that though there is criminal history but in none of the those cases the applicant has been convicted so far and out of 34 cases 11 cases are under section 138 of the N.I. Act, which arise out of civil transaction between the parties and cannot be said to be a criminal case in strict sense. (Para 18) Bail Application allowed. (E-14)
Title: Rajnikant Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Anish Kumar Gupta
English hearing
A483/49 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1636
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law-The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,2023-Section 529 - The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973-Section 483--- Whether the remedy under Section 483 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now repealed) or Section 529 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, as the case may be, would be available to the concerned for seeking prayer of expeditious disposal of the case under Section 16 of Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986--- The 'Court' while exercising the power under Section 16 of the Act of 1986, related to the matters connected with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act of 1986, being an authority under the Act of 1986, would be inferior Criminal Court in relation to High Court. Therefore, the application for expeditious disposal of the proceedings under Section 16 of the Act of 1986 would be maintainable under Section 483 Cr.P.C. or Section 529 BNSS---Petition disposed of with a direction to the concerned Court to conclude the proceedings of the case(s) most expeditiously. Petition disposed of. (E-15)
Title: Abdul Raqib @ Pehtul Vs. State Of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Lavania
English hearing
A227/9547 /2019 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1625
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987-Section 22C--- Petition filed challenging the award whereby the Permanent Lok Adalat has awarded a sum of Rs.13,15,000/-.to the claimants--- The deceased was a contractual worker, he would be deemed to be on a fixed salary, thus, an addition of 40% of the established income is to be added as the deceased was less than 40 years of age which makes the income of the deceased as Rs.9,800/- (income Rs.7,000/- plus 40%)--- Respondents would be further entitled to loss of eSt. at Rs.16,500/- and funeral expenses at Rs.16,500/--- Respondents would also be entitled to spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each in respect of all the six claimants in Claim Petition--- Petition is dismissed with direction to the petitioners/ corporation to pay the total amount of compensation of Rs.23,78,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of claim up to the actual payment/realization---A further cost of Rs.50,000/- is imposed upon the petitioners/ corporation for denying the poor person of the legitimate compensation. (E-15)
Title: UPPCL Vs. Sunita Verma & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia
English hearing
A227/4107 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1621
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227-The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 151 ---Application for amending decree was allowed against which Petitioner filed Civil Revision which got dismissed---Once there was no denial to the fact that endowment deed of 1969 stands and was not in possession of plaintiff, the amendment of preliminary decree cannot be opposed. Had it been a case where the plaintiff was in possession of the endowment deed and had deliberately withheld the same, then the defendant could have opposed the amendment to the preliminary decree and judgment relied upon by him would have come to his rescue. It is also not denied that a suit for eviction against the occupier of endowed property has been instituted on behalf of Deity in the year 2022. Once such is a position, the defendant cannot oppose the amendment of a preliminary decree. Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Shiv Narayan Gupta Vs. Garib Chandra
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
A227/2495/2016 Judgment/Order Date: 12-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1614
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order VI Rule 17 - The Waqf Act,1995-Sections 3(a), 3(r) & 3(s))--- Petition challenging the order allowing amendment application of defendants for amending their written St.ment---Entire constructions, which has been raised by the plaintiff, stands upon the land of National Highway No.73 and in the garb of waqf property, the petitioner is claiming right. The defendants had rightly moved amendment application for amending the written St.ment on the ground that it is the National Highway Authority, who is the owner of land in question as the constructions are standing over the National Highway No.73 which does not belong to the plaintiffs---The plaintiff has made construction over the land of National Highways and had let out the structure to different persons and is realizing the rent treating it to be property of waqf Madarsa. It cannot be said to be a case of 'waqf by user' as the owner of the property in dispute is the National Highway Authority of India, which is under the control of Central Government, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Waqf Madarsa Qasimul Uloom Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
FAFO/895 /2016 Judgment/Order Date: 01-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1610
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XLI Rule 27--- Nowhere does the affidavit indicate that the learned trial court has refused to admit the annexure as an evidence or notwithstanding exercise of due diligence by the appellant, he could not get hold of annexure 1 and neither is the said annexure accompanied by the application under the said provision for treating annexure 1 to be an additional evidence---Appellant has also failed to indicate as to how the aforesaid verification can be related with the driving license which had been filed before the learned Tribunal and thus, in absence of any evidence being led before the learned Tribunal of the driving license filed before it of Shri Hori Lal being fake or forged and the said driving license not having been controverted in any manner, consequently, it cannot be said that the learned Tribunal has committed any error in holding that the driver namely Shri Hori lal was having a valid and effective driving license on the date of the incident. Appeal dismissed. (E-15)
Title: National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shiva Vishwakarma Minor
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing
FAFO/664 /2017 Judgment/Order Date: 26-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1602
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law-The Motor Vehicles Act,1988- Sections 169(2) & 173 - The Evidence Act,1872-Section 114(g)--- The eye witness has been produced and nothing could be extracted from him, which may create any doubt about veracity of his evidence and indicate that he had not seen the accident--- Once an eye witness has been produced, who proved the accident, merely because a person who was in the car has not been produced cannot be a ground for not believing the testimony of the eye witness---The tribunal determined the income of the deceased on the basis of evidence produced before it. Since no contrary evidence could be produced or shown, no illegality or error in the income of the deceased determined by the tribunal--- The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed - -- Merely because the application moved by the appellant for summoning and providing copies of the income tax return on the date of judgment was dismissed by the tribunal, it cannot be said that the power has not been exercised by the tribunal because the Court has also to see that process of law may not be misused to delay or stall the proceedings---Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Dayawati Gupta & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
FAFO/217 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1598
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- The Employee's Compensation Act, 1923-Sections 3 & 4A - The Central Motor Vehicle Rule, 1989 - Rule 18--- Mere renewal of the license would not be and cannot be indicative of the fact that the claimant does not suffer from the 40 % permanent physical disability as duly certified by the concerned Chief Medical Officer--- Insurance Co. will be liable to meet the claim for compensation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under the Act, 1923 on the conjoint operation of Sections 3 & 4 (A) and sub Section 3 (A) of the Act, 1923--- Owner & the insurance Co. jointly and severally liable to pay the awarded amount. Appeal dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Future Generali India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar Singh & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Abdul Moin
English hearing
ELEP/11/2022 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1584
HEADNOTE hearing
Election Petition - The Representation of People Act, 1951-Sections 80 & 81 - The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order VI Rule 17 - Order VII Rule 11---Election petition filed questioning the election of respondent on the ground that he does not belong to Scheduled Castes community and is from Other Backward Caste---In an election petition, material facts have to be set out in the petition under Section 83(1)(a) and no amendment can be carried out. The same applies with the pleading of a suit where the material fact has to be disclosed in view of Rule 2 of Order VI in the pleading by a party relying for his claim or defence---The amendment application moved by petitioner cannot be allowed as it introduces totally a new case---Non disclosure of material fact is an incurable defect which leads to an inevitable conclusion that an election petition is not maintainable---The present case is not for bringing on record material particulars which have been left while filing the election petition, but through proposed amendment, material facts are being brought on record which goes to the root of the case and cannot be allowed at this stage---As the petitioner has not disclosed the material facts in his election petition and had tried to subsequently get the election petition amended, the application moved by respondent no. 1 under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC for dismissing the election petition for non disclosure of cause of action stands allowed. Petition dismissed. (E-15)
Title: Prem Pal Singh Vs. Prem Pal Singh Dhangar & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
English hearing
CRLP/2588 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1578
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 256 & 302 - Death of complainant during pendency of complaint case - Whether complaint abates - Legal representative on basis of Will - Permissibility to continue prosecution - Held, death of complainant does not ipso facto terminate prosecution - Magistrate may, under Section 302 Cr.P.C., permit any person including legal heir or legatee to continue proceedings - No abatement of inquiry or trial on complainant's death - Heir by Will entitled to pursue complaint - Petition dismissed. (Paras 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 18) HELD: Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. provides that if the summons have been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused, unless for some reason, he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day; Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader, or by the Officer conducting the prosecution, or where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. It has been provided in subsection (2) of Section 256 that the provisions of sub Section (1) of Section 256 shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non- appearance of the complainant is due to his death. (Para 9) In view of above, on the death of the complainant, the criminal prosecution does not put to end and the prosecution can be permitted to be continued by the Magistrate, before whom the proceedings are pending and it may be permitted to be continued through Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor as there is no provision of abatement of inquiry and trial in absence of the complainant, whereas the provision has been made for abatement of appeal or trial on the death of the accused. It is for this reason, it does not provide abatement of the proceedings on death of the complainant, rather if the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date; Provided that the Magistrate is of the opinion that personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary and may proceed with the case dispensing his attendance. It is also in the cases where the nonappearance of the complainant is due to his death. The prosecution may be permitted to be conducted by any person personally or by a pleader. Thus, on the death of complainant, his legal representative may move application for prosecuting the case, therefore, a legal representative cannot be debarred only because he is on the basis of a will in his favour. (Para 11) Adverting to the facts of the present case, the complaint has been filed on the ground that the petitioner, showing himself to be the son after death of the husband of the complainant, got his name recorded in the revenue records as heir, whereas they had no issue and the accused/petitioner along with his two brothers is son of Bechai. It is not in dispute that the Will was executed by the complainant Atwari in favour of the respondent no.2 in regard to the property, on which the name had been got recorded by the petitioner fraudulently as alleged during pendency of the application of the complainant for mutation before the Consolidation Officer and after filing of the application by the complainant, the proceedings in consolidation are going on and the respondent no.2 is in possession of the property in dispute of the complainant on the basis of Will. Thus, he is her legal representative and entitled for the property-in-dispute on the basis of Will and entitled to continue with the proceedings on behalf of the complainant. (Para 18) Application allowed. (E-14)
Title: Kodai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajnish Kumar
English hearing
CRLA/6099 /2019 Judgment/Order Date: 29-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1569
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302/34, 304 Part II/34, 323/34 - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Sudden Fight - Exception 4 to Section 300 - Absence of premeditation - Altercation over removal of barrier on pathway leading to scuffle - Blows with lathi and danda resulting in death - No prior enmity or motive - Held, occurrence was sudden, without premeditation, in heat of passion - Accused did not act cruelly or take undue advantage - Case falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 - Conviction altered from Section 302/34 IPC to Section 304 Part II/34 IPC. (Paras 25, 26, 30, 31 and 34) HELD: In the present case, the question whether the appellants could be said to have caused the injuries with intention of causing death of the deceased is concerned, admittedly, from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it came into light that the incident had taken place on the spur of moment and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, therefore, it can not be said that the appellants have pre-motivated or premeditation of mind to cause injuries to the deceased. (Para 25) In the postmortem report no fracture has been found on the body and head of the deceased, which indicates that the appellants had no intention to cause grievous injuries or to kill the deceased. Knowledge and intention of a person is a mental St. and the direct evidence for the same is not possible, it can only be gathered by the attending circumstances like weapon used, commission of crime, manner of assault, nature and number of injuries. These are the factors, which will have to be considered to justify the intention and knowledge. (Para 26) On going through the entire evidence on record, we find that the necessary ingredients to attract 4th Exception to section 300 IPC are clearly present in the facts of the present case inasmuch as death is caused; there existed no pre-meditation; it was a sudden fight; the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, therefore, the case in hand clearly falls under fourth exception to section 300 IPC. (Para 30) In the case of Jugut Ram Vs. St. of Chhattisgarh (2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 520, the Hon'ble Apex Court modified/altered the charges from Section 302 IPC to 304-II IPC. In that case also the weapon lathi was used and the case was of sudden provocation. In the said case two injuries were found on the head of the deceased caused by lalthi blow and in the instant case also two injuries were found on the head of the deceased caused by lathi, therefore, we are of the definite opinion that in the instant case the conviction of the appellants could be altered from Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC to 304-II IPC. (Para 31) n the present case, the act of appellants are not pre-meditated or pre-motivated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC deserves to be converted into Section 304-II IPC, therefore, it can be said that though the appellants had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. (Para 34) Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)
Title: Jumma Shah & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Siddhartha Varma,Madan Pal Singh
English hearing
BAIL/24930 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 13-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1561
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B - Bail - Principles governing grant or refusal of bail - Applicant a habitual offender with 52 criminal cases of cheating and forgery - No explanation for delay of four years in lodging FIR - Role as property mediator alleged in fraudulent sale transaction - Gravity of offence and antecedents disentitle applicant to bail - Co-accused's bail not a ground for parity - Held, discretion to grant bail must be exercised judiciously considering antecedents, gravity, likelihood of tampering with evidence and repetition of offence - Bail refused. (Paras 14, 20, 22, 23, and 25) HELD: This Court has taken into consideration of the fact that the applicant has almost 52 criminal cases pending against him under section 420 IPC. Under Schedule 1 of the Code or Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), an offence under Section 420 IPC is cognizable and non-bailable and is triable by a Magistrate of the First Class, therefore, the instant offence is serious in nature. It is also noted that he is habitual offender of commission of the same nature of the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. In view of the aforesaid facts, there is great apprehension in the mind of the Court that applicant upon release on bail may tamper with evidence and may influence the witnesses. There are also great apprehension that he may breach the conditions imposed by this Court and can repeat the same nature of offence in future. Taking into the consideration of aforesaid reasons, this Court cannot take lenient view while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction. (Para 22) It is pertinent to note that co-accused in the matter who has been released on bail, however, bearing no resemblance to the present applicant as he is habitual offender and has criminal history of 52 cases. (Para 23) Bail Application rejected. (E-14)
Title: Kamlesh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Chandra Dhari Singh
English hearing
WRIA/5494 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 07-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1555
HEADNOTE hearing
Service Law - Assistant Teacher Appointment - Equivalence of D.Ed. and D.El.Ed. - Petitioner completed two-year Diploma in Education (D.Ed.) from M.P. Board (2014) and qualified TET (2015) - Appointment order issued in 2024 but school not allotted; later appointment cancelled on ground that D.Ed. not equivalent to Diploma in Elementary Education (D.El.Ed.) as required under NCTE Regulations - Challenge thereto. Held: NCTE notification (23.08.2010) prescribes "Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)" as minimum qualification. However, syllabus comparison reveals substantial differences: D.El.Ed. focuses on child psychology, elementary education pedagogy, and inclusive education, while D.Ed. is more general, oriented towards upper primary. Therefore, D.Ed. cannot be treated as equivalent to D.El.Ed. Appointment rightly cancelled. No interference warranted. Writ Petition dismissed.
Title: Sanghpriya Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
English hearing
WRIA/10380/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 13-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1550
HEADNOTE hearing
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 - Back Wages - Principle of "No Work No Pay" - Not applicable where employee is prevented from working due to employer's illegal order - Petitioner's appointment was duly approved on 20.5.1994. Director of Education cancelled the approval on 27.2.1998, which was quashed by the High Court on 5.10.2023 with a direction that "necessary consequences will follow". In contempt proceedings, the authorities stated in compliance affidavit that the petitioner has been treated in service w.e.f. 13.5.1998. However, DIOS denied salary on the plea that petitioner had not actually worked after cancellation of approval. Held: Principle of "no work no pay" does not apply where the employer itself restrains the employee from working. Once the cancellation order dated 27.2.1998 was set aside, the original approval revived, and petitioner stood reinstated w.e.f. 13.5.1998. Since the fault lay with the employer in not permitting him to work, the petitioner is entitled to back wages from 13.5.1998 till retirement along with consequential benefits. (Paras 10, 11, 12). (E-5)
Title: Abdul Wahab Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vikram D Chauhan
English hearing
WTAX/71 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 30-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1530
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950- Article 226-Customs Act,1962-Sections 28H, 28I & 28J-Customs Tariff Act,1975: Chapter 8 Vs Chapter 20-M/s Rawder Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. imported "roasted areca nuts" after obtaining an advance ruling from the Customs Authority for Advance Ruling (CAAR), which classified the product under Tariff Item 2008 19 20 (Chapter 20 of Customs Tariff Act)-The Customs Department disputed this classification and claimed the product was instead "dried areca nuts" falling under Chapter 8, specifically Tariff Item 0802 80-The department challenged the CAAR ruling via Custom Appeals and also refused to release the imported goods, citing adverse test reports from CRCL, New Delhi-The importer, in turn, filed a writ petition for release of the goods and to enforce the advance ruling-The Court upheld the CAAR's ruling, it held that roasting is a process distinct from drying involving high heat that alters the physical and chemical properties of the nut-Since Chapter 8 deals with moderate heat/drying and Chapter 20 includes roasted nuts, the classification under 2008 19 20 was correct-Conflicting lab reports were presented, private lab reported moisture content below 4%, declaring the nuts as roasted while CRCL, New Delhi(govt. lab) found moisture content above 7%, declaring them dried and unfit for human consumption- However, The court found merit in the importer's claim and circumstances-Hence, the importer's goods cannot be treated as mis declared solely based on disputed lab reports-the Impugned letter dated 27.12.2024 and seizure memo dated 10.03.2025 quashed- Customs directed to release the goods immediately. (Para 1 to 46) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: M/S Rawder Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajan Roy,Om Prakash Shukla
English hearing
WRIC/1002411/1999 Judgment/Order Date: 16-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1523
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Administrative Law - Firearms - Deposit of licensed firearms during Parliamentary elections - Arms Act, 1959 - Section 24-A & 24-B - Validity of police direction requiring deposit - No suspension/cancellation of licence - Lack of statutory backing - Election Commission - licence-holders cannot be compelled to deposit firearms unless licence is suspended or cancelled in accordance with law - no nexus between objective sought to be achieved and impugned action - Deposit of licensed firearm cannot be enforced in absence of statutory order suspending/cancelling licence - Police cannot compel deposit solely on commencement of election process - Authorities shall not compel firearm license holders to deposit firearms without a prior written notice, especially if they have valid licenses, no criminal antecedents, and were granted the license for security purposes. (Para - 8, 20 to 23) Petitioners, including advocates and law-abiding citizens, holding valid and renewed firearm licenses for their security - having no criminal antecedents, were directed by police officials to deposit their firearms at the police station due to upcoming parliamentary elections - by means of a general order without any written notice - Petitioners filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the authorities not to compel them to deposit their firearms. (Para - 2,3) HELD: - In order to ensure peace and peaceful conduct of elections, firearms may be deposited to the police station concerned by issuing a written notice, but the authorities in no case shall compel the firearm licence holders to deposit their firearms in case they have a valid license, no criminal antecedents, and the license was issued for security. Respondents were directed not to compel the petitioners to deposit their firearms without a prior written notice. For causing harassment to the petitioners by means of a general order, a cost of Rs. 25,000/- was awarded to be paid to the petitioners within six months. (Para - 21 to 24) Petition disposed of. (E-7)
Title: Mohd. Arif Khan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali
English hearing
WRIC/1000570/2001 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1521
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Administrative Law - Judicial review of an administrative order - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 132 - Whether a subsequent officer has the jurisdiction to cancel a predecessor's order without providing an opportunity of hearing - An administrative order passed by a subsequent officer, which cancels a predecessor's order, is invalid and liable to be quashed if it is done without notice, without an opportunity of hearing, and without a vested power of review.(Para - 7 to 10) Petitioner, a Scheduled Caste landless agricultural labourer in possession of land for over 40 years - challenged the Sub-Divisional Officer's order cancelling earlier grant without notice - passed allegedly on social forestry claim - without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. (Para - 3 to 6) HELD: - Impugned order was quashed on the grounds that it was passed without notice or opportunity of hearing, and the officer had no jurisdiction to review the earlier order passed by his predecessor. (Para - 10,11,12) Petition Allowed. (E-7)
Title: Laxmi Objection Filed Appropriate Bench & Ors. Vs. U.P. Zila Adhikari/ Sub-Divisional Officer Misrikh Sitapur & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Irshad Ali
English hearing
WRIC/31912 /2018 Judgment/Order Date: 15-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1510
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 - Inclusion in Grant-in-Aid List - Government Order dated 07.09.2006 - Government Order dated 14.07.2020 - Petitioner's institution granted permanent recognition in 1986 - Claim for grant-in- aid wrongly rejected firstly on non- existent ground of suspicious signature and thereafter on unsustainable grounds including appointment of two Class-IV employees - Petitioner's earlier writ ppetition No.66902 of 2009 allowed with categorical positive direction that if there is some optimum limit the petitioner shall be adjusted against such institution or alternative arrangement shall be made - Despite that, respondents again rejected claim which was quashed in Writ Petition No.48835 of 2011 and special appeal dismissed. Held : Claim was rejected on grounds not sustainable in law, right of petitioner crystallised under Government Order dated 07.09.2006 and subsequent Government Order dated 14.07.2020, which provided that it was not feasible to open a new institution or to establish a new institution on grant-in-aid, could not defeat such crystallised right, rejection on pretext of new policy misconceived - Once State Government had extended benefit of grant-in-aid to similarly placed institution denial to petitioner was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Impugned order set aside, Special Secretary, Basic Education, U.P. directed to take petitioner's institution on grant-in-aid and provide full financial aid forthwith - Writ petition allowed. Allowed. (E-5)
Title: C/M Janhit Madhyamik Vidyalaya & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saral Srivastava
English hearing
WRIC/14892/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1505
HEADNOTE hearing
(A) Writ Jurisdiction - Registration of Documents - Challenging Official Act of Sub-Registrar - Registration Act, 1908 - Section 34 - Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 22 - Partition Act, 1893 - Section 4 - Rules/Regulations - Rule 285 in UP Registration Manual - Duty of Registering Officer - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 - Writ jurisdiction not to be exercised to usurp that of the civil Court - Petitioner must find his remedy in the civil court - For a party to challenge the official act of the registering authority, there must be reliance on the documents presented for registration. (Para - 10,11) Petitioner, co-sharer in inherited property - challenged the Sub-Registrar's act of registering a sale deed executed by his cousins through a power of attorney - arguing the Sub-Registrar failed to perform his statutory duty under Section 34 of the Registration Act - breach of preferential right under Section 22 Hindu Succession Act. (Para - 1, 2, 7) HELD: - Writ petition was not maintainable as the underlying controversy between the parties was civil in nature. Petitioner must seek his remedy in a civil court and refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction to interfere with the official act of the Sub-Registrar. (Para - 10 to 12) Petition disposed of. (E-7)
Title: Kamlesh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Arindam Sinha,Avnish Saxena
English hearing
WRIC/13012/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 06-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1502
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-SARFAESI ACT-Rule 9(5)- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002-The petitioner filed a writ seeking a refund of Rs 17.49 lakhs, which was 25% of the bid amount deposited by him an e- auction conducted by the respondent Bank on 29.12.2023-This amount was forfeited by the Bank when he failed to pay the remaining 75% within the stipulated time, as per Rules 9(5) of the Rule 9(5) of the Rules,2002-the petitioner argued that the forfeiture was unjust since the Bank later withdrew the SARFAESI proceedings and re-initiated them, which he claimed invalidated the original forfeiture and demanded refund on equitable grounds-The court held that forfeiture under Rule 9(5) is a statutory consequence not subject to equitable considerations-The petitioner failed to demonstrate any exceptional or extraneous circumstances that justified his failure to deposit the remaining amount-The withdrawal and re-initiation of SARFAESI proceedings by the Bank did not invalidate the prior forfeiture.(Para 1 to 11) The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)
Title: Anil Kumar Jaiswal Vs. U.O.I. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
English hearing
WRIC/12360/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1497
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 - Sections 10 & 16 - Under Section 10, the Telegraph Authority is empowered to place and maintain telegraph lines and posts on private land subject to payment of compensation for damage; and under Section 16(1), if such exercise is resisted or obstructed, the District Magistrate may, in his discretion, permit the authority to proceed notwithstanding such resistance. Held : the District Magistrate is not required to pass an order under Section 16(1) of the Act in every case where a person, on whose property the transmission line is being laid, raises an objection or files a representation before the District Magistrate. District Magistrate is only required to pass an order under Section 16(1) when the Telegraph Authority refers a particular matter to the District Magistrate for passing an order therein. Petitioner objected to the laying down of transmission lines over his property. Court granted liberty to the Telegraph Authority to refer the matter to the District Magistrate under Section 16(1) of the Act for dealing with the said obstruction/resistance/ representation made by the petitioner. (Para 9, 11) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Antram Goyal Vs. Power Grid Neemrana Bareilly Transmission Ltd. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Shekhar B. Saraf,Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
English hearing
WRIC/11196/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 06-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1486
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law-Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Act,1961-Section 15(2) & (3)- The petitioner an elected member of the Kshettra Panchayat submitted a non- confidence motion against the Block Pramukh-The notice was supported by 70 out of 100 elected members and submitted to the Collector u/s 15(2) of the Act,1961-Instead of convening a meeting, the Collector rejected the motion on 20.03.2025 citing affidavits from 69 members denying their support for the motion-Held, once a non-confidence motion u/s 15(2) of the Act is validly submitted with signatures of at least half of the elected members, the Collector is statutorily obligated to convene a meeting within 30 days and cannot reject the motion based on belated rebuttal affidavits or enter into disputed questions of fact such as forgery or coercion-The Court quashed the Collector's order rejecting the motion and directed a summary verification of signatures from Panchayat records, reiterating that the Collector's role is limited to a prima facie satisfaction, not detailed inquiry.(Para 1 to 31) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: Smt. Bandana Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Anjani Kumar Mishra,Jayant Banerji
English hearing
WRIC/10898/2024 Judgment/Order Date: 27-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1478
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 - Sections 2(za) & 14 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Nominated representative of a person with mental illness - Section 14(4) of MH Act, 2017 enumerates five different categories of persons, who can be appointed, in case no nominated representative is appointed by a person under Section 14(1) of MH Act, 2017 - There is no criteria or suitability and also there is no mechanism provided under the MH Act, 2017 for appointment of a representative to take care of such intellectually challenged persons or their asset. This legal vacuum has been considered by the Courts and each time, the Courts had exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction while appointing a representative or a guardian under the MH Act, 2017. While exercising parens patriae jurisdiction, Courts have to apply the "wills and preferences" of the individual. The "wills and preferences" of the intellectually challenged person have to be determined either in the background of advance directives as stated hereinabove or in the absence of advance directives, it ought to be guided by the factors which point towards the 'wish & intent' of the said mentally ill person. (Para 13, 14, 15) B. Constitution of India, 1950 -Article 226 - Examination of the validity of order - When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or by a reply, otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out by the said statutory functionary. In the instant case, Board rejected the application on the ground that the petitioner had a criminal history of two cases. Court rejected the additional explanation of the Board asserted in the counter affidavit that the offences appeared to be involving moral turpitude. (Para 9) C. Moral Turpitude - Meaning - The term 'moral turpitude' is not defined under the law - It refers to instances where an individual indulges in acts which are against morality, integrity, and ethics. Courts have identified offences involving moral turpitude to include financial misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, theft, sexual misconduct, etc. and refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved - In the instant case, criminal cases registered against petitioner under Sections 143, 341, 323, 332 I.P.C., Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Section 6/11 of the United Provinces Special Powers Act. Court took a holistic view and was of the considered view that the offences alleged do not involve any offence of moral turpitude. D. In the instant case the opposite party no.4 was suffering from intellectual disability. Petitioner, a close relative (Nephew) of opposite party no.4, looking into the pathetic condition of the opposite party no.4, decided to take responsibility of the opposite party no.4, for which other family members had no objection. Petitioner moved an application before the Board u/s 14 of the MH Act, 2017, seeking his nomination as a representative/ prabandhak to take care of the opposite party no.4 and her property. Mansik Swasthya Punarvilokan Board rejected the application on the ground that the petitioner had a criminal history of two cases. Held : A relative as defined under Section 2(za) of the MH Act, 2017 means any person related to the person with mental illness by blood, marriage or adoption. Petitioner was a close relative of opposite party no.4 being her nephew and there was 'No Objection' from other relatives to his nomination as her representative and even the concerned Tehsildar has reported that opposite party no.4 is under the care of the petitioner. Court exercising parens patriae jurisdiction appointed the petitioner as the nominated representative of opposite party no.4, to take all decisions in respect of the affairs of the opposite party no.4 including her medical treatment, healthcare, daily living, financial affairs, to deal with all the movable and immovable assets of the opposite party no.4, including the family pension however, Court restrained him from the transfer of immovable assets, without the prior approval and consent of the 'Mansik Swasthya Punarvilokan Board'. (Para 13) Allowed. (E-5)
Title: Saurabh Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Rajan Roy,Om Prakash Shukla
English hearing
WRIC/4465/2025 Judgment/Order Date: 09-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1473
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Civil Law-Constitution of India,1950- Article 226-Right to Information Act,2005-Section 19(8)-The petitioner filed an RTI application seeking information from the Gram Panchayat, Jabrauli-Despite filing the application, a first appeal, and a second appeal, the requested information was never provided-The State Information Commission imposed a penalty of Rs. 25000/- on the Public Information Officer and recommended departmental action but failed to ensure that the information was actually furnished to the petitioner- The court observed that the core objective of the Act,2005 is to provide information to the citizen-It held that the State Information Commission has wide powers under section 19(8) of the Act, including the authority to direct the PIO to furnish the requested information-The court criticized the Commission for passing the order in a mechanical manner and failing to fulfill its statutory duties-Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the Commission with directions to take concrete steps to obtain and provide the requested information to the petitioner. (Para 1 to 20) The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)
Title: Rajjan Vs. State Information Commission U.P. Lko & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I
English hearing
WRIC/3795 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 23-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1464
HEADNOTE hearing
Constitution of India, Article 226 - Pre- conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, Sections 17, 20, 22, 23, 30 - Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996, Rule 12 - Search, Seizure, Suspension, and Cancellation of Registration - Petitioners challenged the orders dated 26.03.2025 (Appellate Authority), 13.10.2023 (cancellation of registration), and 12.05.2023 (suspension of registration) of their ultrasound centre, alleging non-compliance with the PCPNDT Act. The inspection on 01.05.2023, authorized by the SDM, led to seizure and sealing without the District Magistrate's recorded satisfaction or proper delegation, violating Section 30. No show cause notice was issued before cancellation, and the Advisory Committee's report lacked a recommendation for suspension/cancellation, contravening Sections 17(4) and 20(2). The seizure memo was allegedly fabricated and antedated, with no independent witnesses, violating Rule 12 and Section 100 Cr.P.C. Respondents defended the SDM's authority to delegate and the public interest basis for suspension under Section 20(3). The court held that the search lacked a recorded "reason to believe" by the Appropriate Authority, rendering it illegal, per Ravinder Kumar vs. St. of Haryana. The suspension order lacked evidence of public interest, and the cancellation order was void for absence of a show cause notice and Advisory Committee recommendation. No material showed violations under Sections 22 or 23. All impugned orders were quashed, and the writ petition was allowed. (Paras 12-15) Writ petition allowed.
Title: Alpha Diagnostic Centre & Ors. Vs. State Appropriate Authority. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Pankaj Bhatia
English hearing
WRIA/25278/2014 Judgment/Order Date: 17-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1457
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law- U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 - Appointment of Assistant Teacher (Urdu) - Adib-E-Kamil qualification from Jamia Urdu, Aligarh - Petitioner passed intermediate exam in the year 1995. He got admission in Jamia Urdu, Aligarh to pursue Adib-E-Kamil in July, 1995, its exam was conducted in November, 1995 i.e. within 5 months and result was declared in July, 1996. Petitioner passed Moallim-E-Urdu examination held in February, 1997. Appointments were cancelled on the ground that Jamia Urdu was not a recognized institution and certificates were obtained in less than prescribed duration. Held : Petitioner has passed two courses (Adib-E-Kamil and Moallim-E-Urdu) between July, 1996 and February, 1997 i.e. in a very short period of 8 months i.e. though duration of both courses was 1 year. Petitioner has not completed his studies of one year for Adib-E-Kamil and passed two courses within 8 months despite both courses were of one year. Aforesaid facts establish that Jamia Urdu, Aligarh was distributing degrees without proper classes. Petitioner has no right for appointment being ineligible. Writ petition dismissed. (Para 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) Dismissed. (E-5)
Title: Azahar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
English hearing
WRIA/19427 /2023 Judgment/Order Date: 17-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1438
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 - Sections 19(3) & 22 - Statute of University - St. 2(1) - Post of Vice- Chancellor - Appointment - Short-listing and recommendation of candidates by Executive Council - Principle of election - Applicability - How far merit can be taken into consideration - Held, the members of executive council were expected to choose five best candidates out of those available for their recommendation to the University Court. Such shortlisting is by cast of votes - The strict principles of election are not applicable in the facts of the present case as recommendation is expected to be based upon the merits of the candidate. (Para 46) B. Service Law - Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 - Section 19 - Statute of University - St. 2(1) - Post of Vice- Chancellor - Appointment - Visitor's power - Scope - Nature of process - whether election or selection - Held, the Visitor is not bound by the recommendation made by the Executive Council and the University Court and has the discretion under Statute 2, not to approve any of the persons recommended by the Court and call for fresh recommendation - The Visitor has to consider appointing the Vice-Chancellor from the panel of three persons recommended by the Court, from a panel of five persons recommended by the Executive Council. The appointment of Vice-Chancellor, therefore, cannot be said to be by way of election. (Para 47 and 48) C. Service Law - Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 - Post of Vice-Chancellor - Selection - Doctrine of bias - Applicability - Held, appointment on the post of Vice- Chancellor was based on selection and not election. Once that be so, the defence of respondents/St. that concept of bias would not be attracted cannot be accepted - As appointment based on selection is concerned, the concept of bias would clearly be applicable. (Para 61 and 62) D. Service Law - Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 - Post of Vice-Chancellor - Selection - Participation of husband Prof. Gulrej in the proceeding of Executive Council, how far vitiate the selection of wife for the post of Vice-Chancellor - Held, chairing and participation of Professor Gulrez in the process of recommendation is improper - Held further, though, Prof. Gulrez Ahmad ought not to have presided and participated in the meeting of Executive Council and the University Court, yet, considering the nature of appointment process and the limited recommendatory role of Executive Council and University Court in making of appointment of Vice-Chancellor, we are of the considered view that participation of Prof. Gulrez Ahmad in such proceedings has not vitiated the selection proceedings - High Court issued a directive to the University to resolve, henceforth, not to allow any spouse or close family member to preside and participate any crucial meeting concerning his/her close relative. (Para 74, 75 and 88) Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
Title: Prof. (Dr.) Mujahid Beg Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Ashwani Kumar Mishra,Donadi Ramesh
English hearing
WRIA/11589/2023 Judgment/Order Date: 27-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1424
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 - Disciplinary proceeding - Scope of interference - How far High Court sit in appeal over finding of disciplinary authority - Held, the Court can interfere if the opinion given on the material is perverse, based on irrelevant evidence or ignoring material evidence. We can also interfere if there is a violation of the principles of natural justice, leading to prejudice to the petitioner. It is also open to this Court to see if the procedure, that was adopted, was fair, just and reasonable, and particularly, one conforming to the fundamentals of the standard procedural requirements to hold a disciplinary inquiry. (Para 21) B. Service Law - Disciplinary proceeding - Burden of proof, on whom lie - Held, burden to prove the charge(s) brought against the employee is on the Establishment or the Management, as the Bank choose to call themselves here. If the employee fails to produce any evidence in his defence, that would not lead to proof of the charge, the burden whereof rests on the shoulders of the Establishment. (Para 22) C. Service Law - Disciplinary proceeding - Punishment - Compulsory retirement - Charge of misconduct was leveled - No witness cited as Ist and IInd witness were called in preliminary enquiry - Effect - Officers of the Bank, who had done the preliminary inquiry, and were not present on the spot, were produced - Relevancy - Held, reliance placed on the evidence of these two witnesses to find an affirmation of facts constituting the charge is, truly speaking, reliance placed on irrelevant evidence or material, which should not have been considered during the departmental inquiry - The said evidence is certainly not relevant to prove the charge against the petitioner - Upon this kind of irrelevant material, the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Reviewing Authority could never have found the petitioner guilty. (Para 25, 28 and 31) Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
Title: Prithvi Raj Singh Vs. The Chief General Manager (H.R.), Union Bank of India, Central office, Mumbai
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing
SPLA/161 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 02-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1422
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - Model Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1998 - Rules 5(3), 18 (1) & (2) - Disciplinary proceeding - Suspension - Misconduct - Allegations regarding acquisition of the property made in the chargesheet have not been denied - Effect - Possessing immovable property disproportionate to source of income, whether amount to misconduct - Held, the immovable properties possessed by an employee working in the Corporation disproportionate to the known source of income certainly amounts to a misconduct in view of the definition clause provided under Rule 5(3) - Division Bench found no illegality in the Judgment of Single Judge dismissing writ against suspension. (Para 8, 9 and 11) Appeal dismissed. (E-1)
Title: Rajvir Singh Vs. U.P.Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Attau Rahman Masoodi,Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I
English hearing
FAPL/1116 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 27-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1419
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 498A & 326B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section ¾ - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Section 27 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 125 - Appeal challenged order by which appellant directed to pay amount as stree dhan - Earlier, respondent got maintenance order - Appellant paid Rs. 6 lakhs and tendered Rs. 1 lakh via demand draft - Impugned judgment shows photocopies of jewellery receipts as secondary evidence without stating reasons for their admissibility - Respondent alleged that appellant forcibly snatched her jewellery, assaulted her, but in FIR, allegation was of conspiracy involving seven accused, including appellant - In cross-examination, respondent admitted appellant was not present during incident, ignored by trial court - Trial court concluded appellant did not dispute receipts and admitted price of jewellery mentioned in receipts - However, receipts being photocopies, respondent claims receipts related to jewellery gifted to her as stree dhan - Appellant, having no knowledge of these transactions, cannot deemed to have admitted them - Document must be proved by its maker or witness to its making - Mere absence of objection does not establish appellant's possession of stree dhan jewellery - Proof of possession needed to be established - Return of stree dhan determined at trial within proceedings under Act, not independently through application under Section 27. (Para 2, 6, 8) Appeal allowed. (E-13)
Title: Krishna Kumar Gupta Vs. Priti Gupta
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Arindam Sinha,Avnish Saxena
English hearing
CRLP/4503 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 26-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1400
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Constitution of India,1950 - Article - 226, - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Sections 311, 313 & 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) -Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 467, 468 & 471 - Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) - Section 448 - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) - Sections 3, 4 & 59(2)(c) - India Evidence Act, 1872- Sections 16, 145 & 161 - Writ Petition - challenging the impugned rejection order of transfer application moved under Section 448 of BNSS - Petitioner, formerly serving as Managing Director of LACFEDD, convicted and sentenced in corruption case - Appeal preferred - Bail granted - Enforcement Directorate initiated complaint proceedings under the PMLA - Petitioner filed transfer application u/s 448 BNSS, alleging bias and misconduct by the presiding officer of the trial court - Application rejected - Multiple applications filed u/s 311 Cr.P.C. for summoning of witnesses - dismissed as improper and dilatory - Applications under Section 59(2)(c) of PMLA and Sections 16 & 145 of Evidence Act - rejected on merits, judicial orders found valid and free from legal infirmity - No prejudice shown - Alternative remedies available and availed - Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. filed before High Court - pending adjudication - Contempt proceedings initiated by petitioner for willful disobedience of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme court - pending - Present writ petition, filed challenging rejection of transfer application u/s 448 BNSS - Petitioner alleged demand of Rs. 1 crore bribe by trial court's presiding officer - Court below noted - (i) complaint lacked substance, no action warranted, (ii) repeated applications, aimed at stalling proceedings, (iii) conduct of petitioner and counsel found intended to mount pressure on the court so that they can prolong the trial for they used loud noises in the court room - Court upheld, the integrity of trial process, affirmed validity of impugned orders with a finding that learned session court has not committed any illegality in passing impugned order - Transfer application held to be filed on false and imaginary allegations - accordingly. (Para - 10, 11, 20, 21, 22) Writ petition is dismissed. (E-11) Writ Petition - Dismissed.
Title: Brahma Prakash Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Subhash Vidyarthi
English hearing
BAIL/750 /2025 Judgment/Order Date: 26-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1394
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 376 & 323 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act , 2012 - Section 3/4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161 & 182 - FIR was instituted by informant/victim that she was 15 years old, gone to ease herself out , whereby she was caught hold off by applicant along with one another unknown person, beaten up and raped by him, they ran away from place of occurrence - Considering overall facts and circumstances, including delay in lodging FIR, presence of two contradictory forensic reports, unexplained delay in sending DNA sample for analysis despite recovery of clothes over two years ago, and lack of medical evidence supporting prosecution's version, along with fact that closure report was earlier submitted by Investigating Officer, without expressing any opinion on merits, applicant made out case for bail - Accordingly, bail application allowed. (Para 5, 39) Application allowed. (E-13)
Title: Vijay Kumar @ Krishna Vs. State of U.P & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Krishan Pahal
English hearing
WRIA/18956 /2022 Judgment/Order Date: 19-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1371
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - UP Police Regulations - Reg. 396 - Village Police/Gram Prahari - Minimum wages as per the Police personnel claimed - Entitlement - Held, a Village Policeman is free to undertake any kind of business, trade or occupation and earn his livelihood out of it; and, still, he can very well discharge his duties as a Village Policeman. It is in this context that the honourarium, being paid to the Village Policeman or Gram Prahari, is to be judged on the test of reasonableness. We do not think that the Gram Prahari or Village Policemen are in any way subjected to any kind of bondage or forced labour, taking advantage of their position, emanating from the lack of employment opportunities - The petitioners are not entitled to a mandamus, ordering the St. Government to revise and enhance their honourarium or pay, by whatever name called, to bring it at par with the minimum pay scale earned by a Policeman. (Para 53 and 57) B. Constitution of India,1950 - Article 14 - Reasonable classification - Remuneration of Rs. 2500/- per month was being paid to Village Police - Constitutional validity on the touchstone of reasonableness was challenged - Held, this is not a whole time employment done by the incumbent as his source of livelihood - The remuneration of Rs. 2500/- per month in the present day may be far on the lower side, does not make it arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 53) Writ petition disposed of. (E-1)
Title: Lavkush Tiwari & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: J.J. Munir
English hearing
WRIA/11837/2020 Judgment/Order Date: 20-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1351
HEADNOTE hearing
Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Judicial Review of Answer Key provided by the Expert Committee - Whether court should interfere with the evaluation process of the Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination (ATRE) 2018, specifically regarding objections to the answer key, unevaluated answers, cuttings/overwriting, omission of units, and discrepancies in awarding marks? Held: Law is well settled that the onus is on the candidate to not only demonstrate that the key answer is incorrect but also that it is a glaring mistake which is totally apparent and no inferential process or reasoning is required to show that the key answer is wrong. Constitutional courts must exercise great restraint in such matters and should be reluctant to entertain a plea challenging the correctness of the key answers. The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidate-it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics. The court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption, and in the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate. (Para 12) Dismissed. (E-5)
Title: Prashant Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
English hearing
WRIA/2717 /2004 Judgment/Order Date: 14-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1324
HEADNOTE hearing
A. Service Law - UP Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rules 3 & 7 - Disciplinary proceeding - Punishment - Censure - Principle of natural justice - Application - Allegation of submitting incorrect report was made - However, the respondent initiated proceeding after 17 years - No assertion in the Inquiry Report as to any date was fixed by Inquiry Officer, when the petitioner was called for personal hearing - Inquiry Officer has failed to examine any witness to prove photocopy of the documents - Effect - Held, strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of Rules, 1999 is mandatory for imposing major penalty. The procedure as prescribed under Rule 7 is nothing but incorporation of principles of natural justice - Held further, the inquiry proceedings are vitiated for non- observance of procedure as prescribed under Rule 7 of Rules, 1999 as well as being in violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 20 and 57) B. Service Law - UP Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rules 9 - Disciplinary proceeding - Punishment - Censure - Principle of natural justice - Non consideration of the representation - Effect - How can non- application of mind be reflected - Held, giving of reason for a decision is one of the fundamentals of good administration. It constitutes a safeguard against arbitrariness on the part of the decision- maker - Application of mind is only reflected by the reasons given in the judgment. An order supported by reasons ensures that the adjudicatory authority/court genuinely addressed itself to the arguments and evidence advanced at the time of the hearing - Non- consideration of representation of the petitioner against the findings of the Inquiry Officer is in violation of sub-Rule 4 of Rule 9 of Rules, 1999 as well as also in violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 37, 39 and 57) Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
Title: Jawahar Lal Gupta Vs. State of U.P.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Manish Kumar Nigam
English hearing
A482/16456 /2024 Judgment/Order Date: 07-05-2025 (2025) 5 ILRA 1309
HEADNOTE hearing
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 173, 190, 190(1)(1), 190(1)(b), 190(1)(b), 191(1)(c), 200, 203, 204, 207, 209, 260 & 482 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 - Indian Penal Code,1860 - Section 120-B, 147, 323, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 447, 504 & 506 - Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984- Sections 3 & 4- Applications u/s 482 Cr.P.C. - challenge to impugned summoning orders - Court while adjudicating the batch of petitions, expressed grave concern over the - (i) the mechanical issuance of summoning orders by trial courts, often using printed proforma formats without applying judicial mind or assigning reasons - such practice not only undermines judicial discipline but also burdens the system with avoidable litigation and depriving accused persons of clarity regarding allegations prior to the procedural stage under Section 207 Cr.P.C. - (ii) furthermore, although the statutory remedy of discharge under the Cr.P.C. remains available before the trial court, litigants increasingly bypass this route, approaching the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of cognizance orders and seeking "no coercive action" - such approach, held to be legally untenable and procedurally premature - Court reiterates that "taking cognizance" does not necessitate a formal or reasoned order, but requires the Magistrate to apply judicial mind to the alleged commission of offence with intent to proceed under law - (iii) court also finds that, systemic lapses attributed to insufficient judicial training, legacy practices, excessive dependence on clerical staff, and a backlog-centric culture that compromises judicial scrutiny - Held that, issuance of summoning orders through pre-typed formats and rubber-stamped templates is impermissible and must be discontinued forthwith - directions issued for institutional reforms including sustained judicial training, enhanced supervisory oversight, and legal sensitization of court staff - Judicial Training and Research Institute and relevant authorities directed to circulate the judgment for compliance and future reference - finding no material irregularity in the impugned summoning orders, all applications dismissed - however, liberty granted to the applicants to reapply post compliance with Section 207 Cr.P.C. (Para - 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41) Applications Dismissed. (E-11)
Title: Niraj @ Banti Shahi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Coram (Hon'ble Mr./Ms./Mrs./Dr.) Justice: Vinod Diwakar
English hearing